ADM F. 500 (Rev. 03/22) Order and Judgment
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN RE
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DOCKET NO. RSC-AD-268
STEKING2008
Petitioner
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Law Enforcement Training Center blacklists are continuous denials of employment.
Because it is a requirement to hold a certification before gaining employment within a law
enforcement organization, it makes itself a necessary power to ensure uniformity in law
enforcement training notwithstanding what department a person is taken into. However, because
it makes itself a contingent latch, it positions itself as a gatekeeper of who is and is not a law
enforcement officer in a punitive regard rather than an educational regard. Suddenly, the agency
then takes it upon itself to proactively leverage the contingent latch that was given to ensure
uniformity in training and exploit that leverage to exact its own will of justice. This is a practice
that was common before the new set of laws, yet explicitly denied by the legislature and is
antithetical to the spirit of the law See Public Safety Act § 2(f). The Public Safety Act explicitly
demands that there be some sort of due process of law afforded to even the revocation of a
certification See Public Safety Act § 2(e)(i). It is preposterous to argue that a revocation ought to
be wrapped with more due-process from an ultimate denial of employment.
The hyper-technical argument of the respondents when reading the statute to reason is
wrong and without due regard for a pragmatic approach to law. It is important to always review
the law in the material understanding of all facts. If respondents wanted to be successful with
their argument they would have to prove that petitioner would have a chance of being employed
at any law enforcement agency such as the State Police, or the Sheriff’s Office. However, the
petitioner cannot get employed at these agencies, and he will never be able to because he has this
blacklist. See APA 2.5 § (b)(1)(9). Therefore, the blacklist from the training center becomes a
de-facto employment blacklist. The only way to defeat this point is to prove that he would not be
hindered in gaining employment. Not by going on a tangential argument without consideration to
the consequences of their decision.
This interpretation does not restrict the ability of the government to take adequate action
against dealers, nor does it tie its hands to prevent dealers from rejoining the ranks of
government. There are methods that the law provides which the government can use to ensure
dealers and other severe wrongdoers do not rejoin the ranks of employment. It is called criminal
prosecution. The law opposes and rebukes those who attempt drastic action unilaterally. To
demand that a person get their due process rights fulfilled via a criminal prosecution is not a
burdensome one when the law makes provisions to allow departments to place a person on
indefinite administrative leave if there is an active criminal investigation. See APA § 1.6(b)(1).
There is no material hindrance to prevent adequate response to triage a dealer in the context of
the wide array of tools available to department leaders to properly administrate. All this requires
is that drastic, long term action against someone such as a de-facto blacklist from pretty much
any law enforcement agency, be done with due process of a criminal prosecution.
Retroactive laws which are not criminal are not constitutionally forbidden. Not under the
United States nor our constitution. In Flemming v. Nestor, the court found that ex post facto
denial of social security benefits was not a violation of the ex post facto clause of the
constitution. The court ruled that because the action was not punitive in nature, it is not a
violation of the ex post facto clause. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). Furthermore,
“prohibition is confined to laws respecting criminal punishments, and has no relation to
retrospective legislation of any other description.” See Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S.
227 (1912). However, there is a due process issue that needs to be addressed with retroactive
civil litigation. While the government regulating itself, for the most part, does not create any due
process concerns, we will proceed as if the government is entitled in some way, shape, or form to
due process. When reviewing a retroactive law under the lens of due process, it is evaluated
under the rational basis test. See PBGC v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984). Finally the
court needs to review whether the legislature intended for the provisions to be executed
retroactively. Generally, unless explicitly specified that a provision is retroactive, it shall not be
applied unless the language of the law requires it. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204 (1988). In addition, “[a]n appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision, unless such application would work a manifest injustice or there is statutory
direction or legislative history to the contrary.” See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S.
696 (1974)
Now that we have a good basis and understanding of retroactivity in law, it is time to
consider the language of the law, as well as any manifest injustices from retroactive application
and apply it to the case. As explained with the reasoning for removing the blacklist from the Law
Enforcement Training Center, these actions have prolonged consequences. The placement of the
petitioner on a blacklist is not an injury per say, but a guarantee of one for a background
investigator or application reader to hold an unlawful bias against the petitioner in a hiring
period. The injury sustained by the petitioner is continuous and cannot be compounded to a
single point of action. For example, if a department made a policy outlining an allowed practice
and in fact ordering its officers to fulfill such, however the legislature decides this practice is
wrong, would the order still stand? Of course it wouldn’t. How different is a department blacklist
from this case? After all, a blacklist is an order to deny a person on all future applications.
The reasons for setting aside the dishonorable discharge of the parks service is of the
same degree as the above. A dishonorable discharge has certain statutory disabilities placed on a
petitioner such as the fact that they will get looked disfavorably in all future hiring decisions, and
that he would hold a four month denial of employment from that agency See APA § 1.3(a). In
exchange for these disabilities, the legislature placed in a nuanced system of protections such as
the right to an administrative hearing See APA § 1.3(b). Here the government is attempting to
unfairly leverage retroactivity to gain the disabilities of it, but not the procedures of attaining
those disabilities. If the government wants these disabilities to be effective, it must follow the
procedure demanded by law. If the government wishes to keep the dishonorable discharge then it
must be done upon recommendation of a hearing. If the government is not attempting to leverage
the new statutory disabilities of a dishonorable discharge, then it must modify its action to be
conformant to law as to prevent future violations.
Due to the retroactivity framework, the court will not adjudicate whether the
dishonorable discharge is arbitrary.
So long as there is no unlawful preclusion from the petitioner of him gaining a Law
Enforcement Training Center certification by the petitioner having a revoke, then there is no
reason as according to the retroactive framework I have presented above to set aside the revoke
for a violation of statutory rights. If the court were to apply the statute retroactively in this case
and in this part, then almost every certification would be subject to reinstatement, an
interpretation the court finds to be an injustice so therefore it must not be considered
retroactively.
CONCLUSION
The Law Enforcement Training Center blacklist is SET ASIDE, however its revocation
shall remain effective so long as there is no preclusion from gaining a new certification.
The dishonorable discharge from the Ridgeway Parks Service is SET ASIDE, however
no order of reinstatement shall be made without a recommendation from an administrative
hearing, and to provide a chance for the government to uphold the dishonorable discharge, it
shall convene an administrative hearing.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
At Palmer, Ridgeway, this 17th day of April, 2022.
/s/ siteowner
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
RIDING THE SUPERIOR COURT
