IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT
RSC-CV-513
Petitioner
against,
V_15k
Respondent
On the 22nd of June, Respondent arrested the Petitioner for the charge of “Unlawful
Distribution of Police-Grade Equipment.” This charge makes it illicit for any person to commit
“the act of unlawfully giving or selling police-grade equipment.” See Rid. Crim. Code 5.09. This
arrest was not justified.
1. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
From the start of this country “criminal law enforcement has been primarily a
responsibility of the States.” See Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U. S. __, __ (2020) (slip op. at 19); see
also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982)(“[t]he States possesses primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law,”). This is a benefit of a State’s “residuary and inviolable
sovereignty.” The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); see also Gamble
v. United States, 587 U. S. __, __-__ (2019) (slip op, at 9-10). It has also been recognized that the
“administration of a discrete criminal justice system is among the basic sovereign prerogatives
States retain.” See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977).
However, this sovereignty does not proffer infallibility of a State criminal justice system.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus is a “great constitutional privilege.” See Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75, (8 U.S. 95) (1807). It is designed to be a “precious safeguard of
personal liberty” as there is no “higher duty to maintain it.” See Bower v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19,
306 U.S. 26 (1939); see also Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (85 U.S. 178) (1873). Its use,
empirically, is “intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.” See Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963). For the goal of the great writ is to provide a remedy for
“intolerable restraints.” Fay, at 401-402. Habeas Writs have always been deemed “extraordinary
relief” designed to protect against “extreme malfunctions in the State criminal justice systems.”
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 102 (1977). This is because, “in broad strokes the public
legitimacy of our justice system relies on procedures that are ‘neutral, accurate, consistent,
trustworthy, and fair’.” See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. __, __ (2018) (slip op. at
10). When extreme malfunctions occur “the individual is entitled to his immediate release.” See
Fay, supra at 402. This is rooted in the notion that “restraints contrary to fundamental
law…could be redressed by a writ of habeas corpus.” See Fay, at 408.
The key to prevailing on a Habeas petition, and showing the restraints are contrary to law,
is to show that the police were not “legally entitled to make an arrest.” See In Re Zachcasisbeast,
RSC-CV-367. Entitlement comes from “a judicial warrant or probable cause.” Id.
2. THE ARREST OF THE PETITIONER WAS UNLAWFUL
It cannot be understated that the rights enshrined within the constitution are more than a
“hollow promise.” See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967). The fourth
amendment protection “applies to governmental action.” See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921). It does this through guaranteeing the right of persons to be “secure in their
persons… [and protected from] unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend IV.
This protection is also echoed to all individuals by the Constitution of the State of Ridgeway
which provides “that the people have the right to hold themselves…free from search or seizure.”
See Art. 1 Sec. VIII. Next it becomes important to define what defines a seizure under the fourth
amendment. One need not go far to define a seizure under the fourth amendment. The Supreme
Court has stated that “[w]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.” See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975). To determine “reasonableness” the court must take an on-balance approach between
the “public interest” and the “right of an individual to be free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.” Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) and Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 534-535, 536-537 (1967). Although it is true that there is a legitimate interest in “the
administration of criminal justice,” see United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), there is
no interest in unfair enforcement. There is quite the opposite, as there is a “paramount public
interest that the process of criminal justice be fair. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 411
U.S. 254 (1973). An arrest without probable cause is not fair.
a. THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUGGEST THE PETITIONER
COMMITTED THE AFFLICTED CHARGE
Probable cause has been held to deal with “probabilities and the totality of the circumstances.”
See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U. S. 366, 371 (2003). Thus, it cannot be seen as a rigid concept;
instead, it is “a fluid concept” that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.” See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 232 (1983); see also District Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. __, __ (slip op. at 7). Probable cause merely requires “requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id., at 243-244 n.
13 (1983). Thus it must be proven that it was more than likely that the detainee committed a
crime.
