STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
thr33six8,
Plaintiff
-against-
RichardLennox, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF PALMER
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-1373
ANSWER TO CIVIL COMPLAINT AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Presiding Judge: Hon. Arthur_Chen
Defendant RichardLennox, proceeding with counsel, hereby submits this Answer to the
Civil Complaint and states as follows:
Answer to the Complaint
1. Admitted.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted.
4. Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 4 for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. Plaintiff's concealed
armament is relevant to the reasonableness of Defendant's subsequent conduct
and will be addressed further herein.
5. Admitted.
6. Admitted.
7. Admitted.
8. Admitted.
9. Admitted.
10. Admitted.
11. Admitted.
12. Admitted.
13. Admitted.
14. Admitted.
15. Admitted.
16. Admitted.
17. Admitted.
18. Defendant admits the allegations in Paragraph 18 insofar as Plaintiff returned to
the scene of the shootout and retrieved ammunition. Defendant further states that
this conduct, in context, was material to Defendant's assessment of Plaintiff as a
potential threat.
19. Admitted.
20. Admitted.
21. Admitted.
22. Admitted.
23. Admitted.
24. Admitted.
25. Admitted.
Answer to the Torts Alleged
First Cause of Action — Official Misconduct (1 R. Stat. § 3114)
1. Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 4 for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. Plaintiff's concealed armament is
relevant to the reasonableness of Defendant's subsequent conduct and will be addressed
further herein.
2. Defendant denies that his actions constituted official misconduct. Defendant's response to
Plaintiff at the scene was a lawful exercise of his duties as a law enforcement officer, not
an unauthorized act.
3. Defendant admits that 6 R. Stat. § 3108(a) requires the Palmer Police Department to
"patrol and conserve the peace." Defendant further states that responding to an active
armed incident and addressing individuals who, by objective appearance, posed a
credible threat to that peace is precisely what conserving the peace requires.
4. Defendant denies the allegation in Paragraph 10 of the First Cause of Action that Plaintiff
was not behaving in a manner that could be perceived as a lethal threat. At the time
Defendant responded to the scene:
a. a shootout had just concluded involving multiple armed individuals; Plaintiff was
present at and returned to an active crime scene;
b. Plaintiff retrieved ammunition from a killed law enforcement officer;
c. Plaintiff was in fact armed with a Solami submachine gun and a knife, which were
not visible to Defendant at the time but confirm that Plaintiff was armed;
d. Defendant had no information to distinguish Plaintiff from the other participants
in the armed altercation.
5. Defendant therefore denies that he killed "someone of peace." Based on the totality of the
circumstances known to Defendant at the time, Defendant had an objectively reasonable
basis to believe Plaintiff posed a threat to public safety and the peace.
Second Cause of Action — Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law (1 R. Stat. § 3115)
1. Defendant admits that 1 R. Stat. § 3115 is a valid statute of the State of Ridgeway.
2. Defendant denies that his actions constituted a deprivation of rights under color of law.
Because Defendant's use of force was authorized and reasonable under the circumstances,
no unlawful deprivation of any constitutional right occurred.
3. Defendant further states that the $3,000 payment referenced in Paragraph 25 of the
Complaint was made voluntarily and as a good-faith gesture, and shall not be construed
as an admission of liability for any tort alleged herein.
Affirmative Defenses
First Affirmative Defense - Reasonable Use of Force
Defendant's actions constituted a reasonable use of force in response to an objectively
threatening situation. Defendant arrived at the scene of an active armed shootout, observed
Plaintiff in the vicinity, and observed Plaintiff retrieve ammunition from a fallen officer. Under
the circumstances, a reasonable law enforcement officer would have perceived Plaintiff as a
potential threat to public safety.
Second Affirmative Defense - Qualified Immunity
Defendant acted in good faith in the discharge of his duties as Chief of Police. To the extent
qualified immunity or good faith immunity is available to law enforcement officers under
Ridgeway law, Defendant asserts such protection, as his conduct did not violate any clearly
established right that a reasonable officer would have known at the time.
Third Affirmative Defense - Plaintiff's Contributory Conduct
Plaintiff's own conduct contributed to the situation that led to the use of force. Specifically,
Plaintiff was armed (unbeknownst to Defendant), returned to an active crime scene, and retrieved
items from a deceased officer. These actions, viewed objectively, could give a reasonable officer
cause to respond defensively.
Fourth Affirmative Defense — Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted insofar
as it relies on a finding of "unauthorized" conduct. Because Defendant's use of force was
authorized under the circumstances, the predicate for the deprivation-of-rights claim is not
established.
DATED: April 11th, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
Dariel_Powell, Esq.
Attorney for the Defendant
Attorney General
/s/ Dariel_Powell
