Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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Citation: RSC-CV-320 Date: 2022-05-01 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY BattalionGavin Plaintif, v. SecretiveRBLX Defendant. RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE HONOURABLE JUDGE DANNLABS Counsel for the Plaintiff: AZAD9L Counsel for the Defendant: Insertreality Place of Hearing: N/A Date of Hearing: N/A Date of Judgement: May 4th, 2022 IN THE CASE OF BATTALIONGAVIN V. SECRETIVIERBLX In the case of BattalionGavin v SecretiveRBLX I will grant the motion in favour of the defence. PLAINTIFF LACKS A CLAIM FOR WHICH TO FILE SUIT While there is no rule stating plainly that a civil tort cannot be drummed up from common law, it is important that we rather stick to the statutory torts as listed in the State Code of Statutes, in order to keep civil lawsuits fair and definitive. While I would otherwise agree with the claim in question here, its simply not something viable when there are codified torts. Perhaps lobbying the senate for a new Civil Torts Act would be more useful than this. THE RIGHT TO FAIRLY CRITICIZE MUST BE PROTECTED As the defence rightly stated, in the case of US. v Newby (2016), There was no “actual malice” involved in stating one’s opinion, nor can one’s own opinion be held as objectively false and so it is the right of the defendant to make statements of their own personal opinion, whether or not it hurts the plaintiff’s feelings. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVE INJURY ACTUALLY SUFFERED A tortuous act is defined as “A Civil wrong which wrongly causes someone to suffer loss or harm”. In this case, loss or harm has not been demonstrated by the plaintiff, having shown no loss of employment, harassment or otherwise harmful acts arising from the defendant’s statements. If this were to go to trial, this case would surely fall apart. As stated in Bridges v. Gilbert (2009), Bart v. Telford (1982) and most importantly, Suppan v. Dadonna (2000), “[for] A tort to be actionable requires injury”. Suppan v. Dadonna later then expands on the topic of freedom of speech and retaliation in this paragraph: “...It would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary irmness from that exercise.” With the aforementioned in mind, I hereby dismiss this case with prejudice. It is so ordered, /s/ Dannlabs

MotionRuling_RSC-CV-320_0111-050522.pdf

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