Ridgeway Unified Courts

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No. CCRC-AP-1347 __________________________________________________________________ IN THE RIDGEWAY COUNTY COURT APPELLATE DIVISION Tomskipetski5, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LewisMedvedeva, In His Official and Personal Capacity; PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT Defendant-Appellee. On Appeal from the Ridgeway County Court No. CCRV-AP-1347 Hon. spencernixon, NateLMarshall, LewisFPowell APPELLEE’S ANSWER BRIEF JAREDFT45 Assistant District Attorney COMISSIONER_JASON Assistant District Attorney SITEOWNER District Attorney Office of the District Attorney, Civil and Appellate Affairs Division 1 Jackson Street, Palmer , RW [email protected] Attorneys for Ridgeway County TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 3 STATUTORY [AND REGULATORY] AUTHORITIES 3 ISSUE(S) PRESENTED 4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4, 5 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 ARGUMENT 6 I. LEGALITY OF TERMINATION 6 A. Standard Of Review 6 B. Standard Operating Procedure Violations 6, 7 1. Civilian Ride Along Policy 6, 7 C. Breach of Contract 8, 9 1. Non-Disclosure Agreement Violation 8,9 II. APPLICATION OF TWOMBLY/IQBAL STANDARDS 9-11 CONCLUSION 12 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152 6 (9th Cir. 2017) Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) 6 Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616 619 (9th Cir. 2004) 6 Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 9 Rules Ridd. R. App. P. 6(a)2 3 Other Authorities N/A 2 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT The County Court has jurisdiction of the case that was docketed as Case No. CCRC-CV-1308 pursuant to R.C.C § 4.07. The County Court’s Appellate Division also has supplemental jurisdiction to hear an appeal pursuant to R.C.C § 4.12. The County Court entered said judgement on June 20th, 2021. STATUTORY AUTHORITIES The Ridgeway County Courts has judicial authority, pursuant to R.C.C § 4.04 - R.C.C § 4.09; R.C.C § 4.12. The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 20th, 2021, within the allotted time frame of 5 days from the entry of the final judgement or ruling, pursuant to Ridd. R. App. P. 6(a)2. Thus, this Court has the authority to preside over the appeal. 3 ISSUE(S) PRESENTED I. Whether the County Court erred in granting the Appellee’s motion to dismiss. II. Whether the County Court correctly upheld the TWOMBLY/IQBAL standards whilst dismissing the case. STATEMENT OF THE CASE On the 11th of June, Tomskipetski5 (hereinafter “Appellant”) was on duty as part of his routine duties whilst employed by the Palmer Police Department (hereinafter “the PPD”). The Appellant was conducting a ride along without sending the signed civilian waiver from the ride along to their supervisor. Then the Appellant responded to a situation where they instructed the ride along to pick up evidence from a crime scene. Chief of Police LewisMedvedeva arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and took notice of the Appellant’s actions after being notified by a bystander and instructed the Appellant to report to the station immediately. Subsequently, the Appellant was placed on Administrative Leave, having his vehicles searched under the provisions of the Search Agreement between the Appellant and the Appellee. Shortly thereafter, the Appellant reported Medvedeva to the department’s Internal Affairs and the District Attorney’s Office. The Appellant provided the ride along with a GIF of their screen depicting elements of 4 equipment issued by the department - to which the Appellee alleged a breach of contract of an NDA agreement between the Appellant and the Appellee. Consequently, the Appellant was terminated from the PPD. Appellant contested said termination within the County Court wherein the Appellee’s motion to dismiss was accepted. Appellant now contests the judgment of the motion to dismiss. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The termination of the Appellant was legal, within the boundaries of law and within the rights of the Appellee to action such a termination. The termination was on the basis of Standard Operating Procedure violations & breach of contract (NDA). The County Court correctly prohibited the Appellant from obtaining monetary compensation in cases where the government is a defendant. The County Court correctly exercised and interpreted the TWOMBLY/IQBAL standards whilst dismissing the case. The County Court correctly prohibited the Appellant from bringing criminal charges in a civil action without legal/prosecutorial authority. 5 ARGUMENTS I. LEGALITY OF TERMINATION The Appellant’s conduct and/or actions resulted in a justifiable termination from Palmer Police Department. The termination was based on several violations of the Non-Disclosure Agreement signed by the Appellant, and violations of the department’s Standard Operating Procedure, which warranted said termination. A. Standard Of Review The Appellant’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim as. Dismissals for failure to state a claim are reviewed de novo. See Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017); Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011); Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 2004); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). (“We review de novo a County Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). B. Violation of the Standard Operating Procedure The Standard Operating Procedure outlines restrictions and regulations of how a civilian ride along must be conducted, while acting ‘in their capacity as an officer with the Palmer Police Department. These outlines provided by the 6 Standard Operating Procedure are known as the Ride Along Policy. The Ride Along Policy has listed requirements of how it must be conducted, and one key requirement states “Your immediate supervisor must be informed of the occurrence, you are not required to gain approval but inform them with details regarding the ride along”. The Ride Along Policy also has a correlative clause which states “The Patrol Office has the right to end the ride along at any time for any reason. The supervisor additionally has the right to deny the ride along. Conducting a ride along without informing your supervisor is PROHIBITED.” Another key major requirement that the Ride Along Policy states, is that the participant of the ride along is required to sign a waiver in the officers direct messages, and the officer must show proof of the participation signature to his or her supervisor. The Appellant conducted a civilian ride along without properly fulfilling the requirements outlined in the Ride Along Policy. The Appellant failed to inform his or her supervisor about the occurrence of the ride along, the Appellant also failed to send proof to his or her supervisor of the signed waiver, by the ride along participant. 