RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
XOLAAZ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Deputy
Attorney General of the Department of
Justice; CEPHALGPT, in his
individual and official capacities as the
Sheriff of the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office,
Defendants.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant CephalGPT (“Defendant”), in his individual capacity, by and through
the undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5), respectfully moves the court
to dismiss the above-captioned matter for failure to state a claim. A memorandum of law
in support and proposed order is attached.
Dated: April 16, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
Derogatoryyy (Rid. Bar No. 10210)
Counsel of Record
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
Attorney for Defendant
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
XOLAAZ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Deputy
Attorney General of the Department of
Justice; CEPHALGPT, in his
individual and official capacities as the
Sheriff of the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office,
Defendants.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT CEPHALGPT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
Derogatoryyy (Rid. Bar No. 10210)
Counsel of Record
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
Attorney for Defendant
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................................................... 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................................................. 2
ARGUMENTS.....................................................................................................................3
I. The plaintiff fails at various junctures to state an underlying due process claim....... 3
A. Plaintiff does not have a property interest in employment.................................. 3
B. Even assuming a property interest in continued employment, the plaintiff still
does not plausibly allege the absence of sufficient post-deprivation process...........5
II. Even if the underlying due process claims survive, the plaintiff fails to state a claim
for civil conspiracy......................................................................................................... 5
III. Even if the plaintiff states a claim, the defendant is nonetheless entitled to
qualified immunity......................................................................................................... 6
A. It is not clearly established that the plaintiff has a property interest in continued
employment, especially considering his status as a probationary deputy.................8
B. It is not clearly established whether the plaintiff is entitled to due process prior
to being placed on administrative leave while being criminally prosecuted............ 9
C. It is not clearly established that the Attorney General lacks the authority to
order a government employee on administrative leave while they are being
prosecuted............................................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................12
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the placement of a probationary deputy on administrative
leave following a criminal investigation and the filing of criminal charges. The plaintiff
now seeks damages from the officials who responded. His claims, however, fail at every
level. He has no property interest in continued employment because state law permits
honorable discharge at any time, for any reason, and no court in this state has ever held
otherwise. Even if he did have a property interest, he does not allege—because he
cannot—that post-deprivation process was or will be inadequate, which means his due
process claim which underlies the suit is not yet ripe. His civil conspiracy claim is wholly
derivative, collapsing with the underlying due process claim, and independently fails to
plausibly allege a conspiratorial agreement. And even if any claim survived on the merits,
the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because none of the rights the plaintiff
invokes were clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff JamesGardai is a Probationary Deputy of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s
Office. (Complaint ¶ 1). Defendant CephalGPT is the Sheriff of Ridgeway County.
(Id. ¶ 3). Defendant Xolaaz is the Acting Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway.
(Id. ¶ 2). On or about April 6, 2026, Acting Attorney General Xolaaz issued an order to
Sheriff CephalGPT to place the plaintiff on administrative leave under 2 R. Stat. § 3126.
(Id. ¶¶ 7–8). Sheriff CephalGPT complied and the plaintiff was placed on administrative
leave. (Id. ¶ 9). He had not previously been on administrative leave, nor was he under
investigation by the Sheriff’s Office prior to the directive. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11). He received no
1
notice, hearing, or communication from the Sheriff’s Office or the Department of Justice
in connection with the administrative leave. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13).
The plaintiff brings six causes of action: deprivation of procedural due process
claims against both defendants in their individual capacities (Counts I–II); official
misconduct claims against both defendants in their official capacities (Counts III–IV);
and civil conspiracy claims against both defendants in their individual capacities (Counts
V–VI). This motion is directed to the claims against Defendant CephalGPT in his
individual capacity—Counts II and VI—but the arguments apply at large with equal force
to all claims and all defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(a)(5) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of
an action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rid. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(5). When confronted with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
must “assume the veracity” of “well-pleaded allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). However, the court need not “accept as true” allegations that offer
merely “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678. To
survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
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ARGUMENTS
I. The plaintiff fails at various junctures to state an underlying due process
claim.
The due process claim that underlies the suit here fails at the threshold level
because the plaintiff does not—and cannot—plausibly allege a protected property interest
in continued employment. Even if he did, his due process claim fails regardless because
he has not alleged the absence of sufficient post-deprivation process.
