IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway
Plaintiff,
v.
NPCWAR
Defendant(s)
Case No. RSC-CM-2779
Filed: May 31st, 2026
STATE’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT THEREOF
The State of Ridgeway, by and through undersigned counsel, moves for the recusal of
presiding judge Arthur_Chen under Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(a)(2) due to a direct conflict of interest
with the State of Ridgeway as a result of prior judicial proceedings, where Judge Chen, as the
presiding judge, conspired with a criminal defendant to issue an acquittal through ex parte
communications, in addition to a personal conflict of interest with counsel for the State of
Ridgeway as a result of his nomination by the Ridgeway State Senate to serve as an
impeachment manager for the Articles of Impeachment against Judge Chen. Attached hereto is a
memorandum of law in support.
Respectfully submitted,
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway
Plaintiff,
v.
NPCWAR
Defendant(s)
Case No. RSC-CM-2779
Filed: May XXth, 2026
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF STATE’S
MOTION FOR RECUSAL
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LEGAL STANDARD……………………………………………………………………………………..1
I. Judge Chen possesses a personal prejudice and bias that satisfies the threshold under Canon
3(C)(1)(a).............................................……………………………………………………………1
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………3
LEGAL STANDARD
Canon 3(C)(1) of the Ridgeway Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shall
“disqualify himself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” Cases which implicate a judge’s impartiality include but are not limited to “a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding”, Canon 3(C)(1)(a), and “a financial interest … or any other
interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding”, Canon 3(C)(1)(c).
A decisionmaker who possesses a bias or prejudice against a specific party runs afoul of
procedural due process, which amounts to an error not subject to harmless-error analysis. See
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955),
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1964), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)); see
also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 (1991) (distinguished “trial errors” from
“structural defects,” holding that only some constitutional errors are automatically reversible).
The right to face a neutral decisionmaker is not limited to the criminal trial context and extends
throughout the entirety of the proceedings, including within civil and administrative cases. See
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-243 (1980).
I. Judge Chen possess a personal prejudice and bias against the State of Ridgeway
that satisfies the threshold under Canon 3(C)(1)(a)
The standard for recusal presented under Canon 3(C)(1)(a) presents a striking
resemblance to the standard imposed upon real-world federal judges in the United States, bearing
the same operative language found in 28 U.S.C. § 455; the exact word-for-word phrasing of
Canon 3(C)(1) is mirrored in 28 U.S.C § 455, which compels judges to recuse from proceedings
where their impartiality may “reasonably be questioned”. Courts have interpreted the phrase
“reasonably be questioned” to refer to a probability that the presiding judge has an actual bias or
prejudgment against a party, regardless of whether the judge possesses a subjective belief in his
own impartiality. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) & Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 84, 861 (1988)1. Accordingly, such biases and prejudices
must be of an “extrajudicial” character formed beyond the confines of the current courtroom
proceedings. Liteky, supra, at 545.
Judge Chen’s personal bias and prejudice against the State of Ridgeway is
unambiguously of an extrajudicial character. While presiding in State of Ridgeway v.
JamesGardai, RSC-CM-8845 (Rwy. Sup. Ct. 2026), Judge Chen engaged in ex parte
communications with a criminal defendant, JamesGardai, for the purposes of conspiring to issue
an acquittal, having been subsequently impeached by the Ridgeway State Senate for the
aforementioned conduct. Judge Chen’s prior antagonism against the State of Ridgeway in
previous proceedings cannot merely be attributed to any rational adjudicative process, having
predated these proceedings and been derived from deliberate corrupt conduct, directed at the
very same party appearing before him in this present case. Any reasonable observer aware of
these facts would necessarily question whether Judge Chen harbors actual bias or prejudgment
against the State of Ridgeway. Very simply, “what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice
but its appearance.” Liteky, supra, at 548.
1 Although real-world interpretations of 28 U.S.C § 455 have no binding effect upon this Court, the
presence of identical operating language renders their interpretive authority highly persuasive in
construing Canon 3(C)(1)’s scope and application.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing reasons, the State of Ridgeway respectfully
requests that this Court:
a. Grant this motion for recusal of Judge Arthur_Chen on the grounds previously
aforementioned, and promptly assign another judge or magistrate to preside over the
proceedings in the above-captioned matter without undue delay.
Respectfully submitted,