7 C. Violation of the Non-Disclosure Agreement The Non-Disclosure Agreement that the Appellant signed has two major clauses, relevant to the facts of the appeal. Clause 2 of the Non-Disclosure Agreement, states “I understand and hereby agree to not disclose radio communications unless authorized by a competent authority of Ridgeway County. will not utilize any discord screen sharing methods to unauthorized persons, I will not give out screenshots, or provide video to the public that may contain radio communications that are being used within Ridgeway County.”. The appellate violated such clauses by uploading a GIF which showed a radio channel, named as “DEPARTMENT”. Because the Non-Disclosure Agreement contains a separate advisory statement, the disclosure of radio communications whether or not contains active radio communications, is PROHIBITED. The GIF also released by the Appellant, violated Clause 3 of the Non-Disclosure Agreement, which states, “I understand and hereby agree to not disclose leaderboards, active warrants, background checking information, sensitive records I have been entrusted with, and other information as so classified by relevant statutory provision. I understand that any means of disclosing these methods including the usage of Discord screen share, voice recordings, video recordings, text channels in relation, and other sensitive communications which would contain such records.” The GIF contained 8 background information, which includes, but not limited to: arrest records, citation records, status of citizenship, etc. Background information need not necessarily be classified, and as such, part of it can be public information such as criminal records & status of citizenship. II. COURT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE TWOMBLY/IQBAL STANDARDS The Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) embraced the core components of Twombly that established plausibility pleading and then explained that under Twombly, a “two-pronged approach” was necessary. First, only “well-pleaded factual allegations'' are entitled to the assumption of truth traditionally accorded to the plaintiff’s complaint. Such allegations, said the court, are to be contrasted with “legal conclusions'' or “[t]threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” which a court is free to disregard. Thus, the initial step in the Twombly analysis is for the court to identify those allegations that are “conclusory” and set them aside. Second, the court then determines whether the well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the 9 complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. In order to complete the initial step in the Twombly analysis for the civil complaint within the issue at hand, it would require the Courts to disregard more than half of the civil complaint given the excess number of conclusory allegations made by the Appellant, out of which some are quoted here. The Appellant constantly makes conclusive statements within their civil complaint that include arbitrary speculations, accusations and unsupported statements depicting the Appellant’s personal opinion and not actual facts that form the basis of the first prong. Such statements include an exaggerated statement of facts that do not accurately depict what transpired. Statement of facts are required to be concise, succinct and clear - rather than bold statements alleging corruption in every corner of the State, from the judiciary to the agencies - to the contrary, the Appellant’s civil complaint had all of the opposite; the basis upon which the Appellee filed for a dismissal. Moving forward to the second prong the court then determines whether the well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. The factual allegations of the Appellant within the case include statements of guilt pertaining to each policy violation the Appellant goes over within their civil complaint “The only part that the plaintiff has ever violated in this policy is one of the last 10 points..”, “In the “Ride Along Policy” the complainant has violated no points outside of forgetting to send the screenshot of the signed waiver..” Furthermore, the Appellant argues that they were acting under the provisions of a whistleblower, which the Appellant claims gave him immunity from violating a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Such statements of guilt do not satisfy the second prong wherein it is determined whether the factual allegations give rise to a relief. Appellee further argues that at the time of the violation of the NDA, there were no statutory provisions that defined or otherwise grants protections to an individual acting as a whistleblower - a fact that the Appellant clearly overlooked, as such at the time of violation, “whistleblowing” did not exist. Appellant also argues that they were “[Appellant] was acting in good faith”. Appellee contests that good faith is not an exception to breach of contract. Moreover, said contract contains an advisory clause that allows a termination of the employee should it be breached, regardless of intent. The County Court correctly upheld the standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal as they declined the Appellant’s request for monetary compensation from the government pursuant to 5 R. Stat. § 303. Also, the lower court denied the Appellant authority to pursue criminal charges within a civil action, the basis upon which the Appellant demanded multiple reliefs: monetary compensation, letter of regret & agency reforms - reliefs that could not be granted by the Court. 11 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee pleads to the Appellate Court that the judgment of the County Court should be upheld. Date: 5th July, 2021 /s/ Comissioner_Jason COMMISSIONER_JASON Assistant District Attorney /s/ jaredft45 JAREDFT45 Assistant District Attorney /s/ Siteowner SITEOWNER District Attorney Office of the District Attorney, Civil and Appellate Affairs Division 1 Jackson St, Palmer, RW [email protected] Attorneys for Ridgeway County 12

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