A. Plaintiff does not have a property interest in employment.
“The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a protected interest,” and “only after finding the deprivation of a protected
interest” does the court “look to see” if the underlying “procedures comport with due
process.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). To have a property
interest in a benefit, a person must “have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it,” beyond
“an abstract need or desire.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972). These entitlements are derived from “existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law.” Id. To create this legitimate claim of
entitlement, the independent source must place substantive limits on official discretion.
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). In this regard, the independent source
must “contain explicitly mandatory language” which are “specific directives to the
decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular
outcome must follow.” Ky. Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989).
Here, the plaintiff broadly asserts that “all public employees” within the state have
a protected “property interest in continued employment” under state law.
(Complaint ¶ 18). That sweeping assertion collapses under scrutiny. The sole statutory
3
provision he provides as conclusive—2 R. Stat. § 4101—does not support the argument
he makes when the statute is read, as it must be, against the scheme as a whole.1 Because
the plaintiff lacks a cognizable property interest, his due process claims—and the causes
of action that depend on them—must be dismissed.
While § 4101 generally provides that “all persons who maintain good behavior”
have the “right to employment,” the surrounding statutes do not demonstrate that an
employee may be dismissed only for cause. To the contrary, the statutory framework
provides broad discretionary discharge authority. While certain provisions permit
discharge for charge, e.g. 2 R. Stat. §§ 3107, 3110 (involuntary general discharge and
dishonorable discharge), other surrounding provisions provide that “command staff in all
departments may, at any time, for any reason…, honorably discharge any person.” 2 R.
Stat. § 3324. Read together, these provisions confirm that state law does not create the
kind of mandatory, for-cause limitation necessary to support a constitutionally protected
property interest in continued employment. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976) (holding that, as a matter of state law, a city ordinance stating a limited number of
circumstances under which an employee may be terminated still nonetheless is an at-will
relationship and does not create a property interest in continued employment); Walls v.
Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that, as a matter
of state law, an at-will employee may be dismissed with or without cause, and only public
1 To the extent that the plaintiff would alternatively argue that § 4101 and § 3324 are in conflict because the
former provides a “right to employment” upon “good behavior,” 2 R. Stat. § 4101, and the latter provides for
honorable discharge “for any reason,” 2 R. Stat. § 3324, the provisions are readily harmonized: § 4101 speaks to the
basis on which employment is conferred, while § 3324 governs the mechanics of separation. Even if the statutes
were in irreconcilable conflict, § 3324 would survive implicit repealture under the specific-over-general canon
because the specific grant of at-will discharge authority in § 3324 controls over the general right to employment in §
4101.
4
employees who can be dismissed only for cause possess a property interest in continued
employment).
B. Even assuming a property interest in continued employment, the
plaintiff still does not plausibly allege the absence of sufficient
post-deprivation process.
Because the plaintiff only asserts a procedural due process claim for lack of
pre-deprivation process, but does not allege or take any issue with any post-deprivation
process, his claim fails and is not ripe for review. “The constitutional violation…is not
complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until” the
government ultimately “fails to provide due process.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
126 (1990). For example, demonstrating that a “decisionmaker was biased” in a
pre-termination hearing was “not…a demonstration that there has been a denial of due
process” because the employee was “entitled” to a post-termination hearing “and would
not be deprived of due process unless and until the state refuses to provide due process.”
McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446 (3rd Cir. 1995) (cleaned up).
II. Even if the underlying due process claims survive, the plaintiff fails to state a
claim for civil conspiracy.
1 R. Stat. § 3111 provides a cause of action against “any individual who conspires
or colludes between one or more parties to,” as relevant here, (1) “deprive a third party of
a legal right,” or (2) “deceive a third party to obtain an illegal objective.” 1 R. Stat. §
3111. Here, the claim fails because the underlying due process claims fail. And even if
the due process claims muster enough plausibility to pass dismissal, the complaint still
does not plausibly allege an agreement.
