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Memorandum Opinions and Orders - Chambers of Justice Techiey
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SUPERIOR COURT
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DOCKET NO. N/A
In re Dariel_Powell
MEMORANDUM OPINIONS AND ORDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 4th, 2026, this Court issued search and arrest warrants against Dariel_Powell for
violating R.C.C § 5.08a Unlawful Possession of Government-Issued Equipment. Probable cause was
established for both warrants following a hearing conducted on that same date. On April 6th, 2026,
Dariel_Powell, through counsel tobyrulles4568, filed a motion to quash the arrest and search warrants.
The motion was denied. On April 7th, 2026, Dariel_Powell, again through counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration. This motion was also denied. On April 11th, 2026, both warrants were executed by
Lieutenant Azap634 of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office. The motion to quash was filed with the
Court and will be attached at the end of this document. The motion for reconsideration was presented
orally and will be provided herein as accurately as feasible.
II. MOTION TO QUASH ARREST & SEARCH WARRANT
A. Dariel_Powell’s Motion
A link to Dariel_Powell’s filing can be found here.
B. Ruling of the Court
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“The Court has considered the motion, the arguments of both parties, and the full statutory
framework. The motion is denied in its entirety.
The Court notes it issued both warrants following a probable cause hearing. De novo review has accordingly
been applied throughout.
The Petitioner contends his designation under R. Stat. §§ 2201 and 2202 as Chief Law Enforcement Officer
inherently authorizes possession of a radio, and that as the ultimate source of departmental policy he may
self-authorize such possession. The Court rejects both contentions. Sections 2201 and 2202 confer supervisory
and directional authority, they do not affirmatively authorize possession of specific operational equipment.
R.C.C. § 5.08 imposes an affirmative authorization requirement. Possession must be authorized by state law or
relevant department policy, silence does not satisfy this. The Department of Justice had no policy governing
possession of dispensed equipment at the time of the offense and has never held dispense capability. This
historical silence is not a gap but a structural reality. The after-the-fact addition of a DOJ policy confirms rather
than undermines this conclusion and cannot operate retroactively.
Applying de novo review, the Court affirms its prior probable cause finding. The Petitioner held no dispense
powers, operated within a department with no dispense capability, and possessed the radio in his personal
official inventory, a civilian storage capacity within the meaning of § 5.08. Probable cause was properly
established. The warrants conform to Rule 44 and are facially valid. The arrest warrant is independently
supported by the affirmed probable cause finding.
The motion to quash the search warrant, motion to quash the arrest warrant, motion to suppress evidence, and
motion to dismiss are each DENIED.”
III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. Dariel_Powell’s Motion
“I respectfully ask the Court to reconsider its ruling on the following grounds:
There is no requirement that policy made by the Attorney General be written or formally codified. To impose
such a requirement would amount to the Court creating an unjust judicial doctrine, rather than applying the law.
While the Court may perceive the policy to have been created after the Attorney General obtained the radio, that
is not the case. For the Attorney General to validly obtain a radio, the policy must necessarily have existed prior
to its issuance, such that whoever provided the radio to the Attorney General did so lawfully. Section 5.08(a)
contains no qualifications or requirements that an individual must satisfy in order to lawfully possess
government-issued equipment, nor does it define what items fall within that category. Accordingly, there is no
clear statutory basis upon which to determine what constitutes “government-issued equipment.”
Furthermore, we submit that the Court cannot properly rely on “dispense capabilities,” as this is not a matter of
law but rather a functional or developmental feature external to State law. To consider such a factor is unjust,
prejudicial, and constitutes an error of law.
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This point follows from the second. Members of this same judiciary have themselves used radios provided by
police officers - for example, to run names and locate criminal records in the context of expungement
proceedings. This reflects a clear inconsistency. The judiciary cannot find probable cause for a criminal offence
based solely on the Attorney General’s possession of a radio - where such possession was lawfully obtained -
while judges within the same judiciary engage in materially identical conduct.
