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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
DANNLABS,
Plaintiff,
v.
STANLEY_LABSON,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-421
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT, TACUSS ENFIELD, ESQ.
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL
Defense counsel moves to dismiss the case on the basis that the Plaintiff is lacking
in a cause of action. 1 R. Stat. § 208 says “[a]ny individual who intentionally deceives
another party to secure unfair or unlawful gain, or deprive a victim of a legal right
shall be fraud and liable for compensatory damages injunctive relief, and punitive
damages up to $3,000.” The other cited tort falls under 1 R. Stat. § 210, which says,
“[a]ny individual who damages another’s business ab [sic] relationships, contracts, or
career with a third party causing economic and career harm to harm to another is
tortious interference and liable for compensatory damages and punitive damages up
to $3,000.”
To the first tort alleged against the defendant, these allegations fail to prove how
the Defendant “intentionally deceive[d] another party to secure unfair or unlawful
gain.” Unfair means that an act was “not treating people in an equal way, or not
morally right.” See Cambridge Dictionary (defining “unfair”). Unlawful is defined as
an act that is “not allowed by law.” See Cambridge Dictionary (defining “unlawful”).
There is no written statute that would prevent an individual from posting their opin-
ion or stance on the judge’s ruling in a previous case that they heard. Section IX of
the Constitution of the State of Ridgeway says “[t]hat the people have a right to free-
dom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments, concerning the trans-
actions of government.” Subsequently Section X of the same reads that “[t]he freedom
of deliberation, speech, and debate … is so essential to the rights of the people, that
it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in
any other court or place whatsoever.” This plain reading of the two provisions found
in our Constitution is quite clear: One cannot use one’s right to speech as a basis to
engage in a lawsuit.
This was a notion made quite clear in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966). “[D]ebate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” See also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). For as Justice Brandeis wrote in Whitney
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v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927), “[t]hose who won our independence … believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the government.” Ibid (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Our laws are simply mute on the idea of alleged or in fact defamatory or libelous
language. Therefore, the Plaintiff attempts to two different statutes, following a poor
reading of both, in hopes that they shall serve as the statutes necessary for cases
pertaining to defamation or libel.
However, our Constitution makes it quite clear that complaints as they relate to
speech-related topics or matters not to be heard. Therefore, this court should follow
the word and tongue of the Constitution and dismiss this case.
Though, as for the second tort, that pertains to a business whose relationships, con-
tracts, or career—all in a respective fashion—have some quarrel with a third party
and that would subsequently result in economic or professional backlash. For it is not
often that a judge, whose ruling that some or many dislike for whatever reason, en-
gages in a legal battle with a member of their opposition. This kind of behavior would
result in a violation of Canon 2A of the Ridgeway Code of Judicial Conduct. In that it
says, “[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judi-
ciary.” Since 1792, we have treated the United States Constitution as the law of the
land across the country. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U. S. 409 (1792). We ought to adopt
that same logic though solely in our own state. This idea has consistently been rein-
forced. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936); Chambers v. Baltimore Ohio
R.R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 213 (1827); Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U. S. 529 (2013); Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017); Penascola Tel.
Co. v. West., Etc. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U. S. 608 (1981); French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324 (1901);
Tarble’s Case, 80 U. S. 397 (1871); Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80
(1929); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958); DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U. S. 28 (1969);
Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 539 (1842); Rostker v. Gold-
berg, 453 U. S. 57 (1981); Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U. S. 1 (1960); Southern
Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910); Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138
(1904); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488 (1897); and Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v.
Kibbe, 39 U. S. 353 (1840).
If the Constitution is to serve as the law of the land, then would a sitting Superior
Court Judge enter into a lawsuit that is blatantly against our founding document?
Nevertheless, to engage in that lawsuit that leads back to being because of a ruling
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of the Plaintiff’s is simply unethical. This case should not resume given that it is (1)
an unethical lawsuit of the Plaintiff and (2) an unconstitutional lawsuit albeit.
DATED: JUNE 9, 2022
/s/ Tacuss Enfield, Esq.
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TACUSS ENFIELD
Ridgeway Bar No. 17121
Ridgeway Civil Liberties Union
Tacus#8045
Attorney for the Defendant
/s/ HolyRomanRyan, Esq.
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HOLYROMANRYAN
Ridgeway Bar No. 17105
6A Atlee Road
Palmer, Ridgeway
Ryan!#8903
Attorney for the Defendant
