Case No. RSC-CM-8262 Document 1 Filed 06/10/2026 Page 1 of 12
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
–
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
VOXPAA,
Defendant(s).
Case No. RSC-CM-8262
STATE’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS PENDING GRAND
JURY INDICTMENT
The State of Ridgeway respectfully opposes Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings
Pending Grand Jury Indictment. Defendant asks this Court to halt an otherwise properly
filed criminal prosecution because, according to Defendant, an earlier version of the
Ridgeway Constitution required public officials to be charged by grand jury indictment.
That request should be denied.
The State filed this prosecution under the current Constitution, current Ridgeway
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and current Ridgeway Code of Statutes. Those authorities
permit prosecution by criminal information. Defendant does not identify any current
constitutional provision requiring indictment for these charges, does not show that the
information is defective, and does not establish any prejudice from proceeding under the
charging procedure now governing the Superior Court.
Defendant is not invoking a defense to guilt, punishment, jurisdiction, or notice.
Defendant is invoking an obsolete filing mechanism. That is not enough to stay a criminal
case.
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I. DEFENDANT’S MOTION MISSTATES THE CONTROLLING
QUESTION.
Defendant frames the issue as whether the Ridgeway Constitution allegedly
required indictment on the dates of the alleged conduct. That framing is wrong.
The question before this Court is not what charging mechanism existed when the
alleged conduct occurred. The question is what charging mechanism governed when the
State initiated this prosecution.
A criminal information is not the crime. It is not the penalty. It is not an element. It
is not an evidentiary burden. It is the procedural instrument by which a criminal case
begins. The State’s use of the current charging procedure does not retroactively criminalize
conduct, increase punishment, eliminate a defense, lower the burden of proof, or affect the
facts the State must prove at trial.
Defendant therefore must do more than point to superseded constitutional
language. Defendant must show that current law still requires indictment for these charges,
or that applying current procedure would impair a vested substantive right. Defendant has
shown neither.
II. CURRENT RIDGEWAY LAW AUTHORIZES PROSECUTION BY
CRIMINAL INFORMATION.
Ridgeway Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(a) provides that “[a] criminal proceeding
shall be commenced in the Superior Court by a criminal information or by an indictment.”
Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(a). The rule is written in the disjunctive. It does not say “information only
for misdemeanors.” It does not say “information unless the defendant is a public official.”
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It does not say “information unless the alleged conduct occurred before a constitutional
amendment.” It authorizes both.
Rule 3(b) preserves any right to indictment only as “established by the relevant state
statutes and the State Constitution.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(b). That language directs the Court to
current positive law. Defendant identifies no current statute and no current constitutional
provision requiring indictment for the offenses charged here.
Rule 4(a) confirms that criminal informations are ordinary charging instruments. It
provides that an indictment and a criminal information shall contain a caption and a plain,
concise description of the act constituting the crime. Rid. R. Crim. P. 4(a). The rules
therefore place informations and indictments side-by-side as permissible charging
instruments.
The 2026 Ridgeway Code reinforces the same point. The Justice Department has
authority to prosecute crimes under the Ridgeway Criminal Code. The Criminal Division
prosecutes felony and misdemeanor crimes arising under that Code. State attorneys have
delegated authority to sign indictments, informations, and other official documents. That
statutory framework would be incoherent if informations were unavailable for felony
prosecutions of public officials.
The State filed a criminal information under the procedure in effect at filing. That is
enough.
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III. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE INDICTMENT
FOR THESE CHARGES.
Defendant relies on alleged prior constitutional language stating that public officials,
or persons accused of specified offenses, enjoyed a right to grand jury indictment. But the
current Constitution no longer contains that broad public-official indictment rule. The
current indictment protection is limited to treason and misprision of treason.
Defendant is not charged with treason. Defendant is not charged with misprision of
treason. Defendant is charged with criminal offenses under the Ridgeway Criminal Code.
Therefore, Defendant does not fall within the current constitutional category requiring
indictment.
The State’s allegation that Defendant was on duty does not change that conclusion.
On-duty status is relevant to the State’s proof on certain charges, especially charges
involving official misconduct, abuse of authority, or law-enforcement capacity. But factual
relevance is not the same thing as a constitutional charging requirement.
Defendant’s argument tries to turn an element-related allegation into a procedural
veto. Current law does not support that move.
IV. DEFENDANT HAS NO VESTED RIGHT IN A SUPERSEDED CHARGING
PROCEDURE.
Defendant’s argument depends on treating the former public-official indictment
provision as a vested substantive right that permanently attached on the date of the alleged
conduct. That theory fails.