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Chief Judge Arthur_Chen stated in an impeachment hearing that there exists a radio channel designated “State,”
intended for communication between the Department of State and the Department of Justice. This demonstrates
that interdepartmental radio use was contemplated and implicitly authorised at the level of Developer Oversight.
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Respectfully submitted”
B. Ruling of the Court
“The motion for reconsideration is denied. The Petitioner has not identified a clear error of law
or fact in the Court's prior ruling. Each ground is addressed in turn.
On unwritten policy: policy in any functional governmental or legal sense must be capable of external
identification, communication, and enforcement. An uncommunicated intention held by the Attorney General
cannot constitute policy. Government cannot operate on that basis, and to hold otherwise would permit any
official to retroactively authorize conduct by claiming a prior mental determination. The argument that the
transfer itself proves prior authorization exists is circular, it assumes the lawfulness it seeks to establish.
On the definition of government-issued equipment: a radio dispensed through a law enforcement department's
official equipment system plainly falls within the ordinary meaning of that phrase. The absence of a statutory
definition does not create genuine ambiguity on these facts.
On dispense capabilities: the Court referenced the dispense framework as context, not as the legal foundation of
its finding. Removing it from consideration does not change the outcome. The charge turns on whether state law
or department policy affirmatively authorized possession. Neither did. That conclusion stands independently.
On judicial use of radios: unauthorized conduct by others does not authorize the Petitioner's possession. If such
instances occurred without proper legal authorization, they were equally improper. The Court has no verified
record of this occurring and an assertion in a motion is not evidence.
On the designated State radio channel: the Petitioner cannot simultaneously argue dispense capabilities should
be disregarded as external to state law while relying on a radio channel's existence as implicit legal
authorization. Both are matters of the same operational framework. Furthermore, a remark made in an
impeachment hearing is not a source of law and cannot constitute the affirmative authorization R.C.C. § 5.08
requires.”
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So ordered.
Hon. Techiey
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of Ridgeway
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
RIDGEWAY
In re Dariel_Powell
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MOTION TO QUASH ARREST &
SEARCH WARRANT
Hon. Techiey
Docket Number: N/A
MOTION TO QUASH ARREST & SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST
ATTORNEY GENERAL DARIEL POWELL
COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves
this Honourable Court to quash the search warrant and arrest warrant issued in this matter, and
to suppress all evidence obtained therefrom, on the grounds that the warrants were issued
without probable cause, in clear misapplication of the State law, and in contravention of the
Petitioner’s lawful authority as Attorney General and Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the
State. In support thereof, the Petitioner states as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents a fundamental legal error: the issuance of a criminal process against
the State’s highest law enforcement authority for conduct that is not unlawful as a matter of
statutory interpretation, constitutional structure, or administrative authority. The alleged
offence–unlawful possession of government-issued equipment–cannot, as a matter of law, be
sustained against an individual who, by statute, serves as the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of
the State and possesses the inherent authority over such equipment and its authorised use. The
warrants at issue are therefore facially defective and must be quashed.
II. RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The charge arises under R.C.C. s.5.08(a), which provides, in substance, that an individual
commits an offence where they possess government-issued equipment “when that possession is
not authorised by State law or departmental policy.”
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Separately, R. State. S 2201 established that:
“The Attorney General is an elected office, and he serves as the Chief Prosecutor, Chief
Attorney, and Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the State.”
This statutory designation is not ceremonial. It confers ultimate supervisory and operational
authority over law enforcement functions within the State.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Authority of the Attorney General as Chief Law Enforcement Officer
The Petitioner’s status as Chief Law Enforcement Officer is dispositive. This is not a
nominal title but a substantive grant of authority placing the Petitioner at the apex of the State’s
law enforcement hierarchy. That role necessarily encompasses oversight, consideration, and
operational control, all of which require access to and use of standard law enforcement
equipment. A radio is not an exceptional or specialised item; it is a basic instrument of law
enforcement communication. To conclude that subordinate officers may lawfully possess such
equipment while the official charged with supervising them may not would produce an absurd
and legally untenable result. The statute must be interpreted in a manner that gives coherent
effect to the hierarchy it establishes, and that interpretation compels the conclusion that the
Petitioner’s possession was authorised by virtue of his office alone.
