IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY PARKS SERVICE,
Defendant.
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Case No. RSC-CV-0750
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY
Plaintiff Halo4asin, appearing pro se, moves for summary judgment on liability on Counts I, II,
and III of the Amended Civil Complaint, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in support states as follows. Plaintiff relies on the concurrently filed Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”), the exhibits of record (Exhibits A-F), the Defendant’s
Answer, and this Court’s Ruling on July 11, 2026 (“Ruling”).
INTRODUCTION
1. This case is now ready for judgment on liability. The pleadings are closed, discovery is
not required, and the material facts come from the Defendant’s own admissions, the
exhibits both parties have relied upon, and the timeline this Court described as agreed. On
those facts, the Defendant denied Plaintiff’s appointment on a basis that did not qualify
under the closed criteria of 4 R. Stat. § 122.402, and did so without providing the
reasoning at the moment of denial that 4 R. Stat. § 122.402 requires under this Court’s
construction. Consistent with Section III of the Ruling, Plaintiff reserves the question of
monetary relief for a subsequent phase and seeks here only declaratory and injunctive
relief on liability.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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2. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit preclude summary judgment. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). This Court has already held that the
disputes the parties raised on the motion to dismiss - the sufficiency of the notice and the
point at which notice must be served - are purely legal issues. Ruling § I. Purely legal
issues on an agreed factual record are the office of summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
A. COUNT II - THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF 4 R.
STAT. § 122.404 UNDER THIS COURT’S CONSTRUCTION.
3. This Court has construed § 122.404: “the reasoning for the denial must be provided at the
moment of denial, not at a later time or date,” and “[b]y providing public notice of the
decision, the Ridgeway Park Service had chosen their moment.” Ruling § II. The Court
further recognized that § 122.404(a) permits the duty to be fulfilled by listing the
reasoning on a public database. Id.
4. The facts under that construction are undisputed. The Defendant chose its moment when
its Application Tracker publicly displayed Plaintiff’s Final Screening and Outcome as
“Failed.” SUMF ¶¶ 3-4. The Tracker contained no statement of reasoning; the
public-database route of § 122.404(a) was available and unused. SUMF ¶ 4. The
reasoning was first stated on June 25, 2026, at approximately 1:12 AM, by direct
message, after Plaintiff had pursued the Defendant’s officials for days - and both parties
agree June 25 is when Plaintiff was made aware of the basis. SUMF ¶¶ 5-7; Ruling § I.
The Defendant’s own Answer and Motion placed the June 25 statement at the center of
its defense. Answer ¶¶ 15, 20.
5. Because the reasoning was provided after the moment of denial rather than at it, the
Defendant violated § 122.404 as this Court has construed it. No fact necessary to that
conclusion is contested. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Count II as a matter of law.
B. COUNT I - THE DENIAL RESTED ON A CRITERION THAT DID NOT
QUALIFY UNDER THE CLOSED LIST OF 4 R. STAT. § 122.402.
6. Section 122.402 provides that background investigation criteria “shall be limited to” an
enumerated list. The only criterion the Defendant has ever identified is subsection (f):
whether the individual “has been terminated, or has received other adverse consequence,
within a department or agency.” The Superintendent stated the basis for denial in one
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sentence: Plaintiff “had an activity strike within RCFD.” SUMF ¶ 5; Answer ¶ 1
(admitting the statement).
7. “Other adverse consequence,” read alongside “terminated,” denotes a serious, settled
outcome. A word “is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it
is associated.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015). The undisputed record
shows that no such consequence existed. Warning I was acknowledged by the issuing
department as a clerical logging-bot error on June 16, 2026, and was formally removed
from Plaintiff’s record. SUMF ¶¶ 8-10; Answer ¶ 18 (admitting the acknowledgement
and removal). Warning II was appealed under the issuing department’s own Handbook
Policy 605-3 and is inactive; the Ridgeway County Fire Department’s General Counsel
certified in his official capacity that both warnings “are appealed and inactive” and that
“no adverse action currently stands against” Plaintiff. SUMF ¶¶ 11-13; Answer ¶ 19
(admitting RCFD’s description); Exhibit E.
