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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
PRIMIAQUORUM,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOMINIC8U, ET AL.,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-596
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL
The “law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of sep-
aration of powers.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820 (1997) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Separation of powers “was not simply an abstract gen-
eralization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that
they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S.
919, 946 (1983) (internal quotations marks omitted).
Therefore, we start with the text of the Constitution. The text of the Con-
stitution confines the judicial power to the resolution of “Cases” and “Contro-
versies.” For there to be a case or controversy per the Constitution, the plain-
tiff must have a ‘“personal stake’” in the case—in other words, standing.
Raines, 521 U. S., at 819. To demonstrate their personal question: ‘“What’s it
to you?”’ Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Sep-
aration of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983).
To answer that question in a way sufficient to establish standing, a plaintiff
must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defend-
ant; (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992). If “the plaintiff does not
claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant does not claim to have
suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the court can remedy, there
is no case or controversy for the courts to resolve.” Casillas v. Madison Avenue
Assocs., Inc., 926 U. S. F. 3d 329, 333 (CA7 2019) (Barrett, J.).
Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury
caused by the defendant and redressable by the court ensures that courts de-
cide only “the rights of individuals,” Marbury v. Madison, (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803), and that the courts exercise “their proper function in a limited and
separated government,” Roberts, Article III Limits on Statutory Understand-
ing, 42 Duke L. J. 1219, 1224 (1993). Courts do not adjudicate hypothetical
or abstract disputes. Courts do not possess a roving commission to publicly
opine on every legal question. Courts do not exercise general legal oversight
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of the Legislative and Executive Branches, or of private entities. However,
we may sometimes do this through the power of Anytime Review. As Madison
explained in Philadelphia, courts instead decide only matters “of a Judiciary
Nature.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430 (M. Farrand ed.
1966).
In sum, under the Constitution, a court may resolve only “a real controversy
with real impact on real persons.” American Legion v. American Humanist
Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op.,
at 10).
The question in this case, however, focuses on the requirement that the
plaintiff’s injury in fact to be “concrete”—that is, “real, and not abstract.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340 (2016) (internal quotations marks
omitted); see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014);
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 493 (2009); Lujan, 504 U. S.,
at 560; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 220-
221 (1974).
What makes a harm concrete for purposes of the Constitution? As a general
matter, the Court has explained that “history and tradition offer a meaningful
guide to the types of cases that the standing doctrine empowers courts to con-
sider.” Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U. S. 269, 274
(2008); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102
(1998). And with respect to the concrete-harm requirement in particular, the
Court’s opinion in Spokeo v. Robins indicated that courts should assess
whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a “close relationship” to harm
“traditionally” recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American
courts. 578 U. S., at 341. That inquiry asks whether plaintiffs have identified
a close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury. Spokeo
does not require an exact duplicate in American history and tradition. But
Spokeo is not an open-minded invitation for courts to loosen standing based
on contemporary, evolving beliefs about what kinds of suits should be heard
in courts.
As Spokeo explained, certain harms readily qualify as concrete injury under
the Constitution. The most obvious are traditional tangible harms such as
physical harms and monetary harms. If a defendant has caused physical or
monetary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury in
fact under the Constitution.
Various intangible harms can also be concrete. Chief among them are inju-
ries with a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a
basis for lawsuits in American courts. Id., at 340-341. Those include, for ex-
ample, reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion
upon seclusion. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 473 (1987) (reputa-
tional harms); Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 733 (2008)
(disclosure of private information; see also Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc.,
950 F. 3d 458, 462 (CA7 2020) (Barrett, J.) (intrusion upon seclusion). And
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those traditional harms may also include harms specified by the Constitution
itself. See, e.g., Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 340 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum, 555 U. S. 460 (2009) (abridgment of free speech), and Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993) (infringement of free exer-
cise)).
