ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ZACHCASISBEAST
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-367
Petitioner
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
I have decided to refuse to order remedy with regard to this petition for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
What follows is a summary of the uncontested facts of this case. On May 8th, 2022, Lieutenant xJvmma
of the Palmer Police Department was on duty and in her patrol car at Palmer Boulevard. She saw what she
believed to be a vehicle speeding and performing illegal lane changes. Following this, she stopped and detained
the driver on the side of the road. An interaction which concluded with the driver being placed in handcuffs and
in the patrol vehicle of Lieutenant xJvmma occurred. In the course of the interaction, the driver acted in a
dismissive and derisive manner. The driver is the petitioner in this matter, Mr. ZachCasisbeast. While in the
patrol vehicle, the petitioner provided his identification to Lieutenant xJvmma, and an arrest for Failure to
Identify contrary to S.C.C. § 2.05 followed.
What occurred during the interaction when the driver was detained at the roadside but before being
placed in handcuffs was different between the perspective of Lieutenant xJvmma and the petitioner. In the
affidavit from the arresting officer, Lieutenant xJvmma states that she “issued a total of 3+ verbal orders to the
driver to identify himself”. However, the petitioner submitted videographic evidence demonstrating that several
messages from Lieutenant xJvmma were “tagged”, or censored; presumably, at least some of these messages
were the “verbal orders” referred to in the affidavit.
ANALYSIS
In assessing petitions for writs of habeas corpus concerning arrests, the first question to be asked is
whether the police were legally entitled to make that arrest — that is, the police either had a judicial warrant
ordering an arrest, or the police had probable cause that a crime was committed. If the arrest was not lawful to
begin with, the inquiry ends there; the record must be removed. If not, the next and final question is whether the
petitioner was actually innocent of the charge or charges for which they were arrested. Indeed, an arrest can be
lawful when the subject of the arrest is actually innocent at the same time. A petitioner who demonstrates actual
innocence by establishing facts that make the prospect of a hypothetical conviction on the charges virtually
impossible. The standard is such that a reasonable and well-informed jury could not convict the petitioner in a
hypothetical trial if they were aware of those facts, and those facts were admissible evidence.
There is no dispute regarding whether the traffic stop prior to the arrest was lawful. Therefore, I will
begin by discussing whether the arrest itself was legal. I accept that Lieutenant xJvmma had made at least three
verbal statements to the petitioner intended as demands for identification. What the petitioner actually saw in
this interaction is irrelevant in assessing the legality of the arrest; indeed, in this part of the inquiry, we assess
whether the facts and information that the police officer had knowledge of justified the arrest. See Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 91. However, it is notable that the petitioner had said “TAGS” before being removed from the vehicle
and arrested. A reasonable police officer would infer that what they are saying cannot be understood due to chat
filtering. At the same time, I take into account that Lieutenant xJvmma had (presumably rhetorically) asked
whether she would “have to charge for failure to identify” and again said “Identification…” after being told that
her messages were being censored. In addition, I consider the fact that the petitioner had acted in an impatient
and somewhat contemptuous manner towards Lieutenant xJvmma throughout the course of the stop. This fact,
combined with what Lieutenant xJvmma said after being informed her messages were being censored, may lead
a reasonable police officer to conclude that the subject they are speaking to is refusing to identify themselves.
As a result, I conclude that the arrest was lawful because Lieutenant xJvmma had probable cause that the
petitioner was refusing to identify himself, and thereby committing a criminal act.
Having established that the arrest was legally justified, we next ask whether the petitioner is actually
innocent. There are two important points raised that we must consider for this prong. First, whether Lieutenant
xJvmma made mere “statements” or actual “demands” for identification is disputed. Second, some of what
Lieutenant xJvmma said to the petitioner was censored from the point of view of the petitioner, which means
that at least one of the statements or demands made soliciting identification were not seen by the petitioner.
The definition of S.C.C. § 2.05 in part is “[t]he act of failing to present a county issued identification or
giving fictitious information to a peace officer that has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime has, is or
is about to take place. Failing to present identification to a peace officer after having being lawfully detained.”
There is no legal requirement that an actual demand for identification be made by a police officer. However, in
general, a person will not be guilty of Failure to Identify if a clear and unambiguous demand is not made for
identification because mens rea, or “a guilty mind” may be difficult or impossible to prove — that is, the intent
of the subject to fail to identify may be impossible to prove if they are not prompted to identify themselves. I
agree with the petitioner that Lieutenant xJvmma never made an unambiguous demand for identification that
was visible to the petitioner. Indeed, asking if she would have to “charge for failure to identify” and stating
“Identification…” does not constitute an unambiguous and clear demand. Even so, in my view, I conclude that
even though Lieutenant xJvmma had not made a clear demand from the perspective of the petitioner, the
petitioner has still not established factual innocence. I make this determination based on statements made by the
petitioner while in handcuffs seated in Lieutenant xJvmma’s patrol vehicle. He said: “[You] asked me a
question, [t]hen asked for my id [sic] (…) [I] was going to give [you] my id [sic]”. There was no further
demands for identification made by the police after the petitioner was removed from his vehicle and placed in
handcuffs. Clearly, in making these statements, the petitioner was aware that he was being asked for his
identification. Consequently, even though no verbal demand was made for identification from the perspective of
the petitioner, factual innocence has still not been established because the petitioner knew that identification was
being requested.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore held that the requested remedy must be refused.
I thank both counselors for their excellent submissions.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 21st day of May, 2022.
/s/ frostbleed
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
