ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-328
PRESIDING JUDGE. EAGLEEYE785
Plaintiff
v.
Francois_Wissmann
Defendant
COURT RULING
BACKGROUND
The State of Ridgeway filed a criminal information against Francois_Wissmann on May 02, 2022,
wherein the defendant was charged with Attempted Murder, Aggravated Assault Class II, and Vandalism. The
defendant failed to appear before the court following the issuance of a criminal summons. The defendant was
tried in-absentia with a not-guilty plea entered by the court. On June 04, the court held a trial.
JUDGEMENT
On or around the date of 21st April, 2022, Francois_Wissmann is shown in Exhibit A as smashing a
window with an axe. He is then seen entering the Palmer City Car Dealership with his axe brandished. He
proceeds to wack the victim, Starwarsmasterdavid, using the weapon whilst he is attempting to spawn a vehicle.
The off-duty peace officer runs away from the suspect, reloading his service pistol. Whilst the victim was
respawning his firearm, the suspect proceeds to retreat - smashing another window, before entering his vehicle
and driving off from the scene.
ON THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED MURDER, the Court finds the defendant GUILTY. The State
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. The element of actus reus has
been satisfied; the defendant carried out the physical elements to commit this crime; he had struck the defendant
using an axe - which can reasonably cause death. The element of mens rea has been satisfied; the defendant had
the intention to attempt to murder the suspect. This is evidence from the successive strikes of the axe -
amounting to two, and the fact that the suspect chased after the victim. He had only ceased this conduct upon
the service pistol being drawn by the off-duty peace officer.
ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CLASS II, the Court finds the defendant NOT
GUILTY. The State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act. The Court
was placed in a difficult position when adjudicating on this charge. When we look at the charge of Aggravated
Assault Class II, the definition reads,’The act of causing serious bodily harm to another, or uses a deadly
weapon in the commission, against one who is a public official, police officer, emergency worker, witness or
informant.’ The aforementioned definition does not provide a stipulation as to whether the police officer must
be on duty at the time of the offence for the defendant to be found guilty of this necessary element of the
offence.The ambiguity of the clause opens it up for statutory interpretation. In interpreting such a discrepancy,
the Court looks towards the plain language of the statute to discover its original intent. The Court finds that ‘the
act of causing serious bodily harm to another, or uses the deadly weapon’ is not one that is problematic. The
Court undeniably finds that the act of committing serious bodily harm using a deadly weapon was committed.
The Court must then analyse the clause, “against one who is a public official, police officer, emergency worker,
witness or informant.” When looking at this clause, the court must consider whether it can identify the intent of
the state legislature to require that the aforementioned individuals be acting in their official capacity as a police
officer, or in other words - be reasonably identifiable as a peace officer. In this circumstance, the answer is no.
For the court to ascertain the intent of the legislature, it therefore makes sense to shift its review to legislative
history - e.g. alternative charges with similar conditions. A charge with a more precise definition, encompassing
such a stipulation, is First Degree Murder. The charge of First Degree Murder reads (in part),’or of committing
murder of a peace officer discharging their lawful and official duty, with the knowledge of the person being a
peace officer.’ When we compare the two definitions, it becomes apparent that one charge has an explicit
stipulation for the officer to be acknowledged as a police officer, but the other [Agg. Assault Class I] does not
mention such a stipulation. The Court can then reasonably deduce that it was the legislative intent for the officer
to be ‘reasonably identifiable’ at the time of the act taking place. It is uncontested by the state that the victim
was off-duty; they declare such in the criminal information. The evidence also does not show Mr. David
wearing a police uniform or displaying a badge, nor did they orally identify themselves to be an officer. It is the
opinion of the court that in order for the defendant to be guilty of the offence - where the charge requires that it
be against a police officer - that the victim be reasonably identifiable as a police officer. After all, historic
legislative statute was intended on the conduct being criminally prohibited when you judge it from the vantage
point of a criminal actor. Furthermore not maintaining such a conclusion would depart from the legislative
intent to make it a defense that a criminal actor may be exonerated unless they have the ‘knowledge of the
person being a peace officer’ [see First Degree Murder]. In the words of the court in State v. Rameriez,’It not
only protects peace officers, who to the eye and ear of the person involved present themselves with the garb and
indicia of their status as peace officers, but also peace officers whom the actor either knows in fact or should
reasonably know to be peace officers.’ The defendant could not have visually have observed the victim to be a
peace officer, nor was such a declaration made by the victim through a statement by text. Penal statutes -
fundamentally - must be strictly construed to protect the constitutional right to liberty, which is what the
legislative intention appears to have been when creating such a prong for this charge.Furthermore there is no
liberty in convicting a defendant for an offence where they were not reasonably aware that they would be put
under additional jeopardy due to the mere fact that the suspect was a police officer - for that does not satisfy the
intent requirement for mens rea.
ON THE CHARGE OF VANDALISM, the Court finds the defendant GUILTY. In the evidence that
has been provided, it is evident that the Defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The State
proved actus reus; the defendant is shown striking two (2) windows using an axe. Mens rea is also satisfied as
the defendant conducts the act twice - where the Court can reasonably infer their knowledge that striking a
window would result in it smashing - thereby causing the deliberate destruction and damage to private property.
CONCLUSION
The defendant is found guilty on the charges of Attempted Murder and Vandalism. The defendant is
found not-guilty on the charge of Aggravated Assault Class II, and is acquitted of the charge. The Court shall
sentence the defendant, Francois_Wissmann, to thirty-five (35) minutes incarceration within the county
penitentiary.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 11th day of June, 2022.
/s/ Eagleeye785
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
