STATE OF RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
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DOCKET NO. RSC-CV-309
Presiding Judge. DannLabs
Petitioner
v.
MEDINALUV
Respondent
DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The State of Ridgeway, while representing the Respondent, MedinaLUV, file this brief in
opposition to the writ of habeas corpus, while urging this court to DENY the writ.
INTRODUCTION
The Petitioner in this matter, is incorrect throughout his allegations regarding the arrest that
transpired on the 24th of April 2022. This brief in opposition will clarify why the court should deny the
requested relief and should uphold the arrest in the light of the facts. The petitioner not only acted
outside the bounds of the law to seek protection under the self-defense doctrine, his allegations too, are
misconstrued in this case regarding the explanation surrounding the distinction for the charges of
Second-Degree Murder (§ 3.10) and for Involuntary Manslaughter (§ 3.06).
ARGUMENT
I. THE PETITIONER ACTED OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW
The Petitioner was struck with a bat by icyslider2 whom he later shot on the 24th of April 2022.
A more accurate term, however, would be a mere graze. The injury sustained by the Petitioner compares
more to a simple pinch of the skin rather than the imminent injury that would typically be defined and
clarified in any act allowing for the defense of oneself. While it is true that one has the right to defend
themselves, the case before us is not one of those cases where the Petitioner can claim an affirmative
defense of self-defense. Simply look at the evidence submitted by the Petitioner, the health bar at the top
right of his screen barely was affected by the swing of a bat. However, as soon as the bat struck the
individual, the Petitioner pulled out his firearm, and then icyslider2 who struck him immediately turned
around and started retreating. At this point, the icyslider2 was no longer a threat in any sense, he has a
melee weapon and cannot possibly injure the Petitioner from the distance that was accumulated during
his retreat. However, the Petitioner disregarded this fact completely and began to fire at the individual,
paused to reload, and then continue firing until he fell to ground dead and lifeless. His back was turned
while the Petitioner continued to shoot icyslider2. In no world, can this reasonably be construed as self-
defense. If the court were to rule in favor of the Petitioner and claim that self-defense prevailed in this
situation, all hope will be inevitably lost if the law permits the execution of individuals who no longer
pose a threat, are in the process of running away, and have their back turned to the smoking barrel.
The Respondent, MedinaLUV, was fully within his authority acting under the color of the law to
arrest the Petitioner for killing icyslider2.
II. THE PETITIONER IS INCORRECT IN STATING THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THE
CHARGES WILL BE NULL AFTER AJUDICIATION
The Petitioner tries to allege that there would be no distinction in between the charge of
Involuntary Manslaughter and Second-Degree murder if this arrest was upheld. They claim that “when
one causes the death of another, it will be officer and prosecutorial discretion as to whether to charge a
defendant with Involuntary Manslaughter or Second-Degree Murder.” This is incorrect in the light that
the Petitioner states that the separation of charges would be “useless.” Lesser charges have a long-
established position in criminal codes across the world, they are to be reserved for certain situations
where the burden may not necessarily be present to prove a higher charge, the lesser charges can be
utilized as a substitution to still ensure that a punishment follows through for the commission of a crime.
Officers have long established the law via the “spirit of the law,” as opposed to the literal “letter of the
law.” Officers are guaranteed this responsibility during their duties as law enforcement officers, and it is
at their discretion to decide which crime to charge someone with the presence of the necessary evidence
to substantiate such a claim.
The Petitioner is also incorrect to state that Involuntary Manslaughter and Second-Degree
Murder would have the same definition if this arrest were to be upheld. The charge of Involuntary
Manslaughter under R. Crim. Code § 3.06 states that one is to be held criminally liable for this charge if
they commit the “act of ignoring a known or obvious risk or disregards the life and safety of others and
causes the death of another.” While the charge of Second-Degree Murder under R. Crim. Code § 3.10
states that one is to be held criminally liable for this charge if they commit the act of
“The act of intentionally or knowingly causing death of an individual; or of causing, with intent,
serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes death of an
individual; or of committing or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the
commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human
life.”
It becomes incredibly evident here that the charge for Involuntary Manslaughter has the elements
for Second-Degree Murder, however, it is increasingly present that there is a distinct punishment
differentiation. One is also a misdemeanor while the other is a felony. This is apparent and expected as
Involuntary Manslaughter is a lesser charge, while compared to Second-Degree Murder. The respondent
utilized his discretion as a law enforcement officer, while meeting and satisfying the requirements
necessary for involuntary manslaughter, chose to arrest the petitioner for such.
To further on the contentions within the last paragraph, it should also be acknowledged and
understood that writs of habeas corpus have long been recognized as “discretionary writ[s]” See Wade v.
Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). Due to the extraordinary circumstances that arise around the petition in
situations where one seeks such a writ. Because of its nature as an extraordinary writ, it should be saved
for situations where the alleged violation is a lot more flagrant than the circumstances in this case. In
fact, due to the very nature of the charge, the Petitioner was disciplined lightly by receiving a lesser
charge, as opposed to the more severe charge, Second-Degree Murder.
To grant the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the Petitioner would be an erroneous decision and
should be avoided.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we ask that this court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: April 30th, 2022 TURNTABLE5000
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
