IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
NUGHSON, an individual and company
owner,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOMMES, in his official capacity as State
Attorney General and chief law enforcement
officer,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-290
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
DISMISS
COME NOW, Nughson, through the undersigned counsel does file suit against the above
captioned parties and alleges the following:
ARGUMENTS AGAINST DISMISSAL
A. Facts affirming that Plaintiff seeks valid relief
The Plaintiff is Mr. Nughson, the company owner of W Investigations1 and was notified
by the Secretary of State that he should not engage in the conduct which is illicit under Sec. 3.13
of the Stalking Statute entrenched in the Ridgeway County Criminal Code.
The entire point of Mr. Nughson’s company is to engage in practices that are equivalent
to a private investigator (PI). Plaintiff intends to engage in the conduct of following individuals
for which the State has unconstitutionally outlawed in violation of the 1st Amendment in the
United States Constitution.
Plaintiff seeks appropriate redress as we do not ask for the Court to remove the law off
the statute books in the civil complaint. It is evident that this injury will “likely [...] be redressed
by the requested relief” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). We ask for the
Court to declare the law unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable, a longstanding and
granted permission seen as “fundamental” to the way of a constitutional republic government.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 317 (1803).
B. Standing criteria for pre-enforcement challenges differs from the standing the State
has applied in their motion
Plaintiff has noted that they intend to engage in the course of conduct and seek no
interest in being criminally liable for such actions while they remain enforceable. See Babbitt v.
Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 S.Ct. 2301 (1979). Movants of the motion cite Lujan for no other
1 https://trello.com/c/gXuis8UT/21-w-investigations
reason than surplusage as it does not relate to this case and they explicitly note that. “[O]ne does
not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury
is certainly impending that is enough.” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 593 (1923);
see Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 143 (1974); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 526 (1925), citing Babitt, ibid.
Plaintiff mixes both standing requirements for injuries-in-fact with standing-injuries and
pre-enforcement injuries without separation in the motion to create the appearance of
pre-enforcement challenges holding the same requirements. They are wrong. "[W]here
threatened action by [the] government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose
himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat" see List.
C. The Court should favor a motion for leave to amend the complaint to fix an issue
under the harmless error standard
Defendant is named incorrectly in his private capacity instead of his capacity instead of
in his official capacity as State Attorney General in the Plaintiff’s civil complaint. Defense also
concedes this is the case indirectly through their mere intervention. The Supreme Court has
upheld that unless the motion to amend under this convention is done to “work [to create] very
unfair and mischievous results” it should be granted. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
51 (1967). We submit this request in good faith and ask for leave to amend. See Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
Therefore the motion should be DENIED.
Date: 23rd April, 2022
/s/ ALEXJCABOT
Executive Director
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
cabot#0313
Counsel of Record
/s/ DAVIDLCLARKE
Staff Attorney
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
xd#5562
Counsel of Record
