RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
KAIJKS,
Petitioner,
v.
V_15K,
Respondent.
Case No. RSC-CV-513
Consolidated with
Case No. RSC-CV-486
PROGAMINGVIRUS,
Petitioner,
v.
MATRIX_OC,
Respondent.
STATE DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION
STATE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR THE CONSOLIDATED CASES
The State of Ridgeway hereby files this brief in opposition in the above named matter
consistent with 1 R. Stat. § 135.
INTRODUCTION
Before the court is a challenge to the facial constitutionality of two criminal statutes.
Petitioners’ claims cannot prevail in this court because the petitioners lack standing, and the laws
are not unconstitutionally vague.
Petitioners’ arguments rest on a misleadingly sensational reading of individual words
within an entire statute to create ambiguity that has so far, for the years these statutes have been
in place, not surfaced. Petitioners’ overt misrepresentation of the word of the law is the Achilles’
heel of their argument. More than mystical, their submissions are a Greek tragedy. The petition
should be denied.
ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONERS CANNOT BRING A FACIAL CHALLENGE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAWS AT ISSUE.
A. Habeas Corpus Proceedings Are Inappropriate Forums To Challenge The
Facial Constitutionality Of Laws.
In both cases, the Petitioners lodge a claim against the facial Constitutionality of two
criminal statutes. But habeas corpus proceedings are inappropriate forums to lodge these types of
claims.
Most notably, the Senate spoke clearly when it limited the relief available to habeas
petitioners to “only…immediate release from prison or detainment…[and]...expungement of
record.” 1 R. Stat. § 136. A finding that a statute is unconstitutional is unsupported by the
explicit language of the legislature with regard to the relief allowed in habeas cases. But if the
court found that either of the laws were facially unconstitutional, it is duty bound to enjoin their
enforcement. That type of equitable authority falls outside the narrow remedial allowances given
to this court in these types of cases.
B. Petitioners Lack Standing To Challenge The Facial Constitutionality of
These Laws
A litigant's ability to challenge the constitutionality of a law is limited to the extent that it
“has an adverse impact on his own rights.” County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 US 140
(1979). He, consequently, “does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if
applied to third parties in hypothetical situations.” Id. Petitioners here lodge facial
constitutionality challenges to two criminal statutes on the basis that the statutes, on their face,
are impermissibly vague. They are asking this court to say that each and every application of the
law, both to their case and beyond it, is unconstitutional. In making such a claim, they have an
exceedingly heavy burden—one that they cannot surmount.
At a minimum, in order to challenge the vagueness of a law, the Petitioners must allege
that they did not know they were violating the law. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489 (1982). Petitioners
can only fairly challenge the vagueness of the law if they themselves did not know that their
conduct was offending the law. If they knew their conduct was unlawful and the law inherently
was not vague in its application to them, they lack a standing to bring a facial challenge to the
law.
Of course, Petitioners here make no allegation that they were unaware of the law's
application, nor that they did not know their conduct was a transgression of the law. Because
Petitioner’s fail to allege that the application of the law to the conduct they engaged in was not
clearly proscribed in the statute, they cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as it applies to
others.
II. THE CHARGE OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A POLICE GRADE
FIREARM IS NOT IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE.
If the court finds that the Petitioner Progamingvirus has standing to challenge the facial
constitutionality of the law, the next inquiry is whether the law is impermissibly vague on its
face. The answer is no.
The law at issue reads as follows: “The act of unlawfully possessing police-grade
equipment as a citizen or while off-duty without the proper departmental permissions. Includes
police-issue firearms, ammunition, and any other equipment which law enforcement may
dispense.” 5 R.S.C §5.08.
If you parse through the definition of each individual word, you can read ambiguity into
any phrase or statute. The question is not whether the various dictionary definitions could
possibly obfuscate the applicability of the charge as Petitioner appears to suggest, the test,
instead, “requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US 352
(1983)(cleaned up.)
"[V]vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms
must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.
S. 544, 550 (1975). In this case, the suspect was in possession of police-grade ammunition.
Police grade ammunition has a higher capacity for bullets than non-police grade ammunition.
The question is whether the law clearly applied to these facts such that an “ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited.” Kolender, supra., at 357.
The Statute at issue expressly prohibits “possession police-grade equipment as a
citizen…includ[ing]...ammunition.” 5 R.S.C §5.08. Any person of average intelligence would be
able to understand that the possession of police grade ammunition is conduct prohibited by this
statute. It speaks extremely clearly. As it relates to the facts of this case, the Petitioner’s conduct
was cogently unlawful and any person who is literate would be able to make that judgment. On
this front, the challenge to the vagueness of the law must fail because "[o]ne to whose conduct a
statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 756 (1974). If the charge is not vague as it applies to the conduct at issue, the inquiry must
end because Petitioner cannot pursue a facial challenge to a law when it was constitutionally
applied against him.
III. AS TO THE KAIJKS MATTER, THE PROBABLE CAUSE ALLEGATION IS
MOOT.
Petitioner Kaijks challenges whether the arresting officer in his case had probable cause
for the arrest to move forward. This court cannot answer because a grand jury has already
indicted the individual on the same charges. See State of Ridgeway v. Kaijks, RSC-CM-531
(2022). If the court allowed the claim to move forward, and found that the Petitioner prevailed,
its holding would be at tension with the reasoned judgment of the 5 members of the grand jury.
The court's determination as to this claim is collaterally estopped because the grand jury, as a
branch of this court, has already made a finding as to this question.
Collateral estoppel is a principle that “has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from
the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 US 322
(1979). This bedrock principle prevents the claim from moving forward.