8. The Defendant’s remaining theory - that an “appealed” warning is not “retracted” and
therefore remains a valid “received” adverse consequence - fails as a matter of law. TRhe
completion requirement of Policy 605-3 governs retraction, i.e., the deletion of a warning
from the record; it does not make an inactive, appealed notation an active adverse
consequence. The issuing department is the authority on the status of its own discipline,
and its General Counsel has certified that status in writing: inactive, appealed, no adverse
action standing. An appointing authority may not treat as a qualifying § 122.402(f)
consequence a notation that the issuing department certifies carries no standing adverse
action. To hold otherwise would read “adverse consequence” out of its statutory company
and convert a temporary, curable activity notation into the equivalent of a termination.
9. Nor can the Defendant retreat to the record “as it reasonably appeared” at the time of
decision. Even on that framing, the record before the Defendant included the “appealed”
notations on the issuing department’s own roster, and included Plaintiff’s direct
communication to the Superintendent on June 25, 2026 - with documentation - that both
warnings were appealed, together with a request that the denial be reversed or held
pending the appeal’s resolution. SUMF ¶¶ 14-15; Exhibit D. The Defendant published its
results excluding Plaintiff after that notice. SUMF ¶ 16. What “reasonably appeared” to
the Defendant was a basis its source department marked as under appeal - and the
Defendant proceeded anyway.
10. Because the sole stated basis for the denial was not a qualifying criterion within §
122.402’s closed list, the denial was contrary to legislative act, and the Defendant’s order
and procedure impeded rights secured to Plaintiff by statute within the meaning of 7 R.
Stat. § 122.101. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Count I as a matter of law.
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C. COUNT III - IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DENIAL WAS ARBITRARY
11. For the same undisputed reasons, the denial was arbitrary within the meaning of 4 R. Stat.
§ 121.001: the Defendant finalized Plaintiff’s exclusion after documented notice that the
asserted basis was appealed and inactive, on a criterion outside the closed statutory list.
Whatever weighing discretion § 122.001 commits to an appointing authority, it does not
extend to reliance on a non-qualifying criterion after notice of its status. To the extent the
Court grants judgment on Counts I and II, it need not reach Count III; Plaintiff presents it
in the alternative.
D. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT PRECLUDE JUDGMENT.
12. None of the Defendant’s affirmative defenses raises a genuine dispute of material fact.
The good-faith-reliance defense (Fourth) is contradicted by the Defendant’s own exhibit,
which shows direct notice to the Superintendent before publication. Exhibit D; SUMF ¶¶
14-16. The independent-basis defense (Fifth) fails as a matter of law for the reasons in
Part B. The subjective-judgment defense (Sixth) cannot authorize reliance on a criterion
outside § 122.402’s closed list. The mitigation defense (Eighth) is contradicted by the
record of Plaintiff’s escalation and completed appeals before publication. SUMF ¶¶ 8-16.
The Superintendent’s subjective knowledge - the subject of the sworn account the
Answer reserves - is immaterial to Counts I and II, which turn on the objective content of
the record and the timing of the reasoning under the Court’s construction. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248 (only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome preclude judgment).
RELIEF REQUESTED
13. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court: (a) grant summary judgment for Plaintiff on
liability on Counts I and II, and in the alternative Count III; (b) enter a declaratory
judgment that the Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application violated 4 R. Stat. §
122.402 and 122.404 and impeded rights secured by statute within the meaning of 7 R.
Stat. § 122.101; (c) enter a permanent restraining order under § 122.101 prohibiting the
Defendant from relying on the removed or appealed, inactive activity warnings as a
disqualifying adverse consequence; (d) order injunctive relief reversing the harm,
directing the Defendant to vacate the “Failed” Final Screening result and outcome as to
Plaintiff and to re-evaluate his application on the corrected record in conformity with §§
122.402 and 122.404; and (e) reserve the question of monetary relief or a subsequent
phase, consistent with Section III of the Ruling. A proposed order is submitted herewith.
CONCLUSION
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14. There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment
on liability as a matter of law. The motion should be granted.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
Dated: July 11, 2026
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on July 11, 2026, I served a true copy of the foregoing on counsel for the Defendant
via the Court’s e-filing system and the case channel.
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
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