STATE OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-560
Prosecution
v.
kaikjs
Accused
MOTION TO DISMISS
Comes forth the Accused, kaikjs, requesting the case be dismissed against him on the basis of a double
jeopardy violation.
ARGUMENT
The protections enshrined by the Constitution cannot be reduced to mere wishful thinking by the
Founders. The protections enshrined by the Constitution serve quantifiable purposes. Such is the fifth
amendment. The amendment commands that “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.” It encompasses the notion that a State should not be able to make continued
attempts to “convict an individual for an alleged offense” which would subject them to “embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.” See Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 186 (1957). It further protects from “enhancing the possibility that, even though
innocent, he may be found guilty.” See Id. These are the basic protections of double jeopardy, the same
protections that “make it rare indeed the occasions when the citizen can for the same offense be required to run
the gantlet twice.” Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 373 (1961); see also United States v. Hollywood Motor
Car Co., Inc., 458 U.S. 263, 266 (1982) (“One right guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause was the right
not to be tried twice for the same offense.”); Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012) (“The Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense.”).
The notion that the declaration of a mistrial can lead to re-prosecution is well founded, however, this can
only be accomplished where there is a “manifest necessity.” A “manifest necessity requires a true “necessity for
the act or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat)
579, 580 (1822). This is a “high bar” that cannot be reached unless there is a “high degree” of necessity. See
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). This standard has been declined to be given any “mechanical
application” of any “rigid formula.” See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 690–691 (1949). It merely requires that
the judge take all circumstances into consideration and conclude that there is no other option that would “serve
the ends of public justice.” See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976).
The hasty consideration of the judge that a mistrial undermines the possibility that any other curative
option would serve the Defendant. Further, the presiding Judge is innocent until proven guilty, there was
nothing to suggest bias that would have resulted from the lack of a mistrial. The burden of proving a “manifest
necessity” largely relies on the State. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 684 (1982); see also Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
Now the State will posit that the seeming consent of the Defendant forecloses the arguments, however,
this is incorrect. The near 5 minute lapse in the suggestion of a mistrial to a declaration of one patently
undermines this claim. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 776, 792 n. 17 (2010) (“, we have never suggested that
defendants must object to such orders to preserve a claim, much less object to an order…without any advance
notice.”); See also Jorn, 400 U.S. 487 (“[I]ndeed, the trial judge acted so abruptly… that, had the . . . defendant
[been disposed] to object…there would have been no opportunity to do so.”).
CONCLUSION
This court cannot ignore the blatant double jeopardy violations that have occurred. The founders, in
creating the Fifth Amendment, were cognizant of the abuses that would arise if this was not put in place. Thus,
the court ought to dismiss this case.
Respectfully Submitted,
Accused kaikjs
By their Attorneys,
/s/ HolyRomanRyan
HolyRomanRyan, RSB#17105
