ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-417
Plaintiff
v.
ShadowCulture
Defendant
BACKGROUND
The counsel for the defense has filed a motion in limine to exclude: Exhibit A - on the ground that it is
cumulative evidence; Exhbibit F - on the basis that it is cumulative evidence and Exhibit G - on the basis that
the statement made by the defendant was on the promise of no charges being pursued; and because the miranda
rights for the defendant were not read.
JUDGEMENT
In regards to the motion in limine to exclude Exhibit A, the motion is GRANTED. The Defense
Counsel alleges that the justification to exclude Exhibit A is two pronged: 1) It will mislead the trier of fact; 2)
It is needlessly cumulative evidence. The Defense contends that Exhibit A being a trimmed version of Exhibit B
would wrongfully influence the trier of fact into believing the motive of the defendant to kill the victim. The
Court must take this into considerable determination. The question this court must determine is not whether
maintaining the Exhibit on record should or will influence or change the purview of the trier of fact, but rather if
maintaining the Exhibit on record may influence the trier of fact. It is the opinion of the Court that the
admission of the evidence on the basis of it having the potential to influence the trier of fact to be categorically
arbitrary. Judges of any Court must take into account ALL evidence - except when stipulated otherwise - when
coming to a deliberation on a verdict. The Court is not preindisposed to assume the culpability and intention of
a defendant on the sole basis that certain parts of one exhibit have been omitted to provide a shortened recount
of events.
The Court subsequently shifts its focus to whether the evidence should be excluded on the basis that it is
needlessly cumulative. For an exhibit to be cumulative, it must be additional evidence that has the same effect
as existing evidence. The Court agrees with the contention that the evidence on the basis that it is cumulative.
Exhibit A is simply an abstract of Exhibit B. It does not seek to strengthen or corroborate Exhibit B. The Court
determines that there is objectively an adequate foundation of events of the immediate events in Exhibit A as in
Exhibit B. However, Exhibit A is an abstract of Exhibit B that does not regard for an extensive period of events
and has the potential to mislead not a finder of fact, but witnesses; lay witnesses (who testify to what they have
seen) and expert witnesses (who testify to what the exhibit before them represents) may be wrongfully
influenced into attesting to a fact or opinion due to the exclusion of a specific evidence. However, if Exhibit A
was the same length but slowed dow, it would not be cumulative; it seeks to make an established fact more
probable. However Exhibit A does not satisfy such in the view of the Court; it is unnecessarily repetitious. The
Court determines that the probative value of admitting Exhibit A are substantially outweighed by the prejudicial
values of admitting such Exhibit. The Court finds no prejudice caused to the State by such; Exhibit A is an
abstract of Exhibit B; it is from the same original writing and can be used to analyse the series of events in a
paralleled manner. Based on the aforementioned reasons, the Court has come to the determination it has.
In regards to the motion in limine to exclude Exhibit F, the motion is DENIED. The Defense Counsel
alleges that Exhibit J is a detailed summary of Exhibit G, and therefore serves as cumulative evidence. For
evidence to be cumulative, it must be additional evidence that has the same effect as existing evidence. The
Court disagrees that Exhibit F has the same effect as Exhibit J. Whilst both writings are publicated by the same
expert witness regarding its causation to essentially reach the same determination on the series of event and fact,
the Court agrees with the state that the incident is evaluated from clinical perspectives using supplemental
testimony that is not of repetition and are distinctively different. They establish - unequivocally - their view of
why criminal liability exists in the actions of the defendant. Though they may contain a partially cumulative
contention, it does not outright unrightly outweigh the probative values through the prejudicial values. For that
reason, the Court denies the motion.
In regards to the motion in limine to exclude Exhibit G, the motion is DENIED. The Defense counsel
alleges there are two problems with admitting the discord testimony; 1) the Government had ‘promised’ to not
criminally charge the defendant, and 2) the defendant was not read his miranda rights. The Court agrees with
the response of the State that such a promise was not made and is reasonably misrepresented; the Attorney
General clearly stated they have not decided to bring charges ‘at this time.’ This clearly shows that that the
defendant could be reasonably aware they were not being subject to criminal charges. With regards to the same
issue, it should be noticed that a government official is not required to hold themselves account to such a
promise, unless otherwise stipulated by law. Circumstances would include an agreement between the
government and a witness for such a subject to be an informant. Furthermore, miranda rights are only obligated
to be read under specific circumstances. It would be best explained using the court’s ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona. 384 US 436 (1996), wherein the court stated that such rights need to be read for admissibility when
“statements [are] obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom.’
The Attorney General had expressed that the defendant is making this statement voluntarily and that they were
free to ‘stop at any time.’ The Court recognises the Supreme Court ruling in the appellate matter of Beckwith v.
United States, 425 US 341 (1976). The case involved a Defendant who was interviewed at home by police
officers without the miranda warning. The Court ruled that his statement was admissible on the basis that it did
not contravene miranda rights. Their justification was,”It was a compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation,
and not the strength…of the government’s suspicions…which lead the court to impose the Miranda
requirements with regards to custodial questioning.” Since the defendant made a voluntary statement - a
non-custodial environment (where they could leave at any time,) the Court finds the circumstance does not
necessitate the administering of miranda rights. It is based on the aforementioned that the motion is denied for
this Exhibit.
CONCLUSION
The motion in limine to exclude Exhibit A is granted, and the Exhibit is strucken from the record. The
motion in limite to exclude Exhibits F and G are denied.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 22nd day of June, 2022.
/s/ Eagleeye785
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
