STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSV-CV-270
Plaintiff
v.
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Defendant
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
The State of Ridgeway moves for a summary judgement in favor of the Defendant.
ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE AT-LARGE IS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A State “cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” Railroad Co. v. Tennessee,
101 U. S. 337, 339 (1880). This is the foundational principle of sovereign immunity. This means
that unless a state waives their sovereign immunity, they may not be subject to litigation in the
courts of their own state. And this principle is ingrained in our system of government. Section
2.2(b) of the Rid. Civil Claims Act (2022) provides that “the government is immune from all
suits except those in this section, and in later laws in which liability is explicitly created.”
Subsection 2.1 of this Section provides that “any policy, order, procedure, or directive that
impedes on an individuals rights, immunities, or privileges secured by law, charter, or the
constitution shall be subject to injunctive relief,” et seq. This waiver (which is the basis for the
claim presently before this court) is analogous to the narrow exception to sovereign immunity
created by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S 123 (1908). See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 US 89, at 102 (1984)(recognizing Young as an “exception to the general rule of
sovereign immunity.”) The application of this statute to suits seeking to enjoin enforcement of
laws, policies, orders, or procedures should be read in accordance with Young’s limitations. And
so, while there is a waiver for sovereign immunity under the facts alleged by the Plaintiff, this
liability does not attach to the State at-large, and instead attaches exclusively to the individual
responsible for enforcing the policy, order, or procedure that is being challenged. This is true,
because the exception created under Young only extends to individuals that are responsible for
enforcing the unconstitutional policy. The State at-large, as named here, is not.
Young reasoned that liability would only attach to the individual responsible for
enforcing the act because “it is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting
by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because it is
unconstitutional.” Young, at 159. That's why the court in Young noted that it was wrong to just
name any officer of the state that doesn’t have the responsibility to enforce the law because
doing so would “merely make[] him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby
attempting to make the State a party.” Young, at 157. The state may not be a party because
liability both doesn’t attach to the state as a whole for merely having the law on the books, and
because sovereign immunity serves as a shield. And for this precise reason, when suits seek to
enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law, individuals not responsible for their
enforcement, but named as defendants, have been allowed to obtain dismissal on sovereign
immunity grounds. See Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S __ (2021)(dismissing all but
three defendants on the basis of sovereign immunity).
This court, however, has already rejected this logic by positing that because this suit
comes after the law has already been enforced, it is no longer a “pre-enforcement challenge.”
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, at 1. But Young’s application still survives. Because this suit
seeks to enjoin all future enforcement of this law, it is effectively a pre-enforcement challenge.
Moreover, because this suit is not a suit against the perpetrator of the purportedly illegal action, it
is framed as a pre-enforcement challenge and the court should construe it as such. But even then,
if this case is to be construed as a facial challenge to the statute in controversy, it would still face
the same sovereign immunity obstacles Young articulates. Regardless of what category this case
falls under, the confines of Young still govern.
Facial challenges to laws seeking to enjoin their enforcement must overcome the hurdle
of sovereign immunity. The way they do that is by suing the individual responsible for enforcing
the law. The State at-large is not that individual. Because of this, it cannot be the defendant.
II. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING AGAINST THE NAMED DEFENDANT
This court, in rejecting the State’s motion to dismiss, held that because the state
“produced the first set of laws and acts, of which the wildlife act falls under” it is “correctly
named as defendant.” App. A, at 1. But no jurisprudence begets this rationale. In fact, this
holding contravenes decades of case-law. Young explicitly rejected this logic. Liability, as we’ve
noted, is not created by having an unconstitutional law on the books. Young reasoned that laws
that are unconstitutional, but passed by the sovereign are already “void.” Young at 159. And so,
liability only attaches to individuals who attempt to “use the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act.” Id. And only then, is it an “illegal act.” Id. The Defendant, the State of
Ridgeway at-large, is not responsible for the injury on a legal basis.
But the causal link between the injury and the defendant is a necessary prerequisite for a
claim to have standing. First we make note that because Article V, Section IV gives jurisdiction
to this court over all “cases and controversies.” Because this clause is analogous to the Article
III, Section II cases and controversies clause of the United States Constitution, it is entitled to the
deference that years of jurisprudence has given it. This means that all Plaintiffs before this court
must have standing. Standing exists when, among other things, a Plaintiff “allege[s] personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by
the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 US 737 (1984). But Plaintiff’s allegations do not draw
this nexus. The injury sustained by the Plaintiff is traceable to the individual that inflicted the
injury, no where do they allege that the State at-large caused the injury. That’s because the State
at-large can’t cause the injury. Passing a law that is purportedly unconstitutional is not an injury,
what is, however, is the enforcement of it. That was the precise reasoning in Young and the
reason why enforcement challenges alleging that a law is facially unconstitutional is almost
always brought against the principle enforcer of that law. The State at-large is not liable and
Plaintiff has failed to prove that the alleged injury is fairly traceable to it.
III. RELIEF CANNOT BE GRANTED
Plaintiff, in suing the State at large, confronts even more difficulty in proving that the
injury is “likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Id. Plaintiff sues the entire State of
Ridgeway and seeks an injunction enjoining the enforcement of Section III(b) of the Rid.
Wildlife Conservation Act. But an injunction “operate[s] in personam” Nken v. Holder, 556 US
418 (2009). A State is hardly considered a person. The State of Ridgeway encapsulates an entire
operational government, citizens of the State, and every discrete inner working of an entity of
such immensity. Surely a judicial relief mechanism meant to operate against individual people
cannot operate against an entire State. For the court to issue this relief, and fashion it broadly
against the entire State as the Plaintiff asks, would be to implement an order that makes
individuals who are not adversaries nor parties to this suit bound by it. There is no hidden feature
of the gavel that gives it this sweeping authority. A court “cannot lawfully enjoin the world at
large, no matter how broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro tanto
brutum fulmen [to that extent ineffectual]” Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir.
1930) (Hand, J.).
IV. AS TO CAUSE OF ACTION 2, PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT LACKS MERIT
Plaintiff next argues that they have a right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.
But they misread this clause by ignoring its context. Article I, Section V of the Ridgeway State
Constitution reads that “every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of
life, liberty, and property.” But this clause, the one for which the Plaintiff cites, cannot be read
independently, and must be read in the context of the words they follow because they place
significant conditions on the extent to which this right is enjoyed. The clause itself is a preface to
what follows. It essentially reads that the government will do its due diligence to protect life,
liberty, and property because it is a right of those who are governed to have that protection from
the body that governs them. And in exchange, that person “is bound to contribute the member's
proportion towards the expense of that protection, and yield personal service when necessary.”
Ridgeway State Constitution Article I, Section V. This clause cannot be read, as this Plaintiff
reads it, to have a right to life liberty and property. Rather, it establishes an obligation of the
government to make those protections, and then posits that because of those protections, each
beneficiary is bound to contribute their fair portion to that protection. This clause is not a sibling
to the federal Constitution’s prohibition against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, which is how Plaintiff appears to have invoked it. This clause does not give
rise to a claim at law in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
CLIFFORD2
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
TURNTABLE5000
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
SHIGENOHARUMUNE
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Date: April 15, 2022
