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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
RIDGEWAY
DARIEL_POWELL,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v,
RATHUZEN in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Ridgeway;
AZAP634 in his official capacity as
Lieutenant of the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office,
Defendant-Respondent.
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Hon. UNASSIGNED
Docket Number:
A VERIFIED CIVIL COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Plaintiff Dariel_Powell (“Plaintiff”), by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to 1
R. Stat. § 2210, in his Civil Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus against
Azap634 and Rathuzen, alleges the following:
INTRODUCTION
1. On or about the 11th April, 2026, Plaintiff was arrested and subsequently
detained in the custody of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office at the Ridgeway
County Sheriff's Office State Correctional Facility pursuant to an arrest warrant issued
on a charge of unlawful possession of government-issued equipment under § 5.08(a),
arising solely from his possession of a radio.
2. Although Plaintiff is no longer in physical custody, the arrest and underlying
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warrants remain legally operative and continue to impose consequences upon him.
Plaintiff submits that the arrest and prior detention were unlawful, as the warrants were
issued without a legally sufficient basis and in reliance on an erroneous interpretation of
§ 5.08, failing to establish conduct that falls within the scope of any enforceable
prohibition.
JURISDICTION
3. The Ridgeway Superior Court has original jurisdiction over “all civil and
criminal cases or controversies.” RID. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
4. The Ridgeway Superior Court has the “right to…provide writ of habeas
corpus.” RID. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
5. The venue is proper as the acts and omissions which give rise to this
complaint occurred in the State of Ridgeway.
PARTIES
6. Plaintiff-Petitioner Dariel_Powell (“Plaintiff Dariel”) is an individual,
resident, and citizen of the State of Ridgeway. Plaintiff is the Attorney General of the
State of Ridgeway.
7. Defendant-Respondent Azap634 (“Defendant Azap634”) is an individual,
resident, and citizen of the State of Ridgeway. Respondent is a Lieutenant within the
Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office.
8. Defendant-Respondent Rathuzen (“Government Defendant”) is named in his
official capacity as Governor of the State of Ridgeway. In this capacity, Governor
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Rathuzen is the chief executive officer of the state and is responsible for the faithful
execution of state law. See Rid. Const. art. 2, § 3; art. 4, § 1.
FACTS
9. On April 4, 2026, during a search warrant hearing, a finding of probable
cause was made that Plaintiff, Dariel_Powell, was in possession of “government-issued
equipment,” namely a radio.
10. Based on that finding, on April 5, 2026, Justice Techiey of the Supreme Court
of the State of Ridgeway issued an arrest warrant against Plaintiff for unlawful
possession of government-issued equipment in violation of R.C.C. § 5.08(a).
11. On April 11, 2026, at approximately 17:42, Plaintiff was arrested by
Lieutenant Azap634 of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office pursuant to the issued
arrest warrant. The warrant stated:
“PROBABLE CAUSE ESTABLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT; UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF
GOVERNMENT[-]ISSUED EQUIPMENT, Dariel_Powell FOUND TO BE
IN UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A RADIO DURING SEARCH
WARRANT HEARING ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 4, 2026.
PROVIDE RECEIPT OF EXECUTION TO JUSTICE TECHIEY.”
12. Plaintiff was taken into custody and transported to the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office Jail, where he was booked on a charge of unlawful possession of
government-issued equipment under R.C.C. § 5.08(a).
13. The charge against Plaintiff arose solely from his alleged possession of a
radio.
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14. At all relevant times, Plaintiff’s possession of the radio was not accompanied
by any clearly defined statutory prohibition, nor was there any articulated department
policy governing such possession.
15. R.C.C. § 5.08(a) states:
“The act of unlawfully possessing any government-issued equipment
in any off-duty or civilian storage device, capacity, or other inventory
not mentioned of which is not authorized by state law or relevant
department policy.”
16. The statute does not define “government-issued equipment,” nor does it
provide any clear standard by which an individual may determine what conduct is
prohibited.
17. Following his arrest, Plaintiff was detained in the custody of the Ridgeway
County Sheriff’s Office.
18. Plaintiff subsequently filed motions to quash the arrest and search warrants,
suppress evidence, and dismiss the charge.
19. The Court denied all such motions, affirming the existence of probable cause
and upholding the validity of the warrants.
20. Plaintiff has since been released from custody; however, the arrest,
underlying warrants, and charge remain legally operative and continue to impose
consequences upon him.
21. Plaintiff, by statute, is the Chief Law Enforcement under R. Stat. § 2201,
which reads:
“The Attorney General is an elected office, and he serves as the Chief
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Prosecutor, Chief Attorney, and Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the
State.”
22. The Attorney General, being the Chief Law Enforcement Officer for the state,
is not a nominal title, or a ceremonial/symbolic title; it is a statutory responsibility
bestowed upon the Attorney General, charging him with the operational oversight of all
law enforcement agencies.
23. By statute, the Attorney General is a law enforcement officer of the State of
Ridgeway.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Void-for-Vagueness, Fourteenth Amendment – 1 R. Stat. § 3201)
Against Government Defendants
24. All prior paragraphs within this complaint are incorporated as if they are fully
set forth herein.
25. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“No State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
26. “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972). Laws can be vague either because they (1) fail to inform people of what they
prohibit or (2) lend themselves to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1999); Papachristou v Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 162 (1972).
27. The term “government-issued equipment” as used in R.C.C. § 5.08(a) does
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not provide sufficient notice of what type of conduct is prohibited under the statute.
