IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
The Courageous, Kind-Hearted, and
Honorable JAMESGARDAI,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CM-8845
MOTION TO RECUSE
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO RECUSE
Defendant JamesGardai, proceeding in pro per for the purposes of this motion only,
hereby moves to recuse Hon. Judge Arthur_Chen from the above-entitled matter.
ARGUMENT
I. JUDGE ARTHUR_CHEN IS OBLIGATED TO RECUSE
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires recusal when “there is a
serious risk of actual bias.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States has long “recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in
safeguarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's [...] judges.’”
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015). The appearance of bias is let alone
enough to necessitate a recusal. See Liljeberg v. Health Svcs. Acq. Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
See Rippo v. Baker, 580 US —, —, 137 S. Ct. 905, 907, 197 L.Ed.2d 167 (2017) (per curiam)
(“Our precedents require recusal where the ‘probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975)).
Here, Judge Arthur_Chen has stated the following in relation to material facts regarding
Defendant’s conduct as a police officer::
James literly [sic] went rouge [sic] this morning dude and didn't stop arresting people
even after being put on AL
In keeping with the aim of “‘promot[ing] confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even
the appearance of impropriety whenever possible,’” United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317,
1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,
865 (1988)), recusal turns on “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully
informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would
entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Scrushy, 721
F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ny doubts
must be resolved in favor of recusal.” Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321.
Since the underlying criminal case is a result of Defendant’s conduct as a police officer,
by characterizing Defendant as having “gone rogue” and accepting as fact that Defendant
engaged in improper arrests, the Court has expressed a partial view on matters central to the
case—specifically, labelling the defendant as a rogue law enforcement officer. Such statements
create, at minimum, an appearance that the Court has prejudged Defendant’s conduct and
character, and would cause a reasonable observer to question the Court’s impartiality.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 04/30/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI1
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
Gardai Island
United States Virgin Islands
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
1 An unincorporated association.
