IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY FOR RIDGEWAY COUNTY
__________________________________________
JamesGardai :
Petitioner :
:
v. : Case No.: RSC-CV-4521
:
RIDGEWAY DEPARTMENT OF : :
TRANSPORTATION :
Respondent :
MOTION TO DISMISS
dev_Typ, the Ridgeway Department of Transportation, by and through the Department of Justice,
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the Administrative Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of
the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, and states as follows:
I. Introduction
This case arises from Petitioner’s termination pursuant to 2 R. Stat. § 3324, which
expressly authorizes at-will termination and provides that such terminations “may not be
reviewed by any court.”
Despite this clear statutory directive, Petitioner seeks judicial review and constitutional
invalidation of the statute. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction and the Complaint fails as a
matter of law, dismissal is required.
II. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
2 R. Stat. § 3324 explicitly states that at-will terminations “may not be reviewed by any
court.”
Petitioner admits that his termination was effected pursuant to this statute. Accordingly,
the plain language of § 3324 divests this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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Petitioner’s attempt to reframe the claim as a constitutional challenge does not cure this
defect. Where the Legislature has expressly barred review of a category of actions, the Court
may not exercise jurisdiction absent clear statutory authorization.
Because no such authorization exists here, the Complaint must be dismissed.
III. Failure to State a Claim
Even if jurisdiction were proper, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
Petitioner alleges entitlement to (i) Notice of termination, (ii) A statement of reasons and
(iiI) an opportunity to respond, however, no such requirements exist under 2 R. Stat. § 3324,
which permits termination “at any time” and for any lawful reason.
Because the governing statute authorizes the challenged conduct, Petitioner cannot
establish any legal violation.
IV. NO PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST
Petitioner’s constitutional claims depend on the existence of a protected property interest
in continued employment.
Under Bishop v. Wood, a property interest arises only where state law creates a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment. Where employment is at-will, no such
entitlement exists.
Here, 2 R. Stat. § 3324 expressly establishes at-will employment. Accordingly, Petitioner
cannot establish a protected property interest, and his due process claims fail as a matter of law.
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FORECLOSES PETITIONER’S CLAIMS
Petitioner’s reliance on general statutory language, including 2 R. Stat. § 4101, is
misplaced.
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It is well-established that specific statutory provisions control over general ones. Section
3324 directly governs termination authority and cannot be overridden by generalized statements
regarding employment.
Additionally, the existence of disciplinary procedures does not limit at-will authority.
Such procedures apply to distinct forms of separation and do not create a universal for-cause
employment regime.
VI. IMPROPER RELIANCE ON NON-CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
Petitioner relies extensively on non-binding and non-controlling authority, including
decisions from jurisdictions outside Ridgeway and the United States.
Such authorities are not controlling and cannot override clear statutory law or binding
precedent.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, The Honorable dev_Typ, by and through the Department of Justice as
representing the Ridgeway Department of Transportation prays this Honorable Court:
A. Dismiss the Administrative Complaint with prejudice;
B. Find that 2 R. Stat. § 3324 bars judicial review of the claim; and
C. Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
/s/ dev_Typ
The Honorable dev_Typ, Esq.
D: dev_Typ
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this , a copy of the foregoing motion was Apr 23, 2026
submitted to opposing counsel via electronic submission.
/s/ dev_Typ
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