STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
JamesGardai,
Petitioner
-against-
Ridgeway County Sheriffs Office
Respondent.
Case No. RSC-CV-5477
RESPONDENT'S OPPOSITION TO
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
Presiding Judge: Hon. Arthur_Chen
Respondent Ridgeway County Sheriff's Office, by and through the Department of Justice
of the State of Ridgeway, respectfully submits this Opposition to Petitioner's Verified
Administrative Claim and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
Preliminary Statement
Petitioner's claim rests on a selective and distorted reading of the statutory scheme
governing administrative leave. When the relevant statutes are read together it is clear that: (1)
administrative leave may be initiated on the basis of a criminal investigation alone, without any
internal affairs process; (2) non-internal-affairs entities may place officers on administrative
leave, as the statute itself contemplates; and (3) the Attorney General's order under § 3126 was a
lawful exercise of authority tied to an active criminal investigation. The motion for a preliminary
injunction likewise fails on all four factors. This Court should deny the petition in full.
Argument
I. The Placement on Administrative Leave Was Lawful Under the Statutory Scheme
A. Section 3128 independently authorizes administrative leave on the basis of a criminal
investigation, without requiring any internal affairs process
Petitioner's entire argument is built around § 3126. But he conspicuously ignores § 3128,
which provides: "Administrative leave may only be used if there is a pending misconduct
investigation or criminal investigation." 2 R. Stat. § 3128.
This is the foundational predicate statute for administrative leave. It identifies two
independent bases on which administrative leave may be used: a pending misconduct
investigation, or a pending criminal investigation. No internal affairs involvement is required
under either prong. Where a criminal investigation is pending the statutory predicate for
administrative leave is fully satisfied. Petitioner's argument that administrative leave requires an
internal affairs process simply has no basis in § 3128's text.
B. Section 3125 does not restrict who may initiate administrative leave.
Section 3125 defines administrative leave as "the indefinite suspension pending an
investigation" and limits its use to allegations that would warrant a general or dishonorable
discharge. It says nothing about which official or entity has the authority to initiate such leave.
Petitioner reads a restriction into the statute that does not appear in its text. Courts must presume
that a legislature says what it means and means what it says, and may not import limitations the
legislature chose not to include. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54
(1992).
C. Section 3129(a) affirmatively confirms that non-internal-affairs entities may place officers on
administrative leave.
Petitioner cites § 3129(a) as though it supports his position, but it actually undermines it.
Section 3129(a) provides that administrative court review is available where "the placement was
not by an internal affairs entity." This provision only makes sense if the legislature recognized
that non-IA entities can and do place officers on administrative leave. If only internal affairs
entities could ever lawfully initiate administrative leave, there would never be a non-IA
placement to review, the exception would be surplusage. Courts are obligated to give effect to
every provision of a statute and to avoid readings that render any part meaningless. TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
The only reading that gives § 3129(a) operative meaning is one that acknowledges
non-IA entities, including the Attorney General, may place officers on administrative leave.
Section 3129(a) then provides a basis for judicial review of such placements. That is precisely
this case, and precisely why this Court has jurisdiction to review the question of authorization.
But reviewability is not the same as unlawfulness, and the merits of that review favor
Respondent for the reasons set out here.
D. Section 3126 authorizes the Attorney General to order administrative leave in connection
with a criminal investigation.
Section 3126 provides that a person may be on administrative leave for longer than nine
days where "there is a criminal investigation supplemented by order from the Attorney General
for the person to be placed on administrative leave." Petitioner argues this language only permits
the AG to extend existing leave. The text does not support that reading.
The operative phrase is "order from the Attorney General for the person to be placed on
administrative leave." The word "placed" is active and prospective. It describes the act of
initiating placement, not ratifying or extending a placement already made by someone else. Had
the legislature intended to limit the AG to an extension role, it would have written "order from
the Attorney General extending the person's administrative leave." It did not. The statutory text
must be taken as written.
Furthermore, § 3126 must be read in conjunction with § 3128. Section 3128 establishes
that a criminal investigation is a sufficient basis for administrative leave. Section 3126 then
establishes that where a criminal investigation exists and the AG issues an order, the leave may
extend beyond nine days. Reading these provisions together, the AG's order serves both as the
authorization mechanism and as the basis for extended leave, a coherent, harmonious reading of
the statutory scheme as a whole. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
417 (1992) ("courts must examine the structure and language of the statute as a whole").
Petitioner's contrary reading produces an absurd result: the Attorney General, the State's
chief law enforcement officer, would be powerless to protect the integrity of a criminal
investigation unless some other official happened to have already placed the subject on leave
independently. There is no basis to conclude the legislature intended that outcome.
II. Petitioner's Due Process Claim Fails
Even assuming Petitioner holds a protected property interest in continued employment
under 2 R. Stat. § 4101, due process requires a context-specific balancing of three factors: (1) the
private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35
(1976).
On the first factor, private interest is limited. Section 3138 expressly provides that
administrative leave shall not be considered an administrative demerit and shall not be used
against an individual's disciplinary record. Administrative leave is a temporary, non-punitive
measure. The deprivation, while real, is materially less severe than a termination or a formal
disciplinary action.
On the second factor, requiring a pre-deprivation hearing in the context of an active
criminal investigation carries substantial risk of compromising that investigation, alerting the
subject, enabling witness tampering, or destroying evidence that would be paramount in the
investigation’s findings. The marginal value of a pre-deprivation hearing in these circumstances
is low, and the cost to public interest is high.
On the third factor, the government’s interest is substantial. The Supreme Court has
recognized that, in limited circumstances demanding prompt action, an important governmental
interest coupled with substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless may justify
postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation. FDIC v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230, 240–42 (1988). The post-deprivation process exists here, Petitioner is before this
Court.
III. The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Should Be Denied
Likelihood of success on the merits. As demonstrated above, the placement on
administrative leave was lawful under §§ 3125, 3126, and 3128, and confirmed by the structure
of § 3129(a). The due process claim fails under Mathews balancing. Petitioner is unlikely to
succeed on either claim.
Irreparable harm. Because no constitutional violation has occurred, the presumption of
irreparable harm advanced by Petitioner does not arise. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002
(9th Cir. 2012), has no application absent a demonstrated constitutional deprivation. As to
Petitioner's assertion of risk of homelessness: economic hardship, however sympathetic, does not
constitute irreparable harm where it is temporary and compensable. Sampson v. Murray, 415
U.S. 61, 91–92 (1974). Lost wages may be recovered if Petitioner ultimately prevails; they do
not justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.
Balance of equities. Granting the injunction would restore to active law enforcement duty
an officer who is the subject of an active criminal investigation. The public safety implications
substantially outweigh Petitioner's interest in immediate reinstatement. The equities favor
Respondent.
Public interest. It is not in the public interest to compel the reinstatement of a law
enforcement officer under active criminal investigation. The public has a strong interest in the
integrity of its law enforcement agencies, the protection of ongoing investigations, and the lawful
administration of government employment. A preliminary injunction in Petitioner's favor would
undermine all three.
Conclusion
The placement of Petitioner on administrative leave was lawful under the plain text and
structure of 2 R. Stat. §§ 3125, 3126, 3128, and 3129. The Attorney General had authority to
issue the directive, a criminal investigation provided the required predicate, and the process
employed was constitutionally adequate under the circumstances. Petitioner's motion for a
preliminary injunction fails on all four factors. Respondent respectfully requests that this Court
deny the petition and the motion in full.
DATED: April 11th, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
Dariel_Powell, Esq.
Attorney for the Defendant
Attorney General
/s/ Dariel_Powell
