THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
THR33SIX8
Plaintiff,
-against-
DOMINODOWNLOAD, in his official capacity as a
corporal of the Ridgeway State Police
pursuant to The Torts And Civil Procedure
Act of 2026 § 205(d)(ⅱ)/7 R. Stat. §
121.404; NISICULT, in his official capacity as a
police officer of the Milton City Police
Department pursuant to The Torts And Civil
Procedure Act of 2026 § 205(d)(ⅱ)/7 R. Stat.
§ 121.404; the RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE; and
the MILTON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.
Defendants.
RSC-CV-6949
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL
CLAIMS
Presiding Judge: Hon. EffortlessBrit
Plaintiff thr33six8, proceeding without counsel, hereby moves for summary judgement on
all claims put forward in this civil action's complaint on grounds that (1) there is no geniune
dispute of material facts and (2) the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Ridgeway's civil procedure lets the plaintiff move for summary judgment seven days
after the civil action's commencement. Rid. R. Civ. Pro. 38(b). Ridgeway's civil procedure also1
says that summary judgment "may be rendered on the issue of liability alone…" Id., at 38(c).
However, seeing that the presiding judge has made a ruling denying the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The ruling was on the grounds that (1) plaintiff has raised a geniune issue of
material facts and (2) plaintiff has shown that the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. It appears that the presiding judge will rule in accordance with how federal
procedure dictates summary judgment since the judge used the aforementioned two-pronged
approach in the aforementioned ruling instead of the "issue of liability" approach that's in Rid. R.
Civ. Pro. 38(c).
For reference, federal procedure says that summary judgment shall be granted if "the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). Higher courts have defined "genuine"
and "material"; the Supreme Court has said that an issue of fact becomes a geniune issue of fact
1 "Commencement" in the Rid. R. Civ. Pro. 3(a) sense ("A civil action is
commenced by filing a civil complaint and an entry fee through the court’s
electronic filing system"). It closely mirrors Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 3 ("A civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court").
if the evidence is "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
because "at the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986).
A material fact is a fact that'll affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id., at
248 ("As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment").
GROUNDS
1. There is no genuine dispute of material facts because the evidence corrobates
Compl. ¶ 19 and other material facts, and the evidence favors the movant.
The main question here is what's material. It's already been well-established that Compl.
¶ 19 is material because it is when Dominodownload killed me. Compl. ¶ 20 is also material
because it is when nisicult shot at me. Are these facts disputed? The first material fact that I
have raised, which is Dominodownload killing me, is denied by the defendants, and it is
therefore disputed. However, Compl. ¶ 20 is admitted and is therefore not disputed.
I do not believe that Compl. ¶ 3 (when I killed PPD Capt. xJvmma) is material because
that fact is too chronologically distanced from Compl. ¶ 19 to justify the defendants' actions
then. However, while the defendants deny Compl. ¶ 3, Compl. ¶ 3 is also corroborated by
evidence because Pl. Mat. Ex. 3 shows me killing her.
I also do not believe that there are any genuine disputes to be made of any material facts
in this civil action because my evidence corroborates not only the material facts that I've
mentioned, but also others that this court may determine to be material. For example, Pl. Mat.
Ex. 2 shows me driving to Sterling. Was I harming anyone on that trip? No. Did the complaint's
statement of facts say that the trip to Sterling was harmless? No. Is the fact that I was harmless
material? Yes.
In conclusion, there is no genuine dispute of facts because (1) the evidence
corroborates the material facts, which disallows any genuine dispute of them and (2)
evidence favors the movant because it shows that he was not posing a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury when the defendants met him.
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims because no defense
can successfully defend the defendants' tortfeasance.
(1) Defendants do not have qualified immunity since their behavior violated well-established
constitutional and statuatory rights.
Under case law, government officials have qualified immunity unless "(1) whether the
facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) if so,
whether that right was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct."
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 224 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201); see
also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
Since the complaint has claims coming from tortious excessive force, the excessive force
must be analyzed objectively. Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. ____ (2025). Instead of going
band-for-band, case law requires me to go fact-for-fact.
Well, Defendant Dominodownload killed me while I was driving away, Compl. ¶ 19, and
Defendant nisicult shot at me one second after. Id. ¶ 20. Evidence corroborates Id. ¶ 19-20
because Pl. Mat. Ex. 1 (video showing Dominodownload killing me). Evidence also corroborates
the fact that I was nonhostile while in Sterling because Id. shows me signing with masterqv
before I was killed.
So, the evidence shows that I wasn't even hurting the oxygen molecules in the air. No
bodily harm, no lethal force. See Tennesse v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that a police
officer must have probable cause of a subject posing a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others in order to use lethal force).
The evidence further shows that I was not posing a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury because I wasn't doing anything that could have resulted in such damage.