As a threshold matter, civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action—it is
a derivative tort that rises and falls with the underlying unlawful act alleged to be its
5
object. Where the predicate claim fails, so too must the conspiracy claim. See, e.g.,
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Civil conspiracy depends on
performance of some underlying tortious act.”). Here, the civil conspiracy claim is
premised entirely on the allegedly unlawful deprivation of due process. (See
Complaint ¶¶ 39–46). Because the plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a cognizable property
interest in continued employment, and because he fails to allege the absence of sufficient
post-deprivation process, the predicate deprivation underlying the conspiracy claim
necessarily fails. Without an unlawful underlying act, there is necessarily no legal right
for the alleged conspiracy to have deprived, and the claim must be dismissed.
Even if the underlying due process claims survived, the plaintiff still fails to
plausibly allege the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. State law requires that the
defendants “conspire or collude,” meaning there must be a meeting of the minds directed
toward an unlawful purpose. 1 R. Stat. § 3111. As relevant here, the complaint alleges
only that Xolaaz “directed” CephalGPT to place the plaintiff on administrative leave, and
that CephalGPT “implemented and enforced” that directive. (Complaint ¶¶ 40, 44). Those
allegations are entirely consistent with a superior issuing a lawful order and a subordinate
complying with it—an innocent explanation that is at least as plausible as any
conspiratorial one. But as the Supreme Court has cautioned, where the facts alleged are
equally consistent with lawful conduct, the complaint does not cross the line from
conceivable to plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
III. Even if the plaintiff states a claim, the defendant is nonetheless entitled to
qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields government actors from civil damages unless their
conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
6
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
The doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly” with “the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Put another way, qualified
immunity exists to prevent overdeterrence by ensuring that officials do not shy away
from their duties and that they have fair notice of liability. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 240 (1974); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). To avoid undue interference
with their duties, public officials have the right—within reason—to make the wrong call.
Qualified immunity will operate to protect officials from the “hazy” borders of what is
lawful and unlawful, and shields officers who have “reasonable, but mistaken” views of
the law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). In other words, “qualified immunity
gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments
about open legal questions,” and will protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
Courts faced with qualified immunity claims consider at least one of two
questions: (1) whether the facts alleged show the violation of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. at 735. If the answer to either question is no, then qualified immunity applies. The
court can address the elements in either order, and need only address one if it is
dispositive. Id.
Here, it is necessary only to address the second: whether the right was clearly
established. A “clearly established” right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
7
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (emphasis added). A right is not clearly
established if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question “beyond
debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). To find that a
right is clearly established, courts generally “need to identify a case where an officer
acting under similar circumstances…was held to have violated” the constitutional right.
Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019) (per curiam). The relevant precedent must
define the right with a “high degree of specificity,” so that “every reasonable official
would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Principles stated generally, such as “an
officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force” do not suffice. Kisela v. Hughes,
584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) (per curiam).
A. It is not clearly established that the plaintiff has a property interest in
continued employment, especially considering his status as a
probationary deputy.
At the outset, it is not clearly established that the plaintiff possesses a property
right in continued employment—in other words, it is not beyond debate that the plaintiff
has a property interest. Because property rights “are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law,” Roth, 408 U.S. 564, at 576, and often turn on the relevant law in a jurisdiction,
the plaintiff must identify controlling precedent—rather than a wealth of persuasive
authority that would almost certainly only state general principles in other
jurisdictions—establishing a property right to continued employment here. He cannot, as
no court within our state has held that an employee has a property right under state law,
and certainly not in the circumstances presented here, where the plaintiff is a
8
probationary deputy and not an ordinary employee. Instead, it is much more obvious
under state law that an individual has no property interest in continued employment
because they may be honorably discharged at any time. Because it would not be clear or
obvious to every reasonable official that the plaintiff has a property right in continued
employment, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
B. It is not clearly established whether the plaintiff is entitled to due
process prior to being placed on administrative leave while being
criminally prosecuted.
Nor can the plaintiff point to controlling authority clearly establishing his right to
pre-deprivation process prior to unpaid administrative leave. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has squarely rejected the rule in a situation similar to the one here that “a
governmental employer may not suspend an employee without pay unless that suspension
is preceded by” pre-deprivation process, “providing the employee with notice and an
opportunity to be heard.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997).