IV. AS TO THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST KAIJKS, THIS COURT CANNOT
CANNOT REACH THE MERITS.
Petitioner Kaijks is actively being prosecuted for the conduct that gives basis for their
claim in this proceeding. See State of Ridgeway v. Kaijks, RSC-CM-531 (2022). The only
allegations left for consideration in this court is whether or not the charges actively being levied
against the Petitioner are unconstitutionally vague. If this court made the decision to grant the
writ of habeas corpus on that basis, it would be using its equitable power to enjoin the
enforcement of on-going criminal proceedings. But indeed, that is inconsistent with the long
standing principles of equity.
First, consideration of federal case-law as it relates to the decision to use equitable
authority is applicable in this jurisdiction. To inform this conclusion, we turn to the statutory
parameters of habeas cases. Indeed, "[o]ur first task is to presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Ridgeway Parks Service, et al. v.
SteKing2008, 1 Rid. ___ (2022)(cleaned up). Subsection 2.5 of the Judiciary Act is what
establishes the contours of habeas cases. Subsection 2.5(b)(x) of the Judiciary Act provides that
when the court hears the case and considers all of the materials, the court “may either grant or
deny the petition.” The use of the word “may” in this context gives the court discretion as to
whether the writ should be issued. It doesn’t require it by saying the court “shall” or “must” issue
relief. It simply “may.” This grant of discretion makes way for common-law considerations. And
common-law considerations are precisely what the Senate sought for the courts to invoke when
determining whether to issue a writ. The Senate, in the All Writs Provision, made clear that
courts may only utilize equitable authority when it would be “agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” 1 R. Stat. § 124; The Judiciary Act § 2.2(a-b). As well, the phrase “habeas
corpus petition” goes undefined. And when terms within an act are undefined, then “one must
give the phrase its ordinary meaning in order to satisfy this first step." Steking, supra., at 6
(cleaned up.) The ordinary meaning of the phrase is informed by decades of common-law
principles and precedent. The textual clues that the Senate sought for habeas cases to be
consistent with the principles ingrained in our common-law is abounding.
Common-law considerations expressly forbid this court from enjoining on-going criminal
proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 US 37 (1971)(“courts of equity should not act, and
particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”)
Petitioner’s in this case can challenge the facial constitutionality of the law at issue in their
criminal case, and therefore, have other remedies at law available to obtain the relief they seek.
More practically, the reason courts largely do not enjoin on-going criminal proceedings is “in
order to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and
legal sanctions where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted” Id.
Petitioner cannot pursue a habeas petition in this court on the claims alleged, because
even if the Petitioner prevailed, the court could not grant relief.
V. THE CHARGE OF UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE GRADE
FIREARM IS NOT IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE.
If this court finds the equitable principles stated above are inapplicable, then it may reach
the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner Kaijks challenges the charge of unlawful distribution
of police grade equipment which reads as follows: “The act of unlawfully giving or selling
police-grade equipment. Includes police-issue firearms, ammunition, and any other equipment
which law enforcement may dispense.” 5 R.S.C § 5.09.
The question of vagueness again turns on the facts at hand. In this case, the Petitioner
placed his firearm into a garbage can with the intent to distribute it to another individual who
would pick it up from that same garbage can later on. The petitioner gave police-grade
equipment to another person. Once again, anyone who is literate can see that that conduct
undoubtedly violates the law. "One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not
successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974). Petitioner’s
facial challenge stalls because the law was constitutionally applied to the conduct alleged, and
therefore, they cannot pursue the claim.
Petitioner, in their unlawfully submitted brief, argue that this charge is unconstitutionally1
vague because of the presence of the word “unlawfully.” They attempt to make the case that this
word gives discretion of the officer to make determination as to whether or not something is
lawful or unlawful. This is a misrepresentation of what the law says. The correct way to read the
statute is this: someone is guilty of unlawful distribution of PGE when they unlawfully give or
sell PGE. The word “unlawfully” is meant to characterize the act of selling and giving PGE. It is
not a condition on the words that follow, it's a characterization of them.
1 The Judiciary Act § 2.5(b)(viii) reads: “No additional briefs may be filed without leave of the court.” Petitioner did
not get leave of the court to submit this brief.
Petitioner argues that the presence of this word makes the statute ambiguous to an
unconstitutional degree because it allows for the law to be expounded by "moment-to-moment
judgment of the policeman on his beat; for police command to become equivalent to a criminal
statute comes dangerously near making our government one of men, rather than of laws;
furnishes a convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcemen by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.” See Petitioner’s Brief In
Support, at 4 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Petitioner fails to prove or allege that this is
how the word was used in this case.
Petitioner’s entire argument rests upon the prayer that this court will obnoxiously read
ambiguity into a word when it is not due, and then engage in rank speculation about how this
ambiguity could play out on the ground in the day-to-day operations of law enforcement.
Petitioner does not see the distinction between a criminal statute that has a single word in it with
an potentially ambiguous definition, and a statute that affords law enforcement with a blank
check to do as they will. For the years that this statute has been enacted, it has never been the
case that law enforcement has been able to apply the law so freely. Petitioner’s claim fails both
because the conduct Petitioner engaged in was clearly in violation of the law, and because the
purported ambiguity is common-place in criminal statutes, and does not actually transgress the
constitutional protections claimed.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s arguments rely on the prospect that this court is gullible. For the reasons
stated above, this court should not fall victim to their sleight of hand. Relief should be denied.
Date: July 17th, 2022. Respectfully submitted.
CLIFFORD
Deputy Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