Returning to Pl. Mat. Ex. 1, what does the video show me doing? It shows me signing to
masterqv. That's all I did before the defendants came to me. Having a Stetson M2-A automatic
rifle does not count toward posing a significant threat of death or serious physical bodily harm
because that would only apply if I was shooting with the automatic rifle.
Okay, but which rights were violated? Those are U.S. Const. amend. Ⅳ and amend.
ⅩⅣ, §1 because I was killed, and killings are seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 471 U.S.,
at 26 ("For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, [Justice WHITE] agrees with the Court that
Officer Hymon 'seized' Garner by shooting him. ") Since killings are seizures, they also apply as
deprivations since the seizure was of my life. Since my life was deprived of, my right to life
under R. Const. Art. Ⅰ, § Ⅳ is invoked too. Finally, because R. Const. Art. Ⅰ, § Ⅷ gives me
the right to hold myself free from seizure, it mirrors the Fourth Amendment and therefore is also
invoked here.
These rights are well-established because any reasonable person knows these rights. They
are all constitutional rights after all. In conclusion, the defendants do not have qualified
immunity because (1) their conduct did violate plaintiff's rights by wrongfully and therefore
unreasonably killing (therefore seizing) plaintiff and (2) the violated rights in question are
rights that come from U.S. Const. and R. Const., which are constititutions and are
therefore clearly established.
(2) Defendants are liable for the 7 R. § Stat. 121.403 and 7 R. § Stat. 121.404 claims because the
facts and evidence show such tortious conduct, so this court can render summary judgment on
these claims based on liability pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. Pro. 38(c).
The tort of Official misconduct is a simple tort. "Any individual who is a public servant
and commits an act relating to his office but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official
functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized…" 7 R. Stat. § 121.404.
It doesn't take much to know who are the "public servants" here: they are Defendant
Dominodownload and Defendant nisicult, and, by extension, their respective employing
agencies, which are the Ridgeway State Police and the Milton City Police Department
respectively. The State of Ridgeway is included as a defendant of this civil action because of
Defendant Dominodownload and nisicult's quasi-official capacities. See 7 R. Stat. § 122.004
("Proceedings against an individual in their official capacity as an agent of the government shall
be construed as cases against the government."); Cf. Id. at § 121.404(c) ("...[official misconduct]
suits shall proceed in a form of quasi-official capacity, such that the defendants shall be named as
parties in official capacity…").
Since the defendants' conduct violated my rights, it is an unauthorized exercise of their
functions; for Dominodownload, who is a trooper of the Ridgeway State Police, that is to enforce
the laws of the State of Ridgeway among other things. See 9 R. Stat. §§ 223.003–223.004. For
nisicult, who is an officer of the Milton City Police Department, his duties are at Id. at §§
361.301–361.302. I'd like to point out that both defendants have the duty to "enforce laws of the
state". Id. at § 223.004(a) (for the Ridgeway State Police); Id. at § 361.301(a) (for the Milton
City Police Department).
Does enforcing the law involve violating rights? No.
In conclusion, the defendants are liable for 7 R. Stat. § 121.404: defendants (1) were
public servants who (2) either wrongfully killed the plaintiff or shot at him (3) which is an
unauthorized function of their offices because their perceived execution of their duties
violated plaintiff's constitutional rights and therefore the U.S. Const. and R. Const..
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law is also a simple, although lengthily written
tort: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the State of Ridgeway or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, commits deprivation of rights under color of law and shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…" 7 R.
Stat. § 121.403.
I'd like to point out that this statute mirrors 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the main federal
statute which civilians use to sue police officers. E.g., Tennesse v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 ("The
father [of Garner] subsequently brought an action in Federal District Court, seeking damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for asserted violations of his son's constitutional rights.")
Since the defendants did violate my rights, which are constitutional, and they did so as
law enforcement officers of their respective agencies, therefore acting under their respective
statuatory duty to "enforce the laws of the state", they committed this tort.
Finally, the defendants are also liable for 7 R. Stat. § 121.403: defendants (1) acting
under their statuatory duties (2) wrongfully killed the plaintiff and, as explained, therefore
violated his aforementioned constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, this court ought to grant my motion for summary judgment on
all claims because (1) I have met the two-pronged federal procedure test for summary judgment,
a test that this court has used, and (2) the defendants are liable for all claims, which is enough for
summary judgment pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. Pro 38(c).
RELIEF SOUGHT
As the relief sought for this motion, the plaintiff requests that:
1. this court render summary judgment on all claims.2
DATED: 2026-07-11T01:36:00Z
Respectfully submitted,
———————————————
thr33six8
Plaintiff
/s thr33six8
2 "to render" summary judgment on a claim does not guarentee that the
tortfeasors of a claim will be held liable. This is meant to mirror the
language in Rid. R. Civ. Pro. 38(c).
