STATE OF RIDGEWAY
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DOCKET NO. RSV-CV-2700
Plaintiff
v.
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Defendant
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
The State of Ridgeway moves to dismiss the above named suit.
ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE AT-LARGE IS THE INCORRECT DEFENDANT IN A
PRE-ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGE.
Pre-enforcement challenges such as this one arise out of traditional theories of equity
which were fortified in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S 123 (1908). The way they work is that an
individual who may be subject to an “excessive” injury if the act were to be enforced may sue
the “officer of the State…whom [has] some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it
is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the
State a party.” Id. at 157. Plaintiff here seeks an injunction enjoining the enforcement of the law.
But it would be impractical and unprecedented for the Court to enjoin the entire state at-large.
Indeed, pre-enforcement “defendants must have some connection with the enforcement of the
act—i.e., the right and the power to enforce the act alleged to be unconstitutional.” Whole
Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S __ (2021)(quoting Young, at 161). And in the event that the
named Defendant does not hold such authority, the Defendant must be dismissed. See Whole
Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S __ (2021) (dismissing a number of defendants in a
pre-enforcement suit because they “have no duty at all with regard to the act.”) The Plaintiff
names the incorrect defendant and as consequence will be unable to obtain the relief they seek.
On that principle alone, the case cannot proceed.
II. WILDLIFE MAY NOT FILE SUIT FOR “INJURIES” SUSTAINED WHILE FERAL.
Animals are not people. It would be contrary to science, tradition, and good practice for
this court to hold otherwise. Wildlife for purposes of the law exists when any person dons a “tail
or cat ears.” Rid. Wildlife Conservation Act §3(b)(i). And as they don those ears, they lose the
typical protections afforded to them by law, as well as their personhood. Animals, after all, are
not afforded the broad protections of the federal or state Constitution. Courts have even
recognized the Constitutional difference between animals and humans, and imply that they are
not afforded the same legal protections. “It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are
lawfully confined…they are not like animals in a zoo.” Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 US 1
(1978). The implication is that animals do not have rights. It is true as well, that animals are
often lawfully hunted, eaten, and killed for game. Humans seldom are. In fact, our laws explicitly
prohibit murder, but make plenty of comfortable room for hunting. Animals are not afforded the
same protections whether it be under the Constitution, or under the law at large.
When an individual dons their cat ears or tail, they knowingly waive the legal protections
that were previously afforded to them in their human condition. Because people have protection
under the law and the Constitution, animals do not. When they make this transition, they are no
longer entitled to those protections because our laws protect people, not animals. If this court
were to hold that animals can assert claims at law or file suits in equity, it would blatantly flout
the rule of law, and its traditional applications. Animals have never been afforded Constitutional
guarantees—certainly not the ones Plaintiff asserts—and this case cannot be the first to hold
otherwise.
There are practical implications for this as well. And the complaint filed by the Plaintiff
brings more questions than answers. How might an animal file a case without opposable thumbs?
Can animals argue in court or testify without the appropriate organs with which to conduct any
form of human speech? How can animals be expected to wear the appropriate attire to court if
they have four legs, instead of two arms? And how could the court even possibly evade the “my
client ate my homework/filings” claim? Endless questions. Too few answers. The case must be
dismissed.
Because the alleged constitutional transgressions were incurred while the Plaintiff was an
animal, and because animals are not entitled to the Constitutional rights asserted, Plaintiff’s relief
cannot be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CLIFFORD2
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Counsel of Record
TURNTABLE5000
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
SHIGENOHARUMUNE
Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Date: April 13, 2022
