IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE;
ERRCORE, in his official capacity;
AZAP634, in his official capacity,
Defendants.
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Case No. RSC-CV-5191
Presiding Judge: Hon. Arthur_Chen
PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
SUBMITTED IN WRITING FOR THE HEARING
Plaintiff Halo4asin, pro se, respectfully submits the following argument for the hearing on his
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff is unable to participate by voice and submits his
argument in writing in lieu of oral argument, and remains available to answer any question the
Court may have.
I. THE MOTION IS DECIDED BY THE DEFENDANTS’ OWN ADMISSIONS.
Plaintiff’s motion can be decided on the Defendants’ own words. Their Answer admits that the
application was denied; that the only notice given identified the applicable criterion alone; that
applicants are entitled to an unbiased review; and, at paragraph 65, that a review conducted by a
conflicted officer with a personal stake in the outcome is a biased review. Those admissions,
together with the Defendants’ own statements, establish counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII as
a matter of law. Under Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(d), once the motion was supported the Defendants were
required to come forward by affidavit with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. They
filed no affidavit, here or in their oppositions, and identified no specific fact. They rest on the
denials in their pleading, which is the one thing Rule 38(d) provides cannot defeat summary
judgment.
II. THE DEFENDANTS IDENTIFY NO DISPUTED FACT.
The Defendants repeat that “substantial factual disputes remain,” but that assertion carries their
entire opposition and it fails twice over. They have never identified a single disputed fact and
have filed no affidavit, so nothing in the record controverts their admissions. And the position is
self-defeating: either the facts are genuinely disputed, in which case their unsupported
oppositions do not controvert them, or the facts are admitted, in which case only legal questions
remain, which is precisely what summary judgment decides. Whether an admitted notice satisfies
a statute, and whether admitted facts amount to a conflicted review, are questions of law on
undisputed facts, not issues for trial.
III. COUNT I: A CITATION TO THE CRITERION IS NOT THE REASONING.
The Defendants’ own mandamus opposition concedes the decisive point. They argue that Section
122.404 requires them to “clarify which background check the applicant failed.” That concedes
the duty is real and mandatory; their only claim is that naming “alternate account” satisfied it. It
did not. A citation to the criterion an applicant is said to have failed identifies the category of the
determination; it is not the reasoning for it. The Defendants’ assertion that further detail would
create a “security risk” appears nowhere in the statute, which contains no such exception.
Plaintiff does not seek investigative methods; he seeks the factual basis for the conclusion, which
Section 122.404 requires and which Defendant Azap634 admitted existed when he stated that all
but about two factors were deemed indicative, while never identifying a single factor.
IV. COUNT III: THE GOVERNING PREMISE OF BIAS IS ADMITTED.
Count III does not require proof of motive. The Defendants’ admission at paragraph 65 supplies
the legal standard: a conflicted officer’s review is a biased review. The admitted facts supply the
rest: Defendant Azap634 held supervisory authority over the very person Plaintiff had reported
for misconduct, and Azap634 approved the adverse result. The admitted standard, applied to the
admitted facts, yields a biased and conflicted review as a matter of law. The argument that the
outcome would have been the same is a harmless-error theory the law does not recognize for a
conflicted decisionmaker, and it is contradicted by the Department of Transportation reaching the
opposite result on the same evidence.
V. COUNT IV: ARBITRARY AND WITHOUT DUE OBSERVANCE OF STATUTE.
Plaintiff does not contend that the Department of Transportation’s decision binds the Sheriff’s
Office. The point is narrower and admitted: two agencies examined the identical question on the
identical evidence and reached opposite results, and the Sheriff’s Office reached its result while
admittedly not considering Plaintiff’s exculpatory evidence. That is arbitrary within Section
123.401, and it is independently “without due observance of state statute” under Section 141.101
by reason of the notice, reason, and transparency violations. Either prong of Section 141.101 is
sufficient standing alone.
VI. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND PETITION ARE SUBSUMED.
The relief sought by Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Petition for Writ of
Mandamus substantially overlaps the relief sought here. If the Court grants summary judgment,
that relief is subsumed and those matters may be resolved as moot. Plaintiff notes only that the
Defendants’ preliminary-injunction opposition applies a four-part federal standard that Rid. R.
Civ. P. 47 does not impose, and that Plaintiff’s irreparable harm is the continuing denial of status
and of a lawful, conflict-free process, which no later money judgment can restore, Plaintiff
having sought no damages.
VII. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FAIL.
The Complaint states claims on which relief should be granted. The duties to specify reasoning
and to provide an unbiased review are mandatory, and discretion over the ultimate appointment
does not excuse their breach. Causation is shown by the admitted misconduct complaint, the
badge-tracking report generated three days later by the same officer, and his approval of the
denial. The premise of bias is admitted, and good faith is no defense to the breach of a mandatory
duty and is inconsistent with the admitted sequence before the State Auditor.
VIII. RELIEF.
Plaintiff respectfully requests summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII, with
Count V reserved should the Court find causation genuinely disputed. The relief follows the law
and the Defendants’ own concession: vacate the denial, restore the application, order a
conflict-free re-evaluation with a written, factual basis for any determination, and, pursuant to
Section 401, advance Plaintiff to conditional-employee and cadet status with training, which the
Defendants conceded a successful application yields and which is the relief Plaintiff has sought
throughout. Plaintiff has a Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with a proposed
order, ready to submit at the Court’s convenience.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Halo4asin, certified that on the 15 day of June, 2026, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
WITH PROPOSED ORDER upon dev_Typ, Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for
Defendants, by electronic means pursuant to 7 R. Stat. Section 131.103.
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
