IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DOCKET NO. RSC-CM-8262
Plaintiff
v.
voxpaa
Defendant
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY
TO THE HONORABLE COURT
COMES NOW the Defendant, voxpaa, appearing pro se, and respectfully moves this Honorable Court to
dismiss the Criminal Information on the grounds that it fails to state the charged offenses with the constitutional
and procedural specificity required to sustain prosecution. In support thereof, Defendant states as follows:
I. NATURE OF THE MOTION
This Motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the Criminal Information. The State has charged dozens of
felony counts through aggregated and indistinct allegations that fail to identify the specific conduct underlying
each count. As a result, the Information does not provide constitutionally adequate notice of the charges and
must be dismissed.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a charging document must inform the accused,
“with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him.” Russell v. United States,
369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 (1877)).
Although a charging instrument may employ the general language of a statute, it must also
include specific factual allegations sufficient to create that reasonable certainty. Simmons, 96
U.S. at 362; see also United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that such allegations must be “sufficiently definite to
enable [the defendant] to make his defense and avail himself of the record of conviction or
acquittal.” Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83 (1908).
Further, while statutory language may be used, it “must be accompanied by such a statement of
facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense… with which he is
charged.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117–18 (1974) (quoting United States v. Hess,
124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888)).
Where a statute contains generalized or “generic terms,” the charging document must go further
and “descend to particulars.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875).
Finally, it is well established that a charging document must “set forth each element of the crime
that it charges.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998).
III. THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
The Criminal Information in this case fails to satisfy these requirements.
A. The State Fails to Attribute Specific Conducts to Individual Counts
The Information charges extensive ranges of counts (including Counts 4–23, 24–44, 45–65, and 66–82)
using generalized narrative descriptions, without identifying which specific act corresponds to each
individual count.
By collapsing numerous alleged acts into grouped count ranges, the State fails to “fully, directly,
and expressly” set forth the factual basis of each offense.
B. The Information Relies on Generic Allegations Without Particularized
Facts
Although the State invokes §§ 5.06 and 5.09, it merely mirrors the general statutory prohibitions
without providing the specific factual circumstances necessary to identify the particular offense
charged in each count.
This is precisely the type of pleading the Supreme Court has rejected, requiring that charges go
beyond generic statutory language and “descend to particulars.” Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 558.
C. The Charging Structure Creates Impermissible Ambiguity
The Information does not clarify whether each count represents:
● a discrete act,
● an individual item transfer, or
● an aggregated course of conduct.
This ambiguity makes it impossible to determine how each count independently satisfies the
elements of the offense.
D. The Defendant Is Deprived of the Ability to Prepare a Defense
Because the State has failed to provide sufficiently definite allegations:
● Defendant cannot identify which evidence supports which count;
● Defendant cannot challenge the elements of any individual charge; and
● Defendant cannot protect against double jeopardy.
This lack of specificity violates the requirement that charges be stated with “reasonable
certainty.” Russell, 369 U.S. at 765.
IV. DISMISSAL IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Where a charging document fails to allege offenses with sufficient specificity and does not set
forth the essential facts constituting each offense, it is legally insufficient and must be dismissed.
The deficiencies here are not minor or technical, they are structural. The State’s use of
aggregated counts fundamentally obscures the nature of the charges and prevents meaningful
defense.
V. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court:
1. DISMISS without prejudice for failure to state offenses with sufficient particularity; and
2. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/
voxpaa
Defendant, Pro Se
