STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RidgewayFarming_Alt
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DOCKET NO.RSC-CV-339
Plaintiff
v.
YouFoundSeal
Defendant
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
ARGUMENTS
On behalf of my client RidgewayFarming_Alt, the plaintiff in RSC-CV-339, I hereby declare opposition
to all efforts by the defendant and the defendant's legal counsel to dismiss the case. We oppose any form
of dismissal at this time of writing, whether it be with or without prejudice. We do not believe that the
defendant and counsel have sufficient grounds for the case to be dismissed.
I. THE GOOD SAMARITAN ONLY SHIELDS THE DEFENDANT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Also, in the Good Samaritan Act, Section 3(c) the legislation only protects Good Samaritans from
criminal litigation as it says 'Individuals who, in good faith, assist on-duty member of emergency service
in the prevention of a crime or in suppression of an active crime scene can not be charged with a crime"
nowhere does it protect Good Samaritan from civil litigation in the act, not a single time civil torts or
civil matters are mentioned in the act. The defendant claims that because the header of the act reads the
following "offer legal protection in the form of exemption from lawsuits, and liability, acting as a
safeguard to those who help another in an emergency, life-threatening situation.". However, the header
merely describes the act or at least what, in theory, it contains, but simply looking at Section 3 [TEXT
AND ENFORCEABILITY] of the act, it only ever mentions protection from criminal charges. Only
section 3, as it is titled, is enforceable in the act; the rest merely serves to help understand the
enforceable section. But going back to the section 1 of the act, it states, "This act shall only be severable
by EACH SECTION, paragraph, and other line items within the act." Nowhere does it show in the act
that the header is part of any section and thus shouldn't be enforced. Anyways prefatory clauses /
preambulatory clauses are not enforced, as seen in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008).
That requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the
operative clause. ("The separation of church and state being an important objective, the teachings of
canons shall have no place in our jurisprudence." The preface makes clear that the operative clause
refers not to canons of interpretation but to clergymen.), But apart from that clarifying function, a
prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause; in the prefatory clause, the
defence claims that it refers to section 3, but it doesn't. Section 3 only mentions criminal charges as the
defendant himself stated, "cannot be charged with a crime" Section 3 of the act doesn't even mention
protection from civil liability or protection or civil lawsuits.
The defendant also claims that if bystanders passed through the tunnel at that time of the incident that
their lives would be at risk. However, after the incident occurred the defendant nor the trooper bothered
to move the vehicle. If the risk were that high that bystanders could be in danger, the trooper would have
moved the vehicle out of harm's way. The defendant then attempts to claim that with New Orleans &
Northeastern R. Co. v. Jopes US (1891) judgement in mind that he acted in self-defence. This is not
true and doesn't have similarities to this case. The plaintiff didn't assault any of them and didn't ram their
vehicle a single time during the pursuit.
II. CAUSE OF ACTION CAN, IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS, ARISE FROM A "FOUL AND
ILLEGAL ACT"
First of all, the claim "ONE MAY NOT ENTER A CLAIM OF EQUITY WITHOUT CLEAN HANDS"
or ex turpi causa non oritur action was already overturned multiple times, including in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where officers trespassed onto private propriety to conduct an investigation
that eventually leads to an arrest. Where the state of Texas attempted to cite this legal principle but was
overruled, eventually leading the supreme court to hold that private intimacy was a protected right by
the U.S Constitution. The Good Samaritan Act doesn't protect people who trespass on private propriety.
Rather, when someone's life faces significant harm, defined in the law as "harm that can cause a
significant threat to an individual's life." In this case, the officer's life was never in significant threat.
Secondly, in the previous ruling of Hogin v. Cottingham, 533 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1988) defines the right of
privacy into two primary aspects that may be protected by the constitution: (1) the general law of
privacy, which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy; (2) and
the constitutional right of privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental
invasion. In this case, it would be the first situation where the defendant illegally trespassed into the
plaintiff's private property, which was, in this context, his vehicle. The plaintif also requested numerous
times for the plaintiff to leave, attempting to protect his constitutional right, but the defendant laughed
and cited the act to cover his actions. This can also be seen in the Intrusion of solitude which is one of
the four privacy torts under U.S common law under the element that "The intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person" and the element "The defendant intentionally intruded upon the
plaintiff's seclusion or private concerns." é. The Good Samaritan Act directly allows bystanders who
help officers to trespass onto private propriety, thus invading the privacy of citizens.
The legal principle can also be, in the case Wilson v. Layne 526 US 603 (1999), the U.S appellate court
held that a "media ride-along" in a home violates the Fourth Amendment. This case further proves that
the Good Samaritan Act deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional privacy rights when the defendant
trespassed into the vehicle. Helping a police officer does NOT grant bystanders the ability to trespass
onto private propriety and violates their constitutional right. Third parties can assist law enforcements
officer and go onto private propriety in specific situations such as during warrants in order to identify
stolen propriety or to provide medical assistance in some states. One case related to this matter is Van
Horn v. Watson, B188076 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007). The California Court of Appeal held that only
providing medical assistance and nothing else can cause third party trespass onto private propriety.
III. AMENDING THE CIVIL COMPLAINT
The plaintiff did not expect the Department of Justice to intervene in the matter. We request the
opportunity to amend the civil complaint relief section and request an apology letter. Dismissing this
case for ineligibility from the courts to issue relief would set a dangerous precedent. If a plaintiff suing
an individual doesn't ask for relief such as an apology letter in the civil complaint, the government could
step in and get the case dismissed. The courts can allow the civil complaint to be amended, as can be
seen in the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 (f), which states: "At any time in its discretion
and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
amended [...] ".
CONCLUSION
Overall, dismissing this case would set a dangerous precedent allowing third parties on ride-along to
trespass onto private propriety and to interfere in an active crime scene even if the law doesn't protect
third parties from civil litigations. Various instances have also stated that third parties cannot trespass on
private propriety other than very specific circumstances that the defendant did not meet. It's not the
court's job to expand the scope of the legislation but the job of the legislature to correct the law. We
believe that we have strong grounds for a lawsuit, and for the reasons stated above, we firmly OPPOSE
any effort at this time by the defendant and/or defendant's counsel to dismiss the case. We hope the
Honorable Judge frostbleed will use good judicial discretion in comparing our arguments and will see
that the letter of the law favours the plaintiff.
Date: 17th of May
Respectfully Submitted,
Plaintiffs RidgewayFarming_Alt
By their Attorneys,
/s/ Tomskipetski5
Tomskipetski5, RSB#17142
