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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
DANNLABS,
Plaintiff,
v.
STANLEY_LABSON,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-421
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT, TACUSS ENFIELD, ESQ.
ARGUMENTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defense counsel moves to summary judgment on the case on the basis that both
parties have presented all their evidence and testimony.
Section IX of the Constitution for the State of Ridgeways says, “[t]hat the people
have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments,
concerning the transactions of government, and therefore the freedom of press ought
not to be restrained.” In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), the
Court determined that public officials—including judges—could win a suit for libel
only if they could demonstrate “actual malice.” In that, the Court created two catego-
ries for what actual malice could be. It is either “knowledge that the information was
false” or that it was published “with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
The plaintiff has never provided such materials in discovery to prove this. He has
simply provided the exhibits of what is allegedly libelous material.
To reinforce this actual malice requirement, the Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welsh,
Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), the Court suggested that a plaintiff could not win a defa-
mation case when the statements in question were expressions of opinion rather than
fact. As they said, “under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false
idea.” Holding in the Gertz case, the Supreme Court held that states cannot impose
strict liability because that would run afoul of the First Amendment.
In the four exhibits that the Plaintiff submits to this court during the discovery
period, exhibits C and D are opinions, and—therefore—are no longer viable per the
Gertz holding.
As for exhibit B, this post was never publicly portrayed anywhere. Therefore, it
could not be something subject to potentially violating 1 R. Stat., section 208 and
section 210.
208 reads, “[a]ny individual who intentionally deceives another party to secure un-
fair or unlawful gain, or deprive a victim of a legal right shall be fraud and liable for
compensatory damages injunctive relief, and punitive damages up to $3,000.” This
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would be (1) party A intentionally deceiving party B to (2) to secure unfair or unlawful
(3) gain. While the plaintiff may have an argument to pass on the first prong, he fails
on the third, causing his failure on the second. Plaintiff provides no proof that the
defendant successfully gained anything at all—financially, socially, or any other pos-
sible adverb, regardless of whether the gain was unfair or unlawful. There is no proof
of any gain; therefore, passing the unfairness or unlawfulness test is not relevant in
this case.
This understanding of the text is also the basis for the failure of the effectiveness of
exhibit A. While it proclaims to be a fact, satisfying the Gertz holding, plaintiff fails
to provide any proof as to how the defendant gains anything at all from this that. To
which, he fails to show how any supposed gain would be, subsequently, unlawful or
unfair.
As for the claim of 1 R. Stat, section 210, there is no provided proof as to how the
plaintiff’s career received any damage or how his financial received any punches as a
result of these images being posted.
The plaintiff, being a judge, should be mindful of a few things. In a civil suit, the
burden of proof falls onto the plaintiff. “The intermediate standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence lies between a preponderance of evidence and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005). The instruction
is most naturally read to require proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence. See
Lederman v. Frontier Fire Prot., Inc., 685 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2012). Such allegations
must be proved beyond a “preponderance of the evidence” by “clear and convincing
evidence.” 415 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1969). Clear and convincing evidence is somewhere
between a preponderance of the evidence and “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 455 F.
App’x 212 (3rd Cir. 2011). The clear and convincing standard of proof lies between
beyond a reasonable doubt and a preponderance of the evidence. See Matter of Rose,
934 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1991). If five circuit courts have come to the same decision
that the basic principle of civil law litigation lays on being successful for winning on
a preponderance of evidence, I see no reason why this court should come to any con-
trasting decision.
It is the role of the plaintiff to prove each element by a preponderance of evidence.
See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984); Chapa v. United
States, 497 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2007); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1982); Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.
1985); United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971). Raising our total of five
circuit courts to now nine circuit courts, I push for this court to rule in the defendant’s
favor based on the case law that requires the plaintiff to submit further evidence to
prove his point, which he has not done, and now that the discovery period has closed.
Canonically, “[t]he Ridgeway Code of Judicial Conduct shall apply to the conduct of
all active service magistrates, judges, and justices of the Superior Court of the State
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Ridgeway…,” see provision 2, preamble (application of code) of the Ridgeway Code of
Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, the first canon requires and calls for “[a]n independ-
ent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge must
participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and
shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary will be preserved.” To which, 3A(1) of the same requires “[a] judge should
be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in the law and should not
swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.” This a rudimentary
requirement of any judge, and this court should reinforce its own ethical canons and
requirements.
DATED: JUNE 18, 2022
/s/ Tacuss Enfield, Esq.
TACUSS ENFIELD
Ridgeway Bar No. 17121
Ridgeway Civil Liberties Union
Tacus#8045
Attorney for the Defendant
