IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE;
ERRCORE, in his official capacity;
AZAP634, in his official capacity,
Defendants.
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Case No. RSC-CV-5191
Presiding Judge: Hon. Arthur_Chen
PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Halo4asin, appearing pro se, and replies to the Defendant’s
Opposition.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Opposition does the one thing Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(d) forbids: it rests on the denials in
the Answer. It offers no affidavit, identifies no specific fact, and points to no admissible
evidence. It relabels questions of law as disputes of fact. The facts that decide this motion
are admitted, and a party cannot manufacture a triable issue by denying the legal
conclusions that flow from its own admissions. Summary judgment should enter on
Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII. Count V, retaliation, presents the only genuine
factual dispute, on causation, and Plaintiff does not need it.
II. THE OPPOSITION DOES NOT SATISFY RULE 38(d)
2. Under Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(d), once a motion for summary judgment is supported, “an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,” and “his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.”
3. The Opposition is denials and nothing more. It submits no affidavit, sets forth no specific
fact, and identifies no admissible evidence. That “Defendants dispute” the facts and that
“no evidence exists” are not evidence; they are the very denials the rule says cannot
defeat the motion. Defendants did not invoke Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(e) or show by affidavit
that facts essential to their opposition are unavailable. On the face of the rule, the motion
should be granted.
III. FIVE OF THE SIX “DISPUTES” ARE QUESTIONS OF LAW
4. Defendants list six “genuine disputes of material fact”: whether the notice was legally
sufficient, whether the review was biased, whether an officer had a conflict, whether
retaliation occurred, whether the denial was arbitrary, and whether any statute was
violated. Five are questions of law for the Court to decide on undisputed facts, which is
the office of summary judgment. Whether an admitted notice satisfies a statute, whether
admitted facts amount to a biased or conflicted review, whether an admitted course of
conduct is arbitrary, and whether a statute was violated are legal conclusions, not facts to
be tried. Only “whether retaliation occurred” turns on a contested fact, causation,
addressed below.
IV. DEFENDANTS CANNOT DENY THEIR OWN ADMISSIONS
5. The facts Plaintiff relies on are admitted: the notice identified only the criterion (Answer
¶26); Defendants told the State Auditor the matter “remained under consideration” and
then finalized the denial (¶¶42, 46); RDOT reached a different conclusion on the same
account (¶44); Plaintiff filed the misconduct complaint (¶73); and Azap634 held the
CID, MPI, and FID positions alleged (¶7). The governing premises are admitted as well:
the duty to specify reasoning (¶¶50-51), the right to an unbiased review (¶62), and,
decisively, that “reviews conducted by conflicted officers with personal stakes in
outcomes are biased reviews” (¶65). A denial of the legal conclusion that follows from an
admitted fact is not a genuine issue of fact.
V. COUNT I: A CITATION IS NOT “THE REASONING”
6. Defendants argue that citing Section 122.402 satisfied the duty in Section 122.404 to
“specify the reasoning,” and that the statute does not require disclosing every factor. But
a citation to the rule an applicant allegedly failed states the category, not the reasoning for
the result. Defendants’ own admission proves the reasoning existed and was withheld:
Azap634 stated that “all but about two factors were deemed indicative” (Exhibit H)
without ever identifying them. Defendants’ reliance on Plaintiff’s exhibits defeats their
point. Exhibits F and G are Azap634’s admissions that the exculpatory evidence and his
own knowledge were not considered, and Exhibits L, M, and N show a cursory “third
review” and a refusal to respond, not a statement of reasoning or a meaningful appeal.
Knowing the bare conclusion is not the same as receiving the reasoning the statute
requires.
VI. COUNT III: BIAS DOES NOT REQUIRE RETALIATORY MOTIVE
7. Defendants answer the bias count with retaliation arguments, that there is no proof of
motive and that the temporal proximity is not enough. Count III does not depend on
motive. It asks whether the review was conflicted and biased, and the admitted premise
(¶65) applied to the admitted facts answers it: Azap634 supervised the very subordinate
Plaintiff had reported (¶¶7, 73) and approved the adverse result (Exhibit L). A supervisor
passing on the application of the person who just reported his subordinate is the
conflicted review the merit principles and Defendants’ own admission condemn. The
assertion that “no evidence exists that the outcome would have differed” is both a
harmless-error theory that bias law does not recognize and one contradicted by RDOT’s
reversal on the same evidence.
VII. COUNT IV: PLAINTIFF DOES NOT CLAIM RDOT BINDS RCSO
8. Defendants rebut an argument Plaintiff did not make. Plaintiff does not contend that
RDOT’s determination binds RCSO. Plaintiff contends that RCSO reached the opposite
result on the identical evidence while admittedly not considering Plaintiff’s exculpatory
evidence, Azap634 having conceded that “if we were informed, your background check
may not have been failed” (Exhibit F). Action that disregards the evidence and reaches a
conclusion no other reviewer reached on the same record is arbitrary within Section
123.401. Independently, the denial was “without due observance of state statute” under
Section 141.101 because it was carried out in violation of the notice and unbiased-review
provisions, a basis that does not depend on the word “arbitrary.”
VIII. COUNT V IS THE ONLY GENUINE DISPUTE, AND PLAINTIFF DOES NOT NEED
IT
9. Plaintiff acknowledges that causation on the retaliation count may present a genuine
issue. Rid. R. Civ. P. 38 permits summary judgment upon all or any part of the claims and
on the issue of liability, so the Court may grant judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII,
and VIII and reserve Count V alone if it finds causation genuinely disputed. Prevailing on
the remaining counts affords Plaintiff the full relief he seeks.
IX. THE CONDITIONAL-EMPLOYEE POINT IS A CONCESSION
10. Defendants state that a successful application would have made Plaintiff eligible for
conditional employment and cadet training under the law. That is precisely the relief
Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff has never claimed a guarantee of full employment; his Motion
asks the Court to direct advancement to conditional-employee status and completion of
training under 4. R. Stat. Section 401. Defendants thus agree on the remedy, leaving only
whether the denial was lawful, which the admitted record answers.
X. GOOD FAITH IS NO DEFENSE
11. Good faith does not excuse the breach of a mandatory duty, and Defendants’ admitted
representation that the matter “remained under consideration,” followed by finalization
without further review (¶¶42, 46), is inconsistent with the good faith they assert.
XI. CONCLUSION
12. The Opposition rests on denials the rule forbids and on legal labels dressed as factual
disputes. The dispositive facts are admitted. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
grant summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII, enter the relief set
forth in the Motion, and reserve only Count V should it find causation genuinely
disputed.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Halo4asin, certified that on the 9th day of June, 2026, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment upon dev_Typ, Office
of the Solicitor General, counsel for Defendants, by electronic means pursuant to 7 R. Stat.
Section 131.103.
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
