ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSC-AH-548
IN RE MAALVIN
Respondent
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT CAN NOT MAKE DETERMINATIONS AS TO THE
REASONABILITY OF PUNISHMENT.
The Administrative Court has a narrowly tailored statutory functionality. It may under no
circumstance exceed that statutory functionality. If this court were to make a decision as to whether a
given rule or regulation is reasonable or unreasonable, then we would usurp a department’s ability to
decide how it wishes to discipline members. The only thing this court can do is make a finding that a
certain act was arbitrary or capricious. The only time this court may step in is if the policy meets any
description of “arbitrary” defined as arbitrary by law. The only applicable prong of this definition as to
the arguments of the respondent is the prohibition of vague or ambiguous policy. There is no unclarity in
a policy that explicitly states that you can be terminated for any violation. Instead, that policy creates a
directive that the department and its administrators intend to be strict with their punishments, and will
regularly exercise that clause.
The only way that this court would further sustain any dismissal for arbitrariness is if the
respondent provided evidence of unequal application of either the punitive clause of the policy or the
general clause which prohibits certain conduct. If a department were to unequally apply these policies
then it would make them arbitrary and therefore such actions are not only not antithetical to the law, but
explicitly prohibited by law.
Departments are able to define how their discipline is categorized and enforced; that ability
cannot be encumbered by any administrative court.
2. THE RESPONDENT HAS A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO AN UNBIASED TRIBUNAL.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. It is a common principle that no one shall be
“deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. XIV. It is these very
words that pledge that all levels of government must operate within the bounds of the law and provide
fair procedure. The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an “impartial and disinterested tribunal.”
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-62, 266-7 (1978); see also Marshall v. Jericco, Inc., 446 U.S. 238
(1980). This requirement of neutrality helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken
on the basis of an “erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or law.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 344 (1976). Contemperaneously, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness,
“generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,” Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951), by ensuring that no person will be
“deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance
that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.” Carey, supra.
Concededly, it is axiomatic that a “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). To have an impaneled officer who possesses an
inherent bias take part in the adjudication of this matter would severely impede on the respondent’s right
to this fair trial and tribunal. Not only is a biased decision maker constitutionally unacceptable, “our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the possibility of unfairness.” Id. It has been ruled
by various other binding authorities that due process is denied by circumstances that create the
likelihood or appearance of bias. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
It cannot possibly be understated that “[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind… is a principle basic to our society.” Joint Anti-Fascist Committee, supra.
Beside this right to be heard, is the right to be heard by a fair, impartial and disinterested tribunal. When
a grievous loss is sought after, even to reputation, due process rights are conferred. See Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) The Supreme Court has ruled that a badge of infamy “attaches
to a public employee found disloyal.” Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); see also Peters
v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake…
notice and an opportunity to be heard [by a fair tribunal] is essential. See Constantineau, supra.; see also
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Not only is the respondent a long-serving and respected officer, he
is a State Senator. His good name, reputation, honor, and integrity are at risk of being severed as result
of these proceedings. A badge of infamy has essentially been placed upon the respondent as allegations
of disloyalty have been lodged against them. The principle of procedural due process should not be
ignored under any circumstance.
As the areas governed by administrative determinations increase, so should the efforts of the
courts to extend the concept of due process – equal, even-handed, impartial justice under law, or
otherwise "fundamental fairness" to administrative proceedings. It is this concept that courts must apply
to administrative proceedings – and further shield individuals from unfairness, arbitrariness, favoritism
and discriminatory enforcement. Administrative officials and agencies must be above suspicion of sorts.
The court should, if anything, “be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators…”
Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). The court will not
entertain the possibility of bias among arbitrators in this matter.
CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 2nd day of August, 2022.
/s/ siteowner
RIDING JUSTICE
