ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-426
Plaintiff
v.
MASTERCH8SE
Defendant
RULING ON THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
BACKGROUND
The defendant argues that “an information is sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged,
informs the accused of the nature of the offense, and informs the accused to the extent of being able to make full
answer and defense.” The defense’s argument for these three tests goes largely unsubstantiated by any statutory
or common law citations.
The government responds to this argument by citing Rid. R. Crim. P. Rule 4(a), which provides a
straightforward test in determining if a criminal information is filed properly; all criminal informations "shall
contain a plain, concise description of the act which constitutes the crime or an appropriate legal term
descriptive thereof." The government contends that the information filed in this matter passes this test and thus
the motion to dismiss must be denied.
JUDGMENT
It is most clear that the very first test which must be applied to each specific charge is described in Rule
4(a). If a charge in the information does not include a ‘plain and concise’ description of the act which
constitutes the alleged crime it must be dismissed upon motion by the defendant. The intricate part of this
matter is deciding what exactly ‘plain and concise’ entails. This court holds that the following three conditions
must be met to constitute an acceptable charge in an information;
1. The charge does not entirely rely on statutory text of the alleged crime and fully describes the
acts that the defendant is alleged to have done which constituted their alleged crime,
2. The description of these acts are not entirely conclusory and;
3. If these factual allegations were sustained, they would constitute the alleged crime.
In regards to counts one through three, this court is satisfied that the state has passed all three tests. The
state has adequately described each element of second-degree murder (intentionally causing the death
(‘murdering’) of an individual). The state has grounded these assertions in evidence.
In regards to count four, this court is satisfied that the state has passed all three tests. Although the
defense’s argument is correct in that the state does allege the defendant parked in front of, behind, or beside a
bus, they also allege that the defendant ‘desynced’ the bus. The other two allegations may not necessarily be
relevant to the offense but allegation of ‘desync(ing)’ would sustain liability if it were adequately proven to be
true.
In regards to count five, this court is inclined to agree. The state has failed to describe an element to the
alleged crime and therefore fails the first test. However, this court does not believe that the insufficiency of the
government's information cannot be resolved through a request for a bill of particulars, therefore this court will
not dismiss the four charges unless the state's bill of particulars, if presented, is inadequate.
In regards to count six, this court is satisfied that the state has passed all three tests. The state has alleged
that the defendant struck another vehicle which is one of two stipulations which, if adequately proven, would
sustain guilt of the alleged crime. If the defense is interested in more information regarding this specific charge,
they may request it through a motion for a bill of particulars.
In regards to the final count, count seven, this court is satisfied that the state has passed all three tests.
The state has alleged that the defendant ‘aided’ another person in the commission of at least one crime by
driving them around. This allegation, if adequately proven, would sustain guilt of the alleged crime.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned stated reasons, this court DENIES the defendant’s motion to dismiss the matter
of THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY v. MASTERCH8SE.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 25th day of June, 2022.
/s/ Hecxtro
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