In determining whether a harm is sufficiently concrete to qualify as an in-
jury in fact, the Court in Spokeo said that the legislative’s views may be “in-
structive.” 578 U. S., at 341. Courts must afford due respect to legislative’s
decision to impose a statutory prohibition or obligation on a defendant, and to
grant a plaintiff a cause of action to sue over the defendant’s violation of that
statutory prohibition or obligation. See id., at 340-341. In that way, the leg-
islative may “elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id., at 341 (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562-563, 578;
cf., e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 757, n. 22 (1984) (discriminatory treat-
ment). But even though “the legislative may ‘elevate’ harms that ‘exist’ in the
real world before the legislative recognized them to actionable legal status, it
may not simply enact an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to
transform something that is not remotely harmful into something that is.”
Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F. 3d 616, 622 (CA6 2018) (Sutton, J.) (citing
Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341).
Importantly, this Court has rejected the proposition that “a plaintiff auto-
matically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a
person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vin-
dicate that right.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341. As the Court emphasized in
Spokeo, “standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.” Ibid.
The legislative’s creation of a statutory prohibition or obligation and a cause
of action does not relieve courts of their responsibility to independently decide
whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm under the standing doctrine
any more than, for example, the legislative’s enactment of a law regulation
speech relieves courts of their responsibility to independently decide whether
the law violates the First Amendment. Cf. United States v. Eichman, 496
U. S. 310, 317-318 (1990). As Judge Katsas has rightly stated, “we cannot
treat an injury as ‘concrete’ for standing purposes based only on the legisla-
tive’s say-so.” Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F. 3d 990, 999, n. 2
(CA11 2020) (sitting by designation); see Marbury, (1 Cranch), at 178; see also
Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, 426 U. S. 26, 41, n. 22 (1975); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346,
361-362 (1911).
For standing purposes, therefore, an important difference between (i) a
plaintiff’s statutory cause of action to sue a defendant over the defendant’s
violation of law, and (ii) a plaintiff’s suffering concrete harm because of the
defendant’s violation of law. The legislative may even enact legal prohibitions
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and obligations. And the legislative may create causes of action for plaintiffs
to sue defendants who violate those legal prohibitions or obligations. But un-
der the standing doctrine, an injury in law is not an injury in fact. Only those
plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant over that violation
in court. As then-Judge Barret succinctly summarized, “The Constitution
grants courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause plaintiffs, not
a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.”
Casillas, 926 F. 3d, at 332.
To appreciate how the standing doctrine and “concrete harm” principle op-
erates in practice, consider two different hypothetical plaintiffs. An injured
plaintiff who sues in those circumstances is, by definition, not seeking to rem-
edy any harm to herself but instead is merely seeking to ensure a defendant’s
“compliance with regulatory law” (and, of course, to obtain some money via
the statutory damages). Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 345 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 106-107. Those
are not grounds for standing. A regime where the legislative could freely au-
thorize unharmed plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate law not only would
violate the standing doctrine but also would infringe on the Executive
Branch’s authority. We accept the “displacement of the democratically elected
branches when necessary to decide an actual case.” Roberts, 42 Duke L. J., at
1230. But otherwise, the choice of how to prioritize and how aggressively to
pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law falls within the
discretion of the Executive Branch, not within the purview of purview of pri-
vate plaintiffs (and their attorneys). Private plaintiffs are not accountable to
the people and are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing
a defendant’s general compliance with regulatory law. See Lujan, 504 U. S.,
at 577.
In sum, the concrete-harm requirement is essential to the Constitution’s
separation of powers. To be sure, the concrete-harm requirement can be dif-
ficult to apply in some cases. Some advocate that the concrete-harm require-
ment be ditched altogether, on the theory that it would be more efficient or
convenient to simply say that a statutory standing. But as the Court has often
stated, “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it
if it is contrary to the Constitution.” Chadha, 462 U. S., at 944. So it is here.
DATED: SEPTEMBER 3, 2022
/s/ Tony_Giordano, Esq.
Tony Giordano
Ridgeway Bar No. 18102
Solicitor General
Department of Justice, Ridgeway
tony.#1386
Attorney for the Defendant
