IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, an
organization
Plaintiff,
v.
SHADOWCULTURE, in his official capacity
as Sheriff and de facto chief peace officer ex
rel RIDGEWAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, a law enforcement agency,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-285
CIVIL COMPLAINT
COME NOW, the Ridgeway Civil Liberties Union, through the undersigned counsel
does file suit against the above captioned parties and alleges the following:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges:
1. The Senate of the State of Ridgeway passed the S. 9 known as the “Firearm Freezone
Act” on the 3rd of April 2022 with the Governor passing his signature on the bill on the
4th April 2022 - enacting the bill into statute law.
2. The bill places overreaching and constitutionally vague restrictions on the right to bear
arms ingrained in the 2nd Article of Amendment in the U.S. Constitution.
3. The bill is also in violation of Sec. XII of the State Constitution for the reasons outlined
in point 2.
4. A pre-enforcement challenge is necessary to protect the rights of all members of the
State and the liberties provided to them. "[W]here threatened action by [the] government
is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing
suit to challenge the basis for the threat" List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014).
5. Plaintiffs present arguments against two parts of the bill which strike integral to its entire
construction, specifically the establishment of Gun-Free Zones without lawful exceptions
and secondly the ability of law enforcement to confiscate guns in “any private property”
(which would seek to include private homes under its current meaning) or “public
venue” in a public event or protection detail.
6. The current construction of S. 9 Sec. 2(g) does not limit these seizures to the event at
hand and instead extends with no limit to also include a seizure of a firearm, for
example, in Oakland Park during a “public event” in the airport.
7. As time continues the law continues to infringe the right to bear arms. Powell v.
McCormack: “[A]n unconstitutional action [that] has been taken before surely does not
render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.” 395 U.S. 486, 546-47
(1969).
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
1. The purpose of the bill to “prevent danger”1 is overly broad and takes no external
considerations for the usage of other weaponry and only targets the right to bear arms. It
places no restrictions on other offensive weaponry including axes, knives or bats which
can all do severe bodily harm resulting in death. It is necessary for the Courts to review
legislative history as a basis for upholding or subjecting laws to scrutiny. See Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212 (1994) “we consider the legislative history
and these amendments to be persuasive evidence”.
2. Sec. 2(g)2 This bill serves to be in direct violation of the 2nd Amendment right to bear
arms for the purpose of self-defense and in the home, as a singular example of a place of
confiscation. The Supreme Court held in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2010) that the “right to bear arms implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the
home”.
3. No balancing test should be applied to the case as the Court in Heller rejected such for
many Constitutional rights including the 2nd Amendment right to bear arms, just as they
have done for 8th and 9th Amendment rights. The Court said that by “replacing
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to
their design. Vague standards are manipulable.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
67-68 (2004). “Strict and intermediate scrutiny today are primarily used in substantive
due process and equal protection cases, and for certain aspects of First Amendment free
speech doctrine.” See Heller, et al v. District of Columbia, et al, (2010) (Kavanaugh, J.)
(dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
4. As a result, it is clear that the Court should interpret the Constitution plainly and in
coordination with Heller. “[L]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 844 (1992))
5. Sec. 2(g) of the Act is plainly unconstitutional and must be subjected to a plain and
historical reading and should be struck down on void for vagueness grounds. The
void-for-vagueness doctrine prohibits the government from imposing sanctions “under a
criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it
2 “Active law enforcement may prohibit firearms in any private property, or public venue in the case of a public
event or protection detail. For a temporary amount of time.”
1 See Ridgeway Firearm Freezone Act, Sec. 2(a)
punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement”, Welch v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016).
6. “Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e. g., Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment
applies to modern forms of search, e. g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35–36
(2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Heller,
supra, at 582.
7. It is clear that the Court ought to rule in favor of the holdings in Heller and McDonald
and in favor of the vertical stare decisis as accorded by the Supreme Court unless the
State Supreme Court seeks to overrule any portion, failing to do so would be to abuse
their discretion. A Court would “abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405 (1990).
8. The bill should be severed in accordance with INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931 (1983)
“unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which
are within its powers, independently of which it is not”.
9. The Court decided on the establishment of the person's right of arms for self defense
using the following test: “(1) whether the right to keep and bear arms is “fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty,” 561 U. S., at 767 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
145, 149 (1968)), and (2) whether “this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition,’ ” McDonald, supra, at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S.
702, 721 (1997)) holding that such is a “basic right”, ibid.
JURISDICTION
1. The jurisdiction of the Court originates from Art. V, Sec. IV which states “There shall be
a Superior court which shall exercise original jurisdiction for all civil and criminal cases
or controversies…”
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
1. The Plaintiff is seeking non-monetary relief
a. A declaration from the Court declaring the portions of the Ridgeway Firearm
Freezone Act unconstitutional or in its entirety if the Court finds itself conducting
the legislature's job of omitting and extracting parts of the law.
b. That the Court declare such provisions unenforceable under the weight of law
until the legislature enacts a new constitutional bill.
2. The Plaintiff also seeks additional relief of which the Court may grant that is not
requested through this complaint.
Date: 19th April, 2022
/s/ ALEXJCABOT
Executive Director
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
cabot#2709
Counsel of Record
/s/ TACUSS
General Counsel
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
Tacus#8045
Counsel of Record
/s/ BROTHEMAN1
Senior Staff Attorney
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
Brothe#0001
/s/ AEROZEV
Staff Attorney
RIDGEWAY CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
1200 Oakfield Road, Suite 452
Palmer, Ridgeway
Jack922#9417
