IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY PARKS SERVICE,
Defendant.
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Case No. RSC-CV-0750
OPPOSITION TO PARTIAL
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
1. Defendant asks this Court to dismiss Count II and to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for monetary
relief. Both requests fail. Count II turns on disputed questions of fact - when Defendant’s
denial decision was made, whether Defendant ever “notified” Plaintiff and “specif[ied]
the reasoning” as 4 R. Stat. § 122.003 requires, and whether a statement extracted from
the Superintendent days later, only after Plaintiff repeatedly pursued him, satisfies that
duty. Those questions cannot be resolved on the pleadings. The request for monetary
relief is authorized by 7 R. Stat. § 122.003 and by the “injunctive relief reversing any
harm done” that § 122.101 expressly provides; at a minimum, any defect in the prayer is
curable by amendment and does not warrant dismissal with prejudice.
2. Defendant’s motion also asks the Court to do something it may not do on a motion
directed at the pleadings: resolve contested facts by reference to Exhibit D and to
Plaintiff’s Response to the Request for Particulars. If the Court considers those materials,
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment, and Plaintiff is entitled to
discovery - discovery that Defendant’s own Answer admits is necessary. The motion
should be denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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3. On a motion directed at the sufficiency of a pleading, the Court accepts the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the
pleader’s favor. Dismissal is improper unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency
of the claim; it is not a vehicle for resolving disputed facts or for weighing the adequacy
of the evidence.
4. Where matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court, a
motion of this character must be treated as one for summary judgment, and all parties
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present material and to take discovery.
Defendant’s motion relies on Exhibit D and on Plaintiff’s Response to the Request for
Particulars to argue a contested factual point - that reasoning was specified, and when.
That reliance triggers conversion.
5. Defendant styles its motion under “Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(E)” and alternatively invokes
“Rule 12(b),” "Rule 10(b),” and “Rid. R. Evid. 6(b)(2).” Plaintiff respectfully notes that
these citations do not correspond to any provision Plaintiff has been able to locate in the
Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure or Rules of Evidence. Plaintiff respectfully requests
that the Court require Defendant to supply the pinpoint text of each rule on which it
relies, and decline to credit any authority Defendant cannot accurately quote.
ARGUMENT
A. COUNT II STATES A CLAIM AND TURNS ON DISPUTED FACTS THAT
CANNOT BE RESOLVED ON THE PLEADINGS.
6. Count II alleges that Defendant, upon denying Plaintiff on the basis of a negative
background result, failed to “notify the applicant and specify the reasoning for the
negative result” as 4 R. Stat. § 122.404 requires, and that Defendant specified no
reasoning at the time of the denial, whether on its application results tracker or otherwise,
articulating the basis only afterward. Taken as true, that states a violation.
7. Defendant answers that the Superintendent’s June 25 statement (Exhibit D) satisfied §
122.404. That argument fails at this stage for several independent reasons.
8. First, the timing is disputed and material. The statute keys the duty to the denial.
Plaintiff’s Final Screening result was determined and reflected on Defendant’s
Application Tracker as “Failed” well before June 25 - Defendant’s own tracker entries of
record show the “Failed” determination existing days earlier. The Superintendent’s June
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25 statement therefore came after the denial decision, not upon it. Defendant’s theory that
the denial did not come operative until the class results were published conflates the
finality of the Ranger Class 22 results with the individual screening determination that §
122.404 governs. The statute requires notice upon denial, not upon publication of an
entire class’s outcome.
9. Second, whether the June 25 statement was “notice” at all is disputed. Plaintiff did not
receive an unprompted notification. He pursued the Chief Ranger and the Superintendent
for days - a June 23-34 inquiry, a June 24 message that went unanswered, and a June 25
request for clarification - before the Superintendent responded at approximately 1:12
AM. A statement extracted by the applicant after repeated prompting is not the
appointing authority “notify[ing] the applicant” within the meaning of § 122.404.
10. Third, whether the statement “specif[ied] the reasoning” is disputed. “An activity strike
within RCFD” does not identify which of two warnings was relied upon, does not engage
the closed criterion of 4 R. Stat. § 122.402(f), and does not supply the particularity the
statute contemplates. Whether that terse statement discharged the statutory duty is a
question of fact.
