STATE OF RIDGEWAY
KHAZAIN )
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-360
PRESIDING JUDGE. Hecxtro
Plaintiff
v.
CLIFFORD2, in his official capacity as the
Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway.
Defendant
MOTION TO DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway moves to dismiss the above-named suit.
INTRODUCTION
As per the Plaintiff’s civil complaint, before us we are presented with a case that seeks to assert
and request the Court to review an action taken by the Attorney General. The cause of action that the
Plaintiff uses to proceed with this case is declared as such (administrative review). The Plaintiff also
fails to invoke a tort that paves the way for a proper cause of action. The action that the Plaintiff requests
that the Court review, is invalid and cannot possibly be appealed by this court. Such an order that arises
directly because of mediation cannot be appealed by the agent of the government, and in this case, the
agent is the Plaintiff. He seeks to appeal a final and unappealable decision, to avoid paying the Plaintiff
in the matter of Hitherwguys v. Khazain, RSC-CV-332. The Plaintiff incorrectly alleges that the actions
taken by the Attorney General were unlawful, and this case cannot be allowed to proceed with such
factual allegations being erroneous. The Attorney General utilized his powers as granted by the
legislature via their statutes codified into our state. Therefore, for the undermentioned reasons, this suit
should be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff in his civil complaint described the nature of the suit. However, he lacks a valid
cause of action. Having a valid cause of action is a necessary pre-requisite if one wishes to continue with
a civil suit. He fails to establish a sound, and logical cause of action because of not only a complete lack
of a tort, but he also fails to understand the specifications outlined by the legislature regarding the
purpose and the execution of mediation. The Plaintiff seeks to have the court review the action taken by
the Attorney General, in his official capacity. For the reasons below, the plaintiff lacks a cause of action.
The case, therefore, is nonjusticiable.
The Attorney General, pursuant to 2 R. Stat. § 240, acted as an arbitrator in the mediation
proceedings regarding a dispute between Hitherwguys, the Plaintiff in Hitherwguys v. Khazain, RSC-
CV-332, and the Plaintiff, in this case, Khazain. The Attorney General conducted the mediation in an
impartial manner, where he reviewed the facts stipulated by each side. The Attorney General then after a
thorough review of the facts, and evidence presented, believed the scale tips over to favor Hitherwguys,
the co-defendant in this case. Pursuant to the powers given to the Attorney General by the Rid. Judiciary
Act (2022)(6.5)(b)(ii), granted relief to the Plaintiffs in the matter of Hitherwguys v. Khazain, RSC-CV-
332. The statute stipulates that “[this] decision shall be final and unappealable.” Because the Plaintiff
only filed this suit because of a misinterpretation of the statutes, specifically the one that defines the
finality of a decision when referencing the terms of mediation, the Plaintiff cannot continue without a
valid cause of action, and the decision made by the Attorney General during the mediation proceedings,
cannot be appealed or challenged by the agent of the government. The Plaintiff is effectively seeking to
appeal and reverse the prior judgement by filing this suit. The statute is explicit in its writing to allow for
the Plaintiff to file a civil case if the arbitrator sided with them, if and only if, the relief that was granted
to them never actually came into their possession. But this is not the case for the Defendant in the
matter. The statute does not provide the Defendant with the same opportunity. This is because the
Attorney General is to carefully review the facts and evidence presented before him, as he has done with
this case, and is to decide which side has a secure claim that is substantiated by the facts. If the Plaintiff
was favored in the mediation proceeding, then as long as their relief is provided, the matter should be res
judicata preventing them from pursuing any further relief from the same claim. The Defendant,
however, is not granted such liberty because, as an agent of the government, the Attorney General of the
State of Ridgeway found them to be at fault because of their actions; therefore, this allows for an
alternative to trial altogether, such is the intention of mediation. The Plaintiff contends that “the award
of monetary damages can be challenged in this Court as unlawful.” See Plaintiff’s Civil Complaint, on
page 3. The Plaintiff is incorrect in his contention because this action cannot be challenged. The
decision came because of mediation, where the Attorney General served as the initial arbitrator. In this
situation, the Attorney General decided against the agent of the government, thus the decision is final.
