IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
XOLAAZ, in his individual and official
capacities,
CEPHALGPT, in his individual and official
capacities,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-0078
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff JamesGardai, proceeding in pro per, hereby submits this opposition to the
Government’s April 12th Motion to Dismiss.
ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE HAS ALREADY WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A State “cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” Railroad Co. v.
Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 339 (1880); this is the foundational principle of sovereign immunity.
This means that unless a state waives their sovereign immunity, they may not be subject to
litigation in the courts of their own state.
However, this principle does not apply here, because the State has already waived
sovereign immunity. Indeed, a State’s sovereign immunity is “a personal privilege which it may
waive at pleasure.” Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 477. The decision to waive that immunity,
however, “is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty.” Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How.
527, 529 (1858).
1 R. Stat. § 3114(c) specifically states that official misconduct “[s]uits shall proceed
against defendants in their official capacity.” This language is mandatory; the use of the word
“shall” “creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998). When a legislature affirmatively authorizes
suits against officials in their official capacity, it necessarily authorizes suits against the State
itself, because an official capacity action “is not a suit against the official personally, for the real
party in interest is the [governmental] entity” itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, § 3114(c) functions as an express waiver of
sovereign immunity for claims of official misconduct, removing the State’s ability to shield
itself behind immunity in precisely this context.
This waiver is further reinforced by 1 R. Stat. § 3203, which preserves immunity only
“except those in this section, and in later laws in which liability is explicitly created.” Read
together, these provisions demonstrate a clear statutory structure: immunity is the default rule,
but it is expressly displaced where the legislature has created a cause of action and authorized
suit. Here, § 3114(c) does exactly that by not only creating liability for official misconduct but
directing that such claims “shall proceed against defendants in their official capacity” in court.
Under Supreme Court precedent, any waiver of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally
expressed,” Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), and this statutory
scheme satisfies that requirement by expressly permitting litigation in the State’s own courts
against official capacity defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 04/12/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI1
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
1 An unincorporated association.