Worse still, the plaintiff cannot even point to a wealth of persuasive precedent
clearly establishing the rule he seeks to apply here. In support of the proposition that not
affording notice or an opportunity for a hearing to the plaintiff “before depriving his
property interest in continued employment by instituting unpaid administrative leave
upon him” violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
(Complaint ¶¶ 20, 22, 25, 35), he cites Kennedy v. City of New York, 94-CV-02886
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), Urbina v. Port Auth. of New York, 15-CV-08647 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), and
FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988). At face value, those cases stand only for the
unremarkable proposition that some form of due process—whether that be pre- or
post-deprivation—is required upon deprivation of a protected property interest. See
9
Complaint ¶¶ 20, 22, 25, 35 (“…cannot be imposed without the protection of due
process”); (“…entitled to the protection of due process of law”). Read more carefully, the
cases only undermine the position of the plaintiff.
For example, Urbina is distinguishable. There, the plaintiff was suspended without
pay and then denied a hearing for more than four years, and the court held only that such
a delay was unreasonable in light of his entitlement to a post-deprivation hearing to be
conducted within a reasonable time. The court did not hold—and could not have held in
light of Gilbert—that a pre-deprivation hearing was required.
Mallen fares no better. There, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that
suspended an indicted bank official without any pre-suspension hearing, holding that the
substantial interest in protecting the public and the availability of post-suspension review
rendered pre-deprivation process unnecessary. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240–41. That Mallen
upheld a suspension without any pre-deprivation hearing whatsoever—and the plaintiff
cites it in support of a pre-deprivation hearing requirement—only illustrates the weakness
of his authority.
Taken together, the cited authorities establish nothing beyond the generic principle
that due process applies where a property interest exists—a principle that does not,
without more, put any reasonable official on notice that suspending an employee without
a pre-deprivation hearing violates the Due Process Clause. A reasonable official here
could not have understood that placing the plaintiff on unpaid administrative leave
without a pre-deprivation hearing was unlawful, especially where it is not beyond debate
whether the plaintiff has a property interest in continued employment. Indeed, the most
on-point Supreme Court authority, Gilbert, points squarely the other way.
10
C. It is not clearly established that the Attorney General lacks the
authority to order a government employee on administrative leave
while they are being prosecuted.
Finally, it would not be clear to every reasonable official that the Attorney General
lacks the authority to order a government employee, especially a law enforcement officer,
onto administrative leave while they are under investigation or actively being prosecuted.
As a threshold matter, the plaintiff cannot identify any controlling or even persuasive
precedent interpreting the statute at issue because none exists, making the question not
clearly established. Nor would the plaintiff succeed in arguing that the violation is
obvious. The relevant statute, 2 R. Stat. § 3126, provides that “a person may only be on
administrative leave for no longer than 9 days; however, a person may be put on
administrative leave for longer if: (a) there is a criminal investigation supplemented by
order from the Attorney General for the person to be placed on administrative leave.” 2
R. Stat. § 3126. The relevant language provides that the order is “for the person to be
placed on administrative leave.” Id. (emphasis added). The plaintiff would simply be
wrong to argue that the statute permits only a department to place the person on
administrative leave, and then the Attorney General may only extend that leave. Rather,
the word “placed” assumes that there is no administrative leave to extend to begin with.
Id. Finally, the argument that the administrative leave itself is the thing being
“supplemented” by the order is also wrong, because the antecedent to that phrase is “a
criminal investigation,” and “supplemented” merely modifies the word “criminal
investigation”—not “administrative leave.” Id. Other statutes persuade the same
conclusion. See 2 R. Stat. § 3128 (“Administrative leave may only be used if there is a
pending misconduct investigation or criminal investigation.”) (emphasis added).
11
Because the plaintiff cannot satisfy either prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry—there is no constitutional violation, and if there were, the right was not clearly
established—the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of all claims
against him seeking damages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court should dismiss with prejudice.
Dated: April 16, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
Derogatoryyy (Rid. Bar No. 10210)
Counsel of Record
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
Attorney for Defendant
12
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
XOLAAZ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Deputy
Attorney General of the Department of
Justice; CEPHALGPT, in his
individual and official capacities as the
Sheriff of the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office,
Defendants.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
[PROPOSED] ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and good cause
appearing, it is this __ of ________, 2026, by the Superior Court of Ridgeway for
Ridgeway County:
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as it
is against Defendant CephalGPT, in his individual capacity; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to amend is DENIED as futile.
/s/
Superior Court Judge