To determine whether there was probable cause of the charge inflicted, it is necessary to
determine the elements of the crime. This is carried out through statutory analysis. Statutory
analysis starts with “careful consideration of the text.” See Brnovich v. Democratic National
Convention, 594 U.S. __ (2021). Thus. it is required that it be presumed that “a legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” See In Re SteKing, 1 Rid __
(2022)(internal quotations omitted). The charge of “Unlawful Distribution of Police-Grade
Equipment” is defined as “the act of unlawfully giving or selling police grade equipment.” See
Rid. Crim. Code 5.09. In this statute it appears that two elements encompass this crime: 1)
defendant gave or sold police grade equipment and 2) the Defendant did this unlawfully. Within
the first element, there exists two ways to pass it. The Defendant can either “give” or “sell”
police-grade equipment; absent other indicators, it is required that the ordinary meaning be given
to each word. See, e.g Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012); see also
In Re Steking, supra. The definition of “sell” is “To exchange or deliver for money or its
equivalent.” American Heritage Dictionary (11th Ed.). The definition of “give” encompasses
multiple entries, however the most likely is “To accord or tender to another.” American Heritage
Dictionary (11th Ed.). No matter how you seek to define either of these terms, they both require
the presence of another person. The description of the arrest carried out of the Respondent
provides “suspect unlawfully distributed police-grade equipment through dumpsters.” See
Petitioner Exhibit A. This description includes no inclusion of a recipient of the equipment, thus
there was no probable cause to support the arrest of the Petitioner.
b. EVEN WITH PROBABLE CAUSE THE CHARGE IS STILL
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
However, even if there was probable cause to be found the charge levied against the
Petitioner is still unconstitutional. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
See Amend. XIV. This due process guarantee embraces that the goal of our constitution is “to
maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty.” See Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 461 U.S. 357 (1983) . Statutes that attempt to infringe on these rights must be
definitiness or a certainty of express. See M. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law 53 (1978).
The certainty requirement forbids statutes that make an act unlawful to be so unclearly defined
that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 389 (1926). While the
point of vagueness is often blurred, the general principle is that whenever a court rejects a
vagueness argument – thus upholding a law – they “rested upon the conclusion that they [each
statute] employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough
known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them.” See Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925); see also Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918).
The definition of Unlawful Distribution of Police-Grade Equipment features the adverb
“unlawfully.” Unlawfully modifies the words “giving” and “selling.” Therefore, for anyone to be
guilty of Unlawful Distribution, they must unlawfully give or sell police-grade equipment.
However, 5.09 does not define how one can do something “unlawfully.” This is an issue for two
reasons: it allows for capricious enforcement and a blatant disregard for separation of powers.
To address the first concern with this Statute, each statute – to comply with due process
requirements – must define each criminal offense “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender, supra , 461 U.S. at 357. The failure of congress to
define how one can “unlawfully” act under 5.09, allows for the law to be expounded by
"moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.” See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S.
111, 120 (1969). It allows for police “command to become equivalent to a criminal statute comes
dangerously near making our government one of men, rather than of laws. See Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U. S. 559, 379 U. S. 579 (1965)(separate opinion). It “furnishes a convenient tool for harsh
and discriminatory enforcemen by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed
to merit their displeasure.” See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)(internal
quotations omitted). This power is exactly what due process’s prohibition on vague laws seeks to
prevent. The entire idea behind a free government is that “personality liberty” be held “sacred.”
See Wilkinson v. Leeland and Others, 27 U.S. 672 (1829).
However, 5.09’s issues run deeper than violations of due process. The construction of
5.09 encroaches on the sole power of the legislative branch to legislate. The “supreme legislative
power shall be exercised by a Senate.” See Rid. Const. Art. 2 Sec. II. Further, the Ridgeway
Constitution provides “The Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments, shall be separate
and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the others.” See Art. II
Sec. V. These Sections embody an idea that there should be a separation of powers between the
three departments to ensure no one department is more powerful than the other. “Unlawful
Distribution of Police-Grade Equipment” violates this very essential maxim by giving the
executive officials the ability to explicate the law, and is therefore unconstitutional. Through it's
unconstitutionality, there can be no legal entitlement for an officer to make an arrest.
CONCLUSION
Thus, we the Petitioner, through the undersigned counsel, respectfully request that the
arrest of the Petitioner be removed and the charge of “Unlawful Distribution of Police-Grade
Equipment” be deemed unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ HolyRomanRyan
HolyRomanRyan,
Attorney At Law
R.W. Bar # 17105
Willie McCoy#8903
Counsel of Record
/s/ ArthurSprings
ArthurSprings,
Attorney At Law
R.W. Bar # 18103
ArthurSprings#3600
/s/ gbuttisnotmyname
Gbuttisnotmyname
Attorney At Law
R.W. Bar # 17152
gbutt#0629
