STATE OF RIDGEWAY
LuisAntonioSantiago
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-403
Plaintiff
v.
avixsz
Defendant
DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The State of Ridgeway, representing the Respondent, avixsz, file this brief in opposition
to the writ of habeas corpus, while urging this court to DENY the writ.
INTRODUCTION
The Petitioner in this matter, is incorrect throughout his allegations regarding the arrest
that transpired on the 24th of April 2022. This brief in opposition will clarify why the court
should deny the requested relief and should uphold the arrest in the light of the facts. The
petitioner not only acted outside the bounds of the law and was not engaged in lawful
self-defense, but also seeks to justify his actions under a law whose scope has no bearing on the
facts in question. The Petitioner’s subsequent arrest for Second Degree Murder (§ 3.10) is,
consequently, lawful and should be upheld by this court.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Petitioner in this case alleges that he was falsely arrested. The first inquiry this court
should turn to in deciding this question is “whether the police were legally entitled to make that
arrest.” In Re Zachisbeast, RSC-CV-367. An officer is entitled to make an arrest when “the
police either had a judicial warrant ordering an arrest, or the police had probable cause that a
crime was committed.” Id. On this front, which the Petitioner does not dispute, the arrest is
lawful. And so, the question becomes whether the Petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence.
In order to do this, it is his burden to “establish[] facts that make the prospect of a hypothetical
conviction on the charges virtually impossible.” Id. In this way, “a reasonable and well-informed
jury could not convict the petitioner in a hypothetical trial if they were aware of those facts, and
those facts were admissible evidence.” Id. A reasonable jury would not find that the Petitioner
here was utilizing “self-defense.” See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 1. The Petitioner,
therefore, is not entitled to relief.
II. THE PETITIONER WAS NOT ENGAGED IN LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE
The Petitioner claims to have acted in lawful self-defense on May 14, 2022. He did not.
The Petitioner in this matter not only instigated the confrontation, but continued to employ lethal
force when self-defense was not justified.
Indeed, the Petitioner was not the victim, but rather the instigator. Before any
confrontation began, Petitioner fired his pistol at TrumpTheBuilder. It was only after being shot
that TrumpTheBuilder swung his axe.
As the scuffle continued, the Petitioner was hit with an axe once. The injury sustained by
the Petitioner compares more to a simple pinch of the skin rather than the imminent injury that
would typically be defined and clarified in any act allowing for the defense of oneself. While it is
true that one has the right to defend themselves, the case before us is not one of those cases
where the Petitioner can claim an affirmative defense of self-defense. Simply look at the
evidence submitted by the Petitioner, the health bar at the top right of his screen barely was
affected by the swing of a bat.
However, despite this, the Petitioner continued to fire his weapon, even once the
Petitioner had moved far enough away that a melee weapon, like TrumpTheBuilder’s axe, would
pose no threat to the Petitioner. Furthermore, the Petitioner continues to fire brutal volleys of
shots at TrumpTheBuilder even as TrumpTheBuilder runs away from the Petitioner and tries to
seek shelter in a nearby building. At this point, the TrumpTheBuilder was no longer a threat in
any sense, he has a melee weapon and cannot possibly injure the Petitioner from the distance that
was accumulated during his retreat. Furthermore, TrumpTheBuilder’s back was turned away
from the Petitioner. However, the Petitioner disregarded these facts and ran towards
TrumpTheBuilder, even as he retreated, while continuing to shoot at him. Once
TrumpTheBuilder entered the building, the Petitioner still continued to pursue TrumpTheBuilder
and even reloaded his weapon. The Petitioner was no less than a ruthless agressor here — he was
not trying to protect himself, rather he was trying to pursue, hunt, and ultimately kill
TrumpTheBuilder. TrumpTheBuilder is next seen on a balcony of the building he entered with
his axe. TrumpTheBuilder jumps off the building and it is at this point that the Petitioner fires the
fatal shot. His back turned to the Petitioner, TrumpTheBuilder fell to the ground dead and
lifeless.
In no world can this reasonably be construed as self-defense. The Petitioner not only
instigated this physical confrontation, but actively continued to shoot at TrumpTheBuilder even
when he no longer posed a threat. If the court were to rule in favor of the Petitioner and claim
that self-defense prevailed in this situation, all hope will be inevitably lost if the law permits the
execution of individuals who no longer pose a threat, are in the process of running away, and
have their back turned to the smoking barrel. Indeed, it’s not. This court ruled in SubtractFunds
v. MedinaLuv (RSC-CV-309) that “the law is very clear on an ‘active threat.’ When [the victim]
turned around and started to retreat, he was no longer an active threat, and the petitioner had
defended himself. Yet the petitioner reloaded, then shot him again, acting outside of his defence,
and rather now on the offense, making the charge of Second Degree Murder accurate and in line
with the standards at hand.” This case is no different: the Petitioner acted offensively, rather than
solely defensively. The right to self defense does not arise unless the Petitioner took every
opportunity to avoid combat. Only then is there an actual and true imminent threat to life. The
Petitioner failed to do this. His actions do not constitute lawful self-defense.
Accordingly, the Respondent, avixsz, was fully within his authority acting under the color
of the law to arrest the Petitioner for killing TrumpTheBuilder.
III. THE PETITIONER SEEKS TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS UNDER A LAW
WHOSE SCOPE HAS NO BEARING ON THE FACTS IN QUESTION
The petitioner seeks to justify his use of self-defense under Section 2(a)(i) of the
Ridgeway Vehicular Assault Act, which states that “Lethal force may only be exercised if the
individual is actively assaulting/attempting to assault the victim.” This application of the law is
grossly incorrect. Not only would the Petitioner's actions not qualify as self-defense to begin
with (see the last section), but also this law has no relevance or bearing to the facts of this case.
The Vehicular Assault Act covers when lethal self-defense can be used in respect to instances of
vehicular assault only, not general assault such as the one in question. Section 2(a) of this act
states that “If a motor vehicle strikes or desyncs another motor vehicle more than once… victim
of the assault shall be justified in exercising lethal force on their attacker.” This point necessarily
limits the scope of its subpoints under the Scope-of-Subparts Canon, meaning that Section
2(a)(i), which the Petitioner cites as justification for his use of deadly force in alleged
self-defense, is constrained to only to cover self-defense in response to instances of vehicular
assault. Therefore, the Petitioner not only fails to properly justify self-defense under Section
2(a)(i) of the Ridgeway Vehicular Assault Act, but also, consequently, fails to put forth any legal
justification for his use of force.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we ask that this court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
Dated: June 4, 2022 Respectfully Submitted.
/s/ TOTORO987123
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