B. Departmental Policy and Inherent Authority
Even if State law did not independently authorise the Petitioner’s possession, the statute
expressly provides that authorisation may arise from departmental policy. The warrants fail to
account for the fundamental principle that, as Chief Law Enforcement Officer, the Attorney
General is the ultimate source of such policy. Departmental Policy is not confined to written
directives or formally codified regulations; it includes the operative decisions and authorisations
made by those vested with authority to govern the department. Where the Attorney General
determines that certain conduct is permissible, that determination constitutes policy, regardless
of whether it is memorialised in writing. To hold otherwise would create the illogical position
that the highest authority within the department is subordinate to a policy framework he lacks
the power to define. Accordingly, the virtue of his authority, and the statutory element of
unauthorised possession cannot be satisfied.
C. Absence of Any Statutory Qualifications Restricting Possession
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The Statutory framework reinforces this conclusion by its silence as to any limitation on
who may possess government-issued equipment. There is no requirement that the individual be
a sworn officer, no requirement of departmental employment, and no express prohibition
applicable to the Attorney General. The legislature instead chose a broad authorisation-based
model. In such a framework, the existence of authority–whether derived from State law or
departmental policy–is determinative. The Petitioner's position as Chief Law Enforcement
Officer places him squarely within the category of individuals who are inherently authorised,
and any contrary interpretation would amount to judiciary insertion of limitations. If such
limitations were to be affirmed and placed, then the criminalisation of judges and operators of
the Ridgeway Department of Transportation possessing radios, will too follow.
IV. FACIAL DEFECTS IN THE WARRANTS
The warrants are additionally defective on their face. The search warrant authorises the
seizure of a “radio and other illegal items” without establishing any independent basis to
conclude that such items are illegal. This language is impermissibly broad and fails to meet the
requirement of particularly, effectively permitting a general search untethered from any properly
established probable cause. The arrest warrant is derivative of this defect, relying entirely on the
conclusions drawn from the unlawful search warrant. Where the foundational warrant is invalid,
any subsequent warrant predicated upon it is likewise invalid. These defects are not technical
but fundamental, rendering both warrants legally unsustainable.
V. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
Because the warrants were issued without probable cause and in violation of statute, all
evidence obtained pursuant to them must be suppressed. This includes not only direct fruits of
the search but also any derivative evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful warrants. This
exclusionary rule operates to prevent the State from benefiting from its own unlawful conduct,
and its application is particularly warranted where, as here, the underlying conduct was not
criminal to begin with. Any evidence obtained is irreparably tainted and inadmissible.
VI. STRUCTURAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This case raises broader structural concerns that reinforce the necessity of quashing the
warrants. The prosecution of the State’s Chief Law Enforcement Officer for conduct inherently
within the scope of that office represents a profound misapplication of legal authority. It permits
subordinate actors to second-guess and criminalise the lawful exercise of supervisory functions,
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thereby undermining the hierarchy established by statute. The law does not contemplate such a
result. Properly construed, R.C.C. s. 5.08(a), read in conjunction with R. Stat. s. 2201, makes
clear that the Petitioner’s conduct was authorised, lawful and incapable of supporting probable
cause.
VII. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honourable Court quash the
search warrant, quash the arrest warrant, suppress all evidence obtained as a result thereof, and
dismiss the charges in their entirety.
6th April, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Tobyrulles4568
Counsel of Record
Partner
Rulles Criminal Defence
State Bar No. 101256
D: toby45689
E: [email protected]
Phone No. (555) 0192-8463
Fax: (555) 0178-3921
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