IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, an
organization,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHADOWCULTURE, in his official capacity
as Sheriff and de facto chief peace officer ex
rel RIDGEWAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, a law enforcement agency,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-285
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
DISMISS
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION
I. DISMISSAL IS NOT WARRANTED PER COMMON LAW
A. Uncontested facts presented
Movant of the motion does not contend that the Plaintiff’s have suffered an injury-in-fact
pursuant to List, et al v. Driehaus, et al, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
Movant does not contend that Plaintiff’s suit is anything other than a pre-enforcement
challenge as recognized under the common law. "[W]here threatened action by [the] government
is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to
challenge the basis for the threat" List, ibid.
B. Plaintiff is correctly denoted as an organization, namely the Ridgeway Civil
Liberties Union
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right of organizations to challenge laws,
in pre-enforcement challenges because of their public interest on behalf of their membership.
The ACLU has constantly been permitted to file pre-enforcement suits along with the most
recent and high-profile pre-enforcement challenge relating to abortion in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Org. __ U.S. ___ (2022). The organization is registered as a sole proprietorship
with special licensing permits and therefore requires no internal vote on issues.
Membership denotes participation in the suit as a union with common standing. “[O]ne
does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the
injury is certainly impending that is enough.” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 593
(1923); see Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 143 (1974); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 526 (1925), citing Babitt, infra.
Movants cite Sierra Club in a convincing citation which states “a mere interest in a
problem, no matter how long standing the interest and no matter how qualified the organization
is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization adversely
affected or aggrieved.” However, the facts do not align itself contextually to this case and
therefore have no valid persuasive authority. The Union does not allege that it is representative
and injured by itself being a “member of the public” and the entire “authority” of the public rest
behind them in this suit, but rather its interests and its membership desire to participate in the
free exercise of the 2nd amendment.
Suits time and time again have been launched in the name of an organization/institution
for the exact reasons outlined in this most by the real-life parallel of the Ridgeway Civil
Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union. See ACLU v. Clapper (2015), Reno v.
ACLU (1997), ACLU v. Alvarez (2010), ACLU v. NSA (2007), ACLU v. Department of Defense
(2005), ACLU v. CIA (2018), ACLU v. United States (2021), Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati1, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger,2 Brown
v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n3, Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.4, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l
USA5, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.6, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe7, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project8. In fact, the most common challenge regarding pre-enforcement
suits are led by organizations who are representative of their membership who suffer harm under
the ordinances and regulations under challenge.
C. Movant erroneously attempts to use standing requirements and common law from
non-pre-enforcement cases to justify dismissal
Movant cites Harris et Morton none of which are pre-enforcement challenges to law and
so their standing requirements are inherently different between standing requirements that are
for example demanded in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016). The contexts of which
movant quotes have no reference to pre-enforcement mechanisms and so have very little
deciding weight in favor of the motion for the defense.
D. Substitution of plaintiffs is not necessary nor demanded by common law and if the
Court did rule in favor of leave to amend, substitution of plaintiff’s would not be
illicit
Substitution of Plaintiffs is not an uncommon practice by the Courts and is demanded
sua sponte without general in fact there are such things called “motion to substitute plaintiff[s]”
see United Copper Co. v. Amal. Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917). It is a long held practice
and is practiced frequently in the lower [federal] and State Courts. See also McCluskey v.
Marysville North'n Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 36 (1917). If the Court were to favor the Defense argument
then a request to amend the complaint to substitute the parties would not be frowned upon and
in fact would be permitted absent any regulation from the State Supreme Court.
THEREFORE, THE MOTION SHOULD BE REJECTED.
8 561 U.S. 1 (2010)
7 530 U.S. 290, (2000)
6 535 U.S. 234 (2002)
5 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)
4 484 U.S. 383 (1988)
3 564 U.S. 786, 789, (2011)
2 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037-39 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
1 822 F.2d 1390, 1391-96 (6th Cir. 1987)
Date: 22nd April, 2022
/s/ ALEXJCABOT
Executive Director
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
cabot#2709
Counsel of Record
/s/ INSERTREALITY
Staff Attorney
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
Mike_BN#2768
Counsel of Record