Courts distinguish between substantive changes and procedural changes.
Substantive changes define crimes, increase punishments, or alter defenses. Procedural
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changes regulate the machinery by which cases proceed. A defendant generally has no
vested right in a particular procedural mode unless the change removes a substantial
protection in a way that affects guilt or punishment.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that distinction.
In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925), the Court explained that procedural changes
are not ex post facto merely because they apply to prosecutions involving earlier conduct,
unless they affect substantial protections in a way prohibited by law.
In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), the Court held that a procedural change did
not violate ex post facto principles where it did not alter the definition of the crime or
increase punishment.
In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), the Court clarified that ex post facto
doctrine is aimed at laws that punish previously innocent conduct, increase punishment, or
remove a defense available at the time of the offense.
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), the Court
rejected an expansive theory that every procedural change affecting a defendant creates an
ex post facto violation.
In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), the Court upheld application of a procedural
evidentiary change to a prosecution for earlier conduct, reasoning that changes in modes of
procedure that do not deprive the accused of a substantial defense are not ex post facto.
In Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898), the Court reached the same result for
procedural evidentiary changes.
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Those cases defeat Defendant’s position. The State’s use of an information does not
make innocent conduct criminal. It does not increase punishment. It does not change the
elements. It does not lower the State’s burden. It does not remove a defense. It does not
decide guilt. It only identifies the charging instrument used to commence the case.
That is procedure.
V. RIDGEWAY RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE SUPPORTS APPLYING
CURRENT PROCEDURE.
Ridgeway authority points the same way. In In re SteKing2008, 1 R. Supp. 5 (2022),
the court recognized that retroactivity concerns are strongest where the government
imposes punitive consequences or leverages new legal disabilities without the procedures
required by law. The decision also recognized the broader retroactivity framework, citing
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912), PBGC
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984), Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204
(1988), and Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
That framework helps the State here. Applying current charging procedure does not
impose a new disability. It does not create a new punishment. It does not deny Defendant
trial protections. It does not deprive Defendant of an affirmative defense. It does not give
the State a lighter burden.
It simply applies the procedural law governing the Superior Court at the time this case was
filed.
Under Bradley, courts generally apply the law in effect at the time of decision unless
doing so would cause manifest injustice or unless there is statutory direction to the
contrary. Defendant identifies no statutory direction preserving the former public-official
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indictment provision for later-filed cases. Defendant also identifies no manifest injustice.
Proceeding by information gives Defendant notice, preserves every defense, preserves the
burden of proof, and leaves the merits untouched.
If anything, Defendant’s position creates the injustice. It would force the Court to
apply a repealed charging procedure even though the current Constitution and current
criminal rules no longer require it.
VI. THE EX POST FACTO ARGUMENT FAILS BECAUSE THE STATE IS
NOT RETROACTIVELY CHANGING THE CRIME OR PUNISHMENT.
To the extent Defendant’s motion implies an ex post facto theory, that theory fails.
The State is not prosecuting Defendant under a criminal statute enacted after the
conduct. The State is not asking for a penalty enacted after the conduct. The State is not
relying on a new presumption of guilt. The State is not lowering the quantity or quality of
proof required to convict. The State is not eliminating a complete defense.
The only alleged change is the charging vehicle.
The Supreme Court has been clear that not every law touching a criminal case is ex
post facto. The prohibited categories concern retroactive criminalization, increased
punishment, or changes that make conviction easier in a forbidden substantive way. See
Collins, Dobbert, and Morales.
Defendant cannot seriously claim that being charged by information rather than
indictment determines guilt or punishment. It does not. A grand jury does not acquit. A
grand jury does not convict. A grand jury does not sentence. An indictment is a screening
mechanism. Current Ridgeway law permits a different screening mechanism: a criminal
information authorized upon probable cause.
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Because the State still must prove every charge beyond a reasonable doubt at trial,
there is no ex post facto violation.
VII. THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION.
Defendant also cannot convert this into a due-process problem.
Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend. Defendant has
both. The Criminal Information identifies the charges. Defendant may challenge defective
counts. Defendant may request discovery. Defendant may move to dismiss. Defendant may
contest probable cause where available. Defendant may proceed to trial. Defendant may
confront witnesses. Defendant may require the State to prove every element beyond a
reasonable doubt.
That is due process.
The absence of a grand jury indictment does not, by itself, violate due process.
