STATE OF RIDGEWAY
PIRATEHOOKTAIL )
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-399
PRESIDING JUDGE. Hecxtro
Plaintiff
v.
SMASHCANS, in his official capacity as a
Trooper in the Ridgeway State Police
Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway moves to dismiss the above-named suit.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO BRING THIS SUIT
In order for the Superior Court to have jurisdiction, a “case or controversy” must exist. Ridgeway State
Constitution, Art. V, Sec. IV. This clause in the State Constitution closely resembles the “case or controversy”
clause found in the Constitution of the United States within Art. III, Sec II. Due to the striking similarities
between our clause and the federal government’s, this court should defer to the years of federal jurisprudence
interpreting the clause, and adopt the standing doctrine established by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S.
555 (1992). This court has previously adopted these standards and adjudicated claims using them. There's no
reason it should shy away now. See Nughson v. Bommes, RSC-CV-370; see also RCLU v. ShadowCulture, et
al., RSC-CV-285.
In order for a Plaintiff to have standing to sue, a Plaintiff must have suffered an “(1) injury in fact that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” See Lujan, supra (internal quotations
omitted)(emphasis added). The Plaintiff does not have standing to sue because he fails each and every prong.
The civil complaint details that PirateHookTail was using an alternate account during the incident under
the username Soy-Milkz. See Plaintiff’s Civil Complaint, on page 1. The incident did not directly involve the
Plaintiff, he is unable to suffer an “injury in fact” and therefore fails the “injury in fact” portion of the three-part
test for standing. The incident does not impact the Plaintiff because alternate accounts must be seen as separate
individuals from their main accounts. The court must see alternate accounts as separate individuals due to the
drastic differences that the alternate accounts have with their main accounts. Alternate accounts can have
markedly different criminal records, citizenship statuses, and financial assets when compared to their main
accounts. All of which cannot be transferred between two accounts. Indeed, for the purposes of our government,
they are seen as different individuals. Furthermore, by seeing alternate accounts and main accounts as one
entity, the courts will place unneeded strain on investigative agencies, as well as upon court itself due to the
need to perform the difficult task of identifying who the alternate account belongs and proving that it in fact
belongs to the specified individual.
In RCLU, the court established that in order to demonstrate “injury-in-fact” the party seeking review
must be himself among the injured. This is further substantiated in Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, which
established that although a Plaintiff can have an interest in the case, a Plaintiff will lack standing if the
injury-in-fact was not suffered directly by the Plaintiff. This bears similarities to the current case in that
although the Plaintiff has an interest in the form of his alternate account, the purported injury did not affect the
Plaintiff directly and accordingly, he cannot claim that he himself suffered the injury in fact. The Plaintiff could
not have been among the injured as he was not present at all during the incident and could not have suffered an
injury.
Lujan has also established that in order to have standing, the injury in question must be fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant. The Plaintiff was not present during the incident. As a result, it is
impossible for him to suffer any injury in fact. Without injury, it is futile to trace the injury to the challenged
action of the defendant as the injury does not exist. The Plaintiff is thus unable to prove the second prong of the
three prong standing test.
A favorable decision of the court will not adequately redress the injury suffered by the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff has not suffered an injury of fact and without an injury, there is nothing to be redressed.
II. RELIEF CANNOT BE GRANTED
Even with a favorable decision, it is impossible for the court to redress the injury due the fact that the
requested relief is impossible to provide. In his civil complaint, the Plaintiff requests that he receive a
restraining order against the government that prevents them from “enacting this procedure” as relief. This
request by the Plaintiff can be interpreted either as the Plaintiff requesting himself be exempt from all future
searches by government officers, or being exempt from having a denied search request overridden by
government officers. Both interpretations of the requested relief are equally troubling because they place the
Plaintiff above the rule of law. The enactment of this relief would also place undue burden upon law
enforcement officers as this would prevent officers from searching the Plaintiff even if that search would
otherwise be legal. The courts do not have the ability to place an individual above the rule of law. As such, the
requested relief cannot be granted.
The Plaintiff, has failed to sufficiently show that he himself has suffered an injury in fact, can trace the
incident to the defendant, and show that the relief can be redressed by a favorable decision and therefore does
not have standing. Furthermore, the relief that the Plaintiff has requested is impossible to provide and cannot be
granted.
CONCLUSION
For the above-mentioned reasons, this suit must be dismissed.
/s/ Dinnerblaster28454
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: 06/08/2022