The Defendant cannot attempt to overturn such a decision because monetary relief was provided. After
all, mediation, in this scenario, is an extrajudicial activity. This means that it was outside the court’s
purview, and it disallows this court to review the actions taken by the Attorney General. The Plaintiff’s
failure to recognize this directly turns their argument and renders it inadequate. This is because the
action of “award[ing] [...] monetary damages” cannot be challenged as such a decision made by the
Attorney General was not only lawful, but it is also the intended purpose of allowing for mediation to
occur before a civil suit. This is used to serve as a proper means to grant the Plaintiff relief before ever
going through a civil suit as it delegates the authority to the Attorney General to hold a procedural
mediation hearing, before ruling for either side. The Attorney General did just that, and he followed
procedure to the letter. Therefore, his decision cannot be reviewed by this court, nor can it be challenged
or even appealed by the Plaintiff in this case. The Rid. Administrative Procedure Act (2022)(3.2)(b)
forecloses the review of this matter as this matter directly arises as an attempt to review an action taken
by the Attorney General. In this case, the clause posits that when “review is prohibited by law,” the
Administrative Courts of the State of Ridgeway do not proceed with the case as if they have jurisdiction.
For the matters of this case, any review from a court regarding the result of mediation that was declared
to be in favor of the Plaintiff, cannot continue because it is explicitly prohibited by the law. The clause
in its entirety states that “[t]he administrative courts may not exercise their jurisdiction if review is
prohibited by law.” Ibid. The Plaintiff seeks to invoke the administrative court’s jurisdiction over this
matter through his cause of action, however, the administrative court does not have this jurisdiction
because of the explicit denial of review that is exhibited in the Rid. Judiciary Act (2022).
Additionally, the action may not proceed because the Attorney General is immune from this
suit. The Plaintiff in his civil complaint engaged in a suit against the Attorney General. He listed no tort
in the entirety of the civil complaint, however for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, but to
circumvent sovereign immunity, he must plead a civil action for a systemic rights violation. He doesn’t
do this. Because of that, the government is immune. See Civil Claims Act, §2(b). Even if he had claimed
a cause of action under this tort, the case still falters because it fails to plead an impediment of his rights,
immunities, or privileges. The tort is designated as 1 R. Stat. § 216 in the code of statutes. The tort in its
entirety is as follows:
“Any policy, order, procedure, or directive that impedes on an individuals [sic] rights,
immunities, or privileges secured by law, charter, or the constitution shall be subject to the
injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the government prohibiting them from
enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and injunctive relief reversing any harm
done. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they received concrete, non-hypothetical harm from the
policy, order, procedure, or directive. The courts may subpoena any sensitive policy, procedure,
order, or directive that relates to the issue and that the court adequately secures and seals the
proceeding.”
The Plaintiff does not make mention anywhere in his civil complaint regarding what tort he is
suing the Defendant for. In order for him to have a proper cause of action, he must at the very least,
name the tort. For him to sue the state, the Plaintiff must utilize 1 R. Stat. § 216. So, for the purposes of
this motion to dismiss, we will include the undermentioned paragraph to serve as a response as we are
assuming the tort, they are claiming is the one reserved to pursue civil action for a systemic rights
violation. Regardless, because of the Plaintiff’s failure to invoke the tort as the cause of action, the
Defendant is immune from liability. See Internat'l News Serv. v. Asso. Press, 248 US 215 (1918)(“If the
plaintiff has no legal cause of action, the suit necessarily fails.”)(quoting Levy v. Walker, L.R. 10 Ch. D.
436, 449); see also Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 200 US 480 (1906)(“[the] plaintiff must establish
grounds of liability against the defendant.”); see also Findlay v. McAllister, 113 US 104 (1885)(“Unless
the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendants, he is without remedy.”) Seeing as the Plaintiff
not only failed to invoke a tort as a cause of action, but he also fails to establish proper grounds that
would make the Defendant liable; the suit does not only fail, but the Defendant also cannot be found
liable, and he is immune in this scenario.