11. Fourth, and dispositively for this motion, Defendant proves its point only by asking the
Court to weigh Exhibit D and Plaintiff’s Response to the Request for Particulars against
the complaint’s allegations. That is improper on a motion directed at the pleadings. If the
Court does not exclude those materials, the motion must be converted to one for
summary judgment and Plaintiff afforded discovery. Defendant cannot avoid that result,
because its own Answer, at Paragraph 18, states that it lacks sufficient knowledge
whether the Fire Department’s clerical-error acknowledgement and Ticket 72 were
known to Defendant’s personnel before the results issued, “pending further investigation
and discovery.” Defendant cannot ask the Court to resolve the timing-and-knowledge
facts in its favor now while simultaneously representing that those very facts require
discovery.
12. Because Count II states a claim and, at a minimum, presents disputed facts, it may not be
dismissed.
B. PLAINTIFF’S PRAYER FOR MONETARY RELIEF IS AUTHORIZED AND, IN
ANY EVENT, IS NOT A PROPER TARGET FOR DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE.
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13. Defendant contends that 7 R. Stat. § 122.101 authorizes only a permanent restraining
order and injunctive relief, and that § 122.003 is “only a cap, not a grant.” The argument
is wrong, and in any event premature.
14. First, § 122.003 presupposes recovery. It caps monetary damages in a proceeding against
the government. A cap on damages in a proceeding against the government would be
meaningless if no proceeding against the government could ever yield damages. The
Legislature does not enact caps on remedies that can never exist. Section 122.003 thus
assumes that damages are recoverable in a proceeding properly brought against the
government - and this proceeding is such a proceeding, brought under § 122.101, the
provision Defendant concedes waives immunity.
15. Second, § 122.101 authorizes “injunctive relief reversing any harm done.” That language
is broader than a prospective, status-quo injunction. It reaches make-whole relief,
including monetary restitution, where vacatur and re-evaluation alone cannot undo the
harm Plaintiff has already suffered. So characterized, Plaintiff’s monetary request is
equitable relief within § 122.101’s remedial grant.
16. Third, Defendant itself does not treat the damages question as settled. While attacking
Plaintiff’s citation to § 122.003, Defendant’s own Seventh Affirmative Defense invokes a
different provision - 7 R. Stat. § 122.006(c) - as the operative cap. Defendant cannot have
it both ways. That the parties cite different provisions only confirms that the availability
and measure of monetary relief is an unsettled question unsuitable for resolution by
dismissal with prejudice.
17. Fourth, remedy questions are determined after liability. Whether and in what amount
Plaintiff may recover is not ripe on a motion directed at the pleadings, and the Court need
not resolve the scope of relief now.
18. Fifth, if the Court concludes that the prayer as pled is defective, the proper course is leave
to amend, not dismissal with prejudice. Plaintiff can plead his entitlement to monetary
relief with reference to the supplementary remedial provisions of Title VII, including 7 R.
Stat. § 121.402 and § 121.403. Plaintiff requests leave to amend in the alternative.
C. THE MOTION DOES NOT AND CANNOT REACH COUNTS I AND III OR THE
CORE REMEDY.
19. Defendant does not move against Count I (denial resting on an adverse consequence that
does not validly exist) or Count III (arbitrary action). Those counts proceed regardless of
the disposition of Count II or the prayer. The central relief Plaintiff seeks - vacatur of the
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“Failed” Final Screening result and re-evaluation of his application on the corrected
record - remains fully available under Counts I and III and § 122.101. The partial motion,
even if granted in full, would not narrow the case in any way that affects Plaintiff’s path
to that relief.
CONCLUSION
20. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss in its entirety; or, in the alternative, if the Court considers
matters outside the pleadings, treat the motion as one for summary judgment and permit
discovery; and, should the Court find any defect in the prayer for relief, grant Plaintiff
leave to amend rather than dismiss with prejudice.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
Dated: July 8, 2026
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on July 4, 2026, I served a true copy of the foregoing on counsel for the Defendant
via the Court’s e-filing system and the case channel.
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
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