IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
XOLAAZ, in his individual and official
capacities,
CEPHALGPT, in his individual and official
capacities,
Defendants.
Case No.
COMPLAINT
CIVIL COMPLAINT
Plaintiff JamesGardai, proceeding in pro per, hereby submits this civil complaint against
Xolaaz and CephalGPT and alleges as follows:
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff JamesGardai is a certified law enforcement officer, Probationary Deputy
of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office, and resident of the State of Ridgeway.
2. Defendant Xolaaz is the Acting Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway and
resident of the State of Ridgeway.
3. Defendant CephalGPT is the Sheriff of the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office,
certified law enforcement officer, and resident of the State of Ridgeway.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
4. The jurisdiction of the Court originates from Art. V, Sec. IV which states “There
shall be a Superior court which shall exercise original jurisdiction for all civil and criminal cases
or controversies…”
5. Venue is proper as the actions that took place as stated within this complaint
occurred in Ridgeway County or an area which is subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
6. Plaintiff is employed in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office as a Probationary
Deputy.
7. Upon information and belief, on or about the date of April 6th, 2026, Acting
Attorney General Xolaaz directly sent a directive to Sheriff CephalGPT to place Plaintiff on
administrative leave.
8. This directive to place Plaintiff on administrative leave was done by the Acting
Attorney General and, in his words, supported by 2 R. Stat. § 3126.
9. Plaintiff was then placed on administrative leave by Sheriff CephalGPT.
10. Plaintiff was never on administrative leave prior to this directive.
11. Plaintiff was not being investigated prior to this directive by the Internal Affairs
Unit of the Sheriff’s Office.
12. Plaintiff received no notice or hearing.
13. Plaintiff received no communication from any individual at the Sheriff’s Office
or Department of Justice regarding this administrative leave issuance.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Individual Capacity Against Defendant Xolaaz
(U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV — 1 R. Stat. § 3115)
14. The previous allegations are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
15. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person
shall [...] be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” This amendment is
incorporated to the State of Ridgeway through the Fourteenth Amendment.
16. “A procedural due process claim in the employment context ‘is composed of two
elements: (1) the existence of a property or liberty interest that was deprived and (2)
deprivation of that interest without due process.’” Ventillo v. Falco, No. 19-CV-03664, 2020
WL 7496294, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) (quoting Domeneck v. City of New York, No.
18-CV-07419, 2019 WL 5727409, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2019)).
17. “Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972). Property interests are not governed by fixed definitions but are instead informed by
state law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). (“A property interest in employment can,
of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract.”)
18. All public employees within the State of Ridgeway have a property interest in
continued employment. This property interest is created by statute. See 2 R. Stat. § 4101 (“All
persons who maintain good behavior shall have the right to employment.”); cf. U.S. Const. art.
III, sec. 1. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour.”). Administrative leave is an “indefinite suspension pending investigation.” 2
R. Stat. § 3126. And a “[s]uspension is the prevention of a person from executing their duties
and collecting pay.” 2 R. Stat. § 3125 (emphasis added).
19. If a public employee has a protected property interest in continued public
employment under state law, then placing that employee on administrative leave without pay
deprives that protected interest and therefore triggers due process protections. Indeed, “some
form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). And “[w]here an employee has a property
interest in his job, a suspension can result in a deprivation of that interest and cannot be imposed
without the protection of due process.” Kennedy v. City of New York, No. 94-CV-02886, 1995
WL 326563, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Urbina v. Port Auth. of New York, No. 15-CV-08647,
2017 WL 3600424, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017); see also FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230
(1988) (“It is also undisputed that the FDIC's order of suspension affected a deprivation of this
property interest. Accordingly, appellee is entitled to the protection of due process of law.”)
20. The actions conducted by Defendant Xolaaz, by not affording Plaintiff a hearing,
notice of the charges against him, or an opportunity to defend himself from any allegations
before depriving his property interest in continued employment by instituting unpaid
administrative leave upon him in conjunction with CephalGPT was objectively unreasonable,
willful, wanton, intentional, and done with a clear disregard of Plaintiff’s procedural due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Individual Capacity Against Defendant CephalGPT
(U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV — 1 R. Stat. § 3115)
21. The previous allegations are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
22. The actions conducted by Defendant CephalGPT, by, as the Sheriff of Ridgeway
County, placing Plaintiff on administrative leave without first affording him a hearing, notice of
the charges, and an opportunity to defend himself from any allegations before depriving his
property interest in continued employment by instituting unpaid administrative leave in
conjunction with Xolaaz was objectively unreasonable, willful, wanton, intentional, and done
with a clear disregard of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Official Capacity Against Defendant Xolaaz
(Official Misconduct — 1 R. Stat. § 3114)
23. The previous allegations are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
24. Defendant Xolaaz, being the Acting Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway,
committed an act related to his office, i.e., issuing orders, directives, or memos to law
enforcement officials, specifically the administrative leave directive to Sheriff CephalGPT.
25. This directive against Plaintiff constituted an unauthorized act of his official
functions by placing Plaintiff on administrative leave without first affording him a hearing,
notice of the charges, and an opportunity to defend himself from any allegations before
depriving his property interest in continued employment by instituting unpaid administrative
leave in conjunction with CephalGPT which was objectively unreasonable, willful, wanton,
intentional, and done with a clear disregard of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
26. In any case, the administrative leave was unauthorized because the Attorney
General has no authority to institute administrative leave without an individual already legally
being on administrative leave.
27. 2 R. Stat. § 3126 provides that a person may be placed on administrative leave for
more than nine days if “there is a criminal investigation supplemented by an order from the
Attorney General for the person to be placed on administrative leave.”
28. The starting point in statutory interpretation, as always, is the text. Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016). Where “the plain language” of the statute is “unambigious,” the
inquiry “begins with the statutory text, and ends there aswell.” National Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
Department of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018). Because statutory language “cannot be
interpreted apart from context,” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993), it is necessary
to examine “the structure and language of the statute as a whole.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992). Indeed, “courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
29. Read the statute again, in whole:
“A person may only be on administrative leave for no longer than 9 days; however, a person
may be put on administrative leave for longer if: (a) there is a criminal investigation
supplemented by order from the Attorