IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Studs Per Second
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-523
Plaintiff
against,
BPD_edgar
Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS
The defense in this case comes bearing a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
ARGUMENT
The Ridgeway State Constitution provides that this Court is entitled to hear “all civil and criminal cases
or controversies.” See Article I Section IV. This “case or controversies” clause mimics that of the Federal Court
System’s jurisdiction to hear cases. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret this clause through Federal jurisprudence.
Before a court can hear a matter, it must determine if there exists an actual case or controversy. See, e.g.,
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 349 (1911). The case or controversy doctrine requires that any case be
justiciable. A case cannot be ruled as justiciable if there is “no standing to maintain it.” See Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Standing is a concept that has been molded into a three-pronged test. The first prong of this
test is “injury in fact.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Injury in-fact must be a) “concrete or particularized”, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 756 (1984),
and b) “actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or hypothetical.” See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 495
U.S. 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyon, 461 U. S. 95,102 (1983)). The second prong of standing requires
that the injury is “fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant.” See Lujan, supra. Thirdly, the
Plaintiff must show that the injury is likely to be “redressed by the requested relief.” See Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Absent this
standing the “the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”
DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006). This has led courts to the conclusion that standing is
a jurisdictional concept. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (noting that standing is jurisdictional in
nature).
On the 10th of July, 2022, the Plaintiff brought forth four separate counts. The first count is that of
Breach of Contract. The Plaintiff alleges that When Defendant distributed to Iamthebestlaith, OHitsMILK, and
SilverMaddog, the contract with Plaintiff was breached.” See Civ. Complaint at 2. For this count, the Plaintiff
seeks 3000 in punitive damages. This will not redress any injury alleged. One of the major objectives of
punitive damages is to “future misconduct.” See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268
(1981). The role of punitive damages, thus “runs counter to the normal reparative function of tort and contract
remedies.” See K. Redden, Punitive Damages §2.1, p. 24 (1980); see BFI, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 297 (1989) (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, with regard to count one, the
Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue such action.
Count two does not hold water either. The main allegation of Count 2 is that the “Defendant’s conduct
contrary to the Employee Handbook damaged Plaintiff’s relationship with their clients by impeding the
efficiency of deliveries and also by removing necessary resources from the workplace utilized by the company
to maintain company-client relationships, while urther causing harm to those that were dealt and accepted
clipboards.” See Civ. Complaint at 2. Where this claim leaves the realm of possibility, is at the second
paragraph. The clipboards that Studs Per Second has access to, are infinitely available to employees. They are
replenishable by the press of a button, much like Police Grade Equipment. Thus, there is no hindrance to the
Plaintiff’s efficiency, nor business relations. Due to this there is no injury in fact.
With regard to the third count, there is, again, no injury in fact. The Plaintiff brings the claim of “civil
conspiracy.” But, for the same reasons as count two, there is no actual injury in fact. The only cognizable injury
would be if the clipboards were actually limited in any manner. However, if this court were to find injury, the
Plaintiff still does not pass the third prong of the standing test, as there is no possible way that 3,000 in
compensatory damages could compensate for any injury. The punitive relief requested contains the same issue.
The Plaintiff, on count four, also fails prong three of the standing test. The Plaintiff attempts to justify
such relief by stating that “The total amount of damages is assessed to cover the cost of the market value of the
clipboard and the lost revenue produced by the clipboard.” See Civ. Complaint at 4. This, however, does not
hold water. No lost revenue can be particularized by anyone due to the nature of the tool dispensed; further,
there is no “market value” for the clipboard as it is fully replenishable and cannot be sold or bought for any
standardized metric of currency.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff does not have standing, rather the company has conjectural injuries and bogus relief. Standi
Thus, the court ought to dismiss this case.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ HolyRomanRyan
HolyRomanRyan,
Attorney At Law
R.W. Bar # 17105
Ryan!#8903
/s/ ArthurSprings
ArthurSprings,
Attorney At Law
R.W. Bar # 18103
ArthurSprings#3600
/s/ gbuttisnotmyname
gbuttisnotmyname
Attorney At Law
R.W. Bar # 17152
gbutt#0629