Under United States constitutional practice, the federal grand jury requirement has not
been imposed on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884), upheld prosecution by information against a due-process challenge. While
Ridgeway law controls here, Hurtado is persuasive authority for the basic point that
prosecution by information is not inherently unfair.
Ridgeway’s own rules expressly permit criminal informations. Defendant cannot call
unconstitutional what Ridgeway procedure specifically authorizes, absent some superior
constitutional provision requiring otherwise. No such current provision exists here.
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VIII. DEFENDANT’S RELIANCE ON HIS ALLEGED PUBLIC-OFFICIAL
STATUS IS A DEAD END.
Defendant argues that because the State alleges he acted as an on-duty Palmer Police
Department officer, the State has admitted him into the class protected by the former
constitutional language.
That argument fails for three separate reasons.
First, the current Constitution controls the current filing. The former language is no
longer the operative charging rule.
Second, public-official status is relevant to the substance of the charges, not the
charging mechanism. The State may allege that Defendant abused official authority without
consenting to obsolete procedure.
Third, even under Defendant’s own framing, the alleged right belonged to the
process of accusation, not to the definition of the offense. It was not a defense. It was not
immunity. It was not a limitation on criminal liability. It was, at most, a procedural
screening requirement. Current law now supplies the applicable screening requirement for
informations.
Defendant’s argument therefore collapses into the same unsupported claim: that old
procedure permanently governs new filings. It does not.
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IX. DEFENDANT’S REQUESTED REMEDY IS OVERBROAD.
Even if the Court believed there were some arguable defect, a stay of all proceedings
is not the necessary remedy.
Defendant has not shown that the information is void. Defendant has not shown
that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant has not shown that the charges
fail to state offenses. Defendant has not shown that evidence will be lost, rights will be
impaired, or trial preparation will be impossible unless the case is halted.
A stay is extraordinary relief. It interrupts the public interest in the timely
prosecution of criminal charges. Defendant bears the burden of showing entitlement to
that relief. Defendant offers only a legal theory based on superseded constitutional text.
If the Court finds any uncertainty, the proper course is not to freeze the prosecution.
The proper course is to apply current Rule 3 and allow the case to proceed by information,
while preserving Defendant’s ability to raise ordinary pretrial motions.
X. DEFENDANT’S RULE WOULD BE UNWORKABLE AND WOULD
UNDERMINE CURRENT LAW.
Defendant’s position would create a chaotic rule for Ridgeway prosecutions.
Under Defendant’s theory, courts would not apply the current Constitution and
current criminal rules to cases filed today. Instead, courts would reconstruct the procedural
law existing on the date of each alleged act, then decide whether repealed procedures
continue to govern each count. If a case involved conduct spanning multiple constitutional
periods, the prosecution could be split into different charging regimes. If a defendant held
public office on one date but not another, the charging mechanism could change
count-by-count.
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Nothing in current Ridgeway law requires that mess.
Procedural rules exist so courts have a stable method for processing cases. When a
case is filed, the court applies the procedure then in effect unless the law says otherwise or
manifest injustice would result. Defendant’s rule would replace that stability with obsolete
procedure and tactical delay.
The Court should reject it.
XI. THE MOTION SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED BECAUSE IT IS
UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.
Defendant’s motion quotes an alleged prior constitutional provision, but it does not
establish that the provision remains operative, that it was preserved for later-filed
prosecutions, or that current Ridgeway law requires indictment for these charges. The
motion also does not address Rule 3(a), Rule 3(b), Rule 4(a), the 2026 Code’s prosecutorial
framework, or the current Constitution’s narrower indictment language.
That omission matters. Defendant is the moving party. Defendant seeks to stop the
prosecution. Defendant therefore bears the burden to show a clear entitlement to a stay.
He has not met that burden.
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XII. CONCLUSION
This case was filed under the current Constitution, current Ridgeway Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and current Ridgeway Code of Statutes. Those authorities permit
prosecution by criminal information. Defendant is not charged with treason or misprision
of treason. No current constitutional provision requires indictment for these charges. The
former public-official indictment language does not survive as a vested substantive right,
and applying current procedure creates no ex post facto problem, no due-process violation,
and no prejudice.
Defendant’s motion is not a defense to the charges. It is an attempt to revive an
obsolete charging mechanism to delay prosecution. The Court should decline to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Defendant’s Motion to
Stay Proceedings Pending Grand Jury Indictment be DENIED, and that this matter
proceed in the ordinary course.
Dated: May 1, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway
Respectfully Submitted,
luhvcouture
State Attorney
Office of Government & Corruption
Ridgeway Department of Justice
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