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RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONED_JJ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Adjutant
General of the Ridgeway National
Guard,
Defendant.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Zoned_JJ (“Defendant”), in his individual capacity, by and through the
undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5), respectfully moves the court to
dismiss the above-captioned matter for failure to state a claim because the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity. A memorandum of law in support is attached.
Dated: April 6, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
(123) 456-7890
[email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONED_JJ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Adjutant
General of the Ridgeway National
Guard,
Defendant.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
(123) 456-7890
[email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 21, 2026, JamesGardai was serving as a Deputy with the Ridgeway
County Sheriff’s Office. (Complaint ¶ 5). While on patrol, he observed Superior Court
Judge CharlesLXV commit an assault. (Id. ¶ 6). He then attempted to arrest CharlesLXV
by handcuffing and dragging him. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7). At that point, Zoned_JJ—the Adjutant
General of the Ridgeway National Guard—deployed a taser against JamesGardai.
(Id. ¶¶ 8–9). After being tased, JamesGardai recovered and responded by deploying his
own taser against Zoned_JJ. (Id. ¶ 10). A member of the Ridgeway National Guard,
mlchalpm, intervened by tasing and handcuffing Zoned_JJ into a wall. (Id. ¶ 11). The
confrontation continued, and JamesGardai tased and attempted to arrest mlchalpm.
(Id. ¶¶ 12–13). While he was attempting to apprehend mlchalpm, Zoned_JJ drew his
firearm and fatally shot JamesGardai. (Id. ¶ 14–15).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(a)(5) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of
an action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rid. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(5). When confronted with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
must “assume the veracity” of “well-pleaded allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). However, the court need not “accept as true” allegations that offer
merely “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678. To
survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility
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when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
ARGUMENTS
I. The defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the right is not
clearly established.
Qualified immunity shields government actors from civil damages unless their
conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
The doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly” with “the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Put another way, qualified
immunity exists to prevent overdeterrence by ensuring that officials do not shy away
from their duties and that they have fair notice of liability. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 240 (1974); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). To avoid undue interference
with their duties, public officials have the right—within reason—to make the wrong call.
Qualified immunity will operate to protect officials from the “hazy” borders of what is
lawful and unlawful, and shields officers who have “reasonable, but mistaken” views of
the law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). In other words, “qualified immunity
gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments
about open legal questions,” and will protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
Courts faced with qualified immunity claims consider at least one of two
questions: (1) whether the facts alleged show the violation of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. al-Kidd, 563
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U.S. at 735. If the answer to either question is no, then qualified immunity applies. The
court can address the elements in either order, and need only address one if it is
dispositive. Id.
Here, it is necessary only to address the second: whether the right was clearly
established. A “clearly established” right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (emphasis added). A right is not clearly
established if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question “beyond
debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). To find that a
right is clearly established, courts generally “need to identify a case where an officer
acting under similar circumstances…was held to have violated” the constitutional right.
Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019) (per curiam). The relevant precedent must
define the right with a “high degree of specificity,” so that “every reasonable official
would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Principles stated generally, such as that “an
officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force” do not suffice. Kisela v. Hughes,
584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) (per curiam). For that reason, “Garner and Graham do not by
themselves create clearly established law outside an obvious case.” White v. Pauly, 580
U.S. 73, 80 (2017) (per curiam).
This is not an obvious case. It does not present a run-of-the-mill Fourth
Amendment violation, but instead a unique set of facts and circumstances that have never
been addressed by this court. The plaintiff cannot point to any case—let alone one with
the requisite high degree of specificity—establishing that the Adjutant General of the
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Ridgeway National Guard violates a clearly established constitutional right by using
lethal force against a law enforcement officer who had already deployed a taser against
him, was actively engaged in an ongoing physical confrontation with National Guard
personnel, and continued to pose a threat to the public during a rapidly escalating
multi-party encounter.
The plaintiff cannot identify a prior case in which an official acting in
circumstances similar to those faced by the defendant was held to have violated a
constitutional right because no such case exists. The facts here are extraordinary in
several respects. First, Zoned_JJ did not initiate the confrontation—he deployed his taser
only after observing JamesGardai physically dragging a judge. At that moment, Zoned_JJ
faced an ongoing and ambiguous law enforcement situation involving a judicial officer
and a deputy, with no clear indication that the arrest was lawful. Second, before using
lethal force, Zoned_JJ had already been tased by JamesGardai, demonstrating that
JamesGardai was both willing and able to use force against him. Third, when Zoned_JJ
fired his weapon, JamesGardai was in the process of apprehending a member of the
Ridgeway National Guard, further demonstrating that the threat posed by JamesGardai
had not abated. Taken together, these circumstances present a factual mosaic unlike
anything addressed in prior case law.
The plaintiff cannot establish that any reasonable official in the defendant’s
position would have understood, with the requisite degree of specificity, that using lethal
force under these precise conditions—following being tased, during an ongoing
multi-party confrontation, against an officer actively detaining a Guardsman—was
constitutionally prohibited. Where the “contours of the right” are not “sufficiently
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definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that
he was violating it,” qualified immunity must apply. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
779 (2014).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court should dismiss with prejudice.
Dated: April 6, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
(123) 456-7890
[email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
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