No. 26-7
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Petitioner(s),
v.
PHIZKOD
Respondent(s).
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway
No. 26-7
Hon. Robin5D
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
FOR PETITIONER
XOLAAZ
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Attorneys for Petitioner
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT1
The Superior Court exercised jurisdiction over this criminal matter pursuant to the laws
and Constitution of the State of Ridgeway. Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to Rid. R.
Sup. Ct. 11(1)(a)(iii), which permits the State to appeal a court order in a criminal case. The
Order appealed from and was entered on May 4, 2026. The state timely filed its notice of appeal
on May 5, 2026, pursuant to Rid. R. Sup. Ct. 11(2). This appeal is taken from a final order
declaring R.C.C. § 3.08 unconstitutional, dismissing Count 11 of the Amended Criminal
Information with prejudice, and enjoining enforcement of the statute statewide.
ISSUE(S) PRESENTED
1. Whether the Superior Court erred in invalidating R.C.C. § 3.08 as facially vague
2. Whether the Superior Court misapplied the overbreadth doctrine to a non-speech criminal
statute
3. Whether the Superior Court failed to apply the settled common-law definition of attempt
4. Whether the Superior Court improperly refused to construe R.C.C. § 3.08 alongside
related provisions of the Ridgeway Criminal Code
5. Whether the Superior Court exceeded its authority by issuing statewide injunctive relief
prohibiting enforcement of R.C.C. § 3.08.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 23, 2026, the Defendant, PHIZKOD, entered the Palmer Courthouse during
an active probable cause hearing and opened fire, killing seven individuals. During the attack,
the Defendant aimed and fired at countharebourg2, a member of the public attempting to flee
into a holding cell. countharebourg2 was struck multiple times but survived, not because the
Defendant abandoned his purpose, but because countharebourg2 successfully evaded further
fire.The State charged PHIZKOD with seven counts of Murder in the Second Degree (R.C.C. §
3.10), three counts of Obstruction of Justice (R.C.C. § 2.07), and one count of Attempted Murder
under R.C.C. § 3.08, which provides: "Whoever attempts to kill another individual."On a
pre-trial motion, the Superior Court declared R.C.C. § 3.08 facially unconstitutional as void for
vagueness, dismissed Count Eleven with prejudice, and issued a statewide injunction against
enforcement of the statute. The State appealed.
ARGUMENT
The Superior Court erred in three respects. First, R.C.C. § 3.08 is not void for vagueness.
The term "attempts to kill" carries centuries of settled common-law meaning requiring specific
intent and a substantial step toward completion. Read alongside R.C.C. §§ 3.07 and 3.10, the
statute provides unambiguous notice to ordinary persons and clear guidance to law enforcement.
Second, the overbreadth doctrine has no application here, it is a First Amendment tool reserved
for statutes chilling protected expression, and attempted murder is not expressive conduct. Third,
1
the statewide injunction exceeded any permissible equitable remedy. The Defendant made no
showing of irreparable harm requiring statewide relief, the balance of hardships favors the State,
and enjoining enforcement of an attempted murder statute plainly harms the public.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order
of the Superior Court, reinstate Count Eleven of the Amended Criminal Information, and vacate
the statewide injunction against enforcement of R.C.C. § 3.08.
Date: 05/11/2026
/s/ Xolaaz
XOLAAZ
Attorney General
Attorneys for Petitioner – State of Ridgeway
APPENDIX