28. The term “off-duty or civilian storage device, capacity, or other inventory not
mentioned” as used in R.C.C. § 5.08(a) does not provide sufficient notice of what type of
conduct is prohibited under the statute.
29. The phrase “not authorized by state law or relevant department policy” as
used in R.C.C. § 5.08(a) does not provide sufficient notice of what type of conduct is
prohibited under the statute.
30. Because these terms are poorly and vaguely defined, R.C.C. § 5.08(a) vests
law enforcement with wide discretion to determine what conduct is criminal.
31. Alternatively, R.C.C. § 5.08(a) is so standardless that it invites arbitrary
enforcement because it criminalises conduct by Plaintiff Dariel but permits identical
conduct by Defendant Azap634.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Habeas Corpus – 1 R. Stat. § 2210)
Against Defendant Azap634
32. All prior paragraphs within this Petition are incorporated as if fully set forth
herein.
33. In reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a court considers at least
one of two questions: (1) whether the police were legally entitled to make an arrest; or
(2) whether the suspect is actually innocent of the charge for which they were arrested.
In re ZachCasisbeast, 1 R. Supp. 12 (2022). If the answer to either question is no, then
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the petition must be granted. Id. The court needs only to address the first question if it is
dispositive. Id.
34. Here, it is only necessary to address the first question: whether the arrest was
lawful. An arrest must be supported by probable cause; absent such probable cause, the
arrest is unlawful and cannot stand as a matter of law.
35. A writ of habeas corpus lies to inquire into the legality of an arrest, detention,
or restraint on liberty.
36. Plaintiff was arrested and detained pursuant to an arrest warrant issued on a
finding of probable cause for an alleged violation of R.C.C. § 5.08(a).
37. That finding of probable cause was legally defective.
38. R.C.C. § 5.08(a) criminalises the “unlawful possession of government-issued
equipment” but fails to define what constitutes “government-issued equipment,” fails to
provide any clear standard governing possession, and fails to articulate what conduct
renders such possession unlawful.
39. The statute further conditions legality on authorisation by “state law or
relevant department policy,” yet no such policy existed at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest,
and no clear statutory authorisation scheme was in place.
40. As applied to Plaintiff, the alleged conduct—mere possession of a radio—
does not constitute a clearly defined criminal offence under any enforceable legal
standard.
41. Because the statute provides no clear definition or standard, it cannot form a
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valid basis for probable cause.
42. Accordingly, the arrest warrant issued against Plaintiff was unsupported by
probable cause and was invalid as a matter of law.
43. Plaintiff’s arrest and resulting detention therefore constituted an unlawful
restraint of liberty.
44. Although Plaintiff is no longer in physical custody, the arrest, warrant, and
underlying charge remain legally operative and continue to impose consequences upon
him.
45. Independently, the arrest and finding of probable cause are legally defective
because the Plaintiff, at all relevant times, served as the Attorney General of the State of
Ridgeway and therefore the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the state pursuant to 2 R.
Stat. §§ 2201–2202.
46. In that capacity, Plaintiff possesses supervisory and directional authority over
law enforcement operations and the implementation of state law. Such authority
necessarily encompasses the use, possession, and control of law enforcement equipment
reasonably required to carry out official duties.
47. R.C.C. § 5.08(a) conditions lawful possession of government-issued
equipment on authorisation by state law or relevant department policy. Plaintiff’s
statutory designation as Chief Law Enforcement Officer constitutes such authorisation as
a matter of law.
48. To conclude otherwise would produce an untenable result whereby the
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highest law enforcement official in the State would be prohibited from possessing the
very equipment necessary to direct, coordinate, and oversee law enforcement functions,
while subordinate officers are permitted to do so.
49. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that R.C.C. § 5.08(a) is
constitutionally valid, Plaintiff's possession of a radio falls squarely within the scope of
lawful authorised conduct under state law.
50. Because Plaintiff’s conduct was authorised by virtue of his office, it cannot
form the basis of a criminal offence, and therefore cannot support a finding of probable
cause.
51. The arrest warrant issued against Plaintiff is thus invalid as a matter of law,
and his arrest and detention constituted an unlawful restraint of his liberty.
52. Habeas corpus relief is therefore appropriate to declare the arrest and
detention unlawful and to vacate the underlying warrant and its legal effects.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the following
relief:
a. Issue a writ of habeas corpus finding that Plaintiff’s arrest and prior detention were
unlawful;
b. Declare that the arrest warrant issued against Plaintiff was unsupported by
probable cause and is invalid as a matter of law;
c. Vacate and set aside the arrest warrant and any related findings of probable cause;
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d. Order the expungement and sealing of Plaintiff’s arrest record arising from the
alleged violation of R.C.C. § 5.08(a);
e. Enjoin Respondents from enforcing the invalid warrant or otherwise taking action
against Plaintiff based on the same alleged conduct;
f. Declare that R.C.C. § 5.08(a) is void for vagueness and therefore unenforceable,
or, in the alternative, enjoin Respondents from enforcing the statute unless and
until it is authoritatively construed to provide a clear and ascertainable standard of
prohibited conduct;
g. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
April 12th 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Tobyrulles4568
Counsel of Record
Partner
Rulles Criminal Defence
State Bar No. 101256
D: toby45689
E: [email protected]
Phone No. (555) 0192-8463
Fax: (555) 0178-3921
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EXHIBIT A
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EXHIBIT B
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Document record
File size
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Uploaded
Apr 13, 2026 6:15 PM
Filed
Apr 13, 2026 6:15 PM
Filing code
TEMP-20260413-104
Uploaded by
tobyrulles4568
Notes
Civil Complaint & Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