However, under the assumption that the Plaintiff’s intended to invoke 1 R. Stat. § 216, the
Defendant would still be immune from liability for the following reasons. Pleadings must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P.
(Title III, Rule 8). These rules are virtually identical when one compares them to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, namely, Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2) to Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). The Plaintiff fails
to properly plead that the Attorney General “impede[d] on [his] rights, immunities, or privileges secured
by the law, charter, or the constitution […]” See 1 R. Stat. § 216. For this case to proceed, the civil
complaint, and all the facts therein, must be “plausible on [their] face.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007). Even if all the facts of the civil complaint were taken as true, it
would not be enough for this complaint to follow through and continue in this court. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 US 662, 664 (2009)(Holding that claims can be dismissed if the facts pleaded do not entitle
the Plaintiff to relief). Because the Plaintiff failed to properly plead an impediment on his “rights,
immunities, or privileges, secured by law, charter, or the constitution [...],” the Attorney General is
immune to the claims consistent with 1 R. Stat. § 216; therefore, this case cannot be allowed to proceed.
The Plaintiff is also blatantly incorrect. The Plaintiff alleges in his civil complaint that the
Attorney General “illegally awarded monetary damages to [the co-defendant].” See Plaintiff’s Civil
Complaint, on page 2. The reasoning the Plaintiff provides is erroneous. He alleges that the order
promulgated by the Attorney General was generated because of the civil suit—this is incorrect.
Mediation proceedings are extrajudicial, and therefore, are not and cannot be tied back to the initial civil
suit. The case should have never been heard initially before the court because “[n]o case against an agent
of; or the government shall be heard by the civil courts without there first being an attempt at
mediation.” To satisfy all parties, a stay was implemented which was favorable for all sides. Mediation
in most cases, including this one, should be treated as an out-of-court mediation due to the nature that
arose surrounding the circumstances of this case. Therefore, in mediation hearings, the statute
promulgating that “[n]o monetary damage shall be awarded in a case against the government, cases
where the government is a party or cases where the government has intervened” cannot apply to
extrajudicial proceedings. See 1 R. Stat. § 219; see also Rid. Civil Claims Act (2022)(2)(c). The
Attorney General was well within his rights when he ordered relief to be granted in favor of the Plaintiff
pursuant to his powers to act as a mediator, as well as his powers to grant relief. It is also worth noting
that regardless of whether the government was either involved in a case against itself, a case where it’s a
party, or a case where the government has intervened, monetary damages can nonetheless still be
awarded. This is because of the implementation of a quasi-official capacity, wherein, an individual who
has been sued in their official capacity can still be responsible for monetary funds so long as the Plaintiff
proves a set of facts. See Rid. Civil Claims Act (2022)(n)(iii); see also 1 R. Stat. § 214. This means that
regardless of the connection that mediation has to the procedural posture of the case, the Attorney
General acted well within the bounds of the law to order the monetary damages.
The Attorney General acted well within the powers granted to him by the statutes of our state.
The claims alleged by the Plaintiff are not only untrue but are also baseless. The power to serve as an
arbitrator in mediation proceedings will be a power of the Attorney General so long as it is ordained in
our statutes. It will also always be a power granted to the Attorney General to grant monetary relief to
the Plaintiff because of the verdict reached in a mediation proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, this
Court should recognize this suit and its cause of action and make a careful, well-informed decision. We
implore the court to recognize the impotence and incompleteness exhibited in the Plaintiff’s civil
complaint. The Attorney General’s decision to order monetary damages to the co-defendant, in this case,
should be protected, as it was a matter that has already been decided and rendered nonjusticiable; the
very nature of the situation paves the way for the decision to be protected due to its finality and due to
its demeanor, it cannot be appealed to this court. The statutes are explicitly clear; therefore, this suit
should not be allowed to continue any further.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, this suit should be dismissed.
TURNTABLE5000
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
Dated: June 6th, 2022
