IN THE RIDGEWAY COUNTY COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
TRENDLUV,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RIDGEWAY COUNTY
Defendant.
Case No. CCRC-CV-1445
Presiding Judge: Hon. SpencerNixon
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
In the defendant’s motion to dismiss, their first and second claim is that the
plaintiff did not satisfy Rid. R. Civ. P.9(a)(2). This rule says that “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, the
defense has this wrong when they argue that the plaintiff did not satisfy this. This rule
was met on two counts –– in the statement of facts and statement of arguments. See civil
complaint. This also extends to point three. Even so, the plaintiff would like to expand
upon the foundational claim in the motion to dismiss. The defense says, “[w]e argue that
the defendant has the full right to terminate any employee of the County for a reasonable,
or in this case, fully accurate, belief that an individual is engaging in illegal activity and
association with those who would jeopardize the mission and duty of the County.” As this
is a dispute, it clearly indicates the court has some reason to hear this case. In point four
of the motion to dismiss, the defense brings up the notion of due process. “[N]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Amend. V.
In this case, these clauses create competing interests—preserving executive power while
ensuring due process rights. There is a vast array of liberty interests that exist within our
society. In this case, we must consider one: employment. We must first identify the
“private interest that will be affected by the official action.” Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 at 335 (1976). Freedom to seek employment is a strong private interest that
must be con- sidered when due process is concerned. The first prong is met. Second, the
“risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in- terest through the procedures used.” Ibid.
Under the Ridgeway County Charter, Section 3.03(c), “[t]he County Executive is
authorized to suspend or remove County employees with just grounds unless the
employee is a member of the County Sheriff's Office or the District Attorney's Office.”
The question before this court was whether that termination was supported with “just
grounds,” ibid. Lastly, the “[g]overnment’s interest” and the “administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Ibid. Given the fact
that this is a slippery slope of a situation, additional or substitute procedural requirements
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would need to be explored more in-depth through the keeping of this case on the docket.
The simple idea that “[t]he power of removal is incident to the power of appointment”
holds true in this case. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 48 (1926). In their seventh
point, the defense questions the effectiveness of a writ of quo warranto. Now, this form
of writ is commonly used in civil cases throughout the United States of America. It
typically serves as the cause of action to justify, in this case, the enforcement of a legal
right against another party. In this case, that legal right would be the right to employment.
Ibid. As for the question into the requested materials in the relief, the plaintiff’s
termination requires “just grounds,” ibid. Therefore, the plaintiff is asking for the
defendant to explain why the termination was supported with just grounds.
DATED: July 16th, 2021 Respectfully submitted,
TrendLUV
/s/ TrendLUV
Attorney for the Plaintiff pro se
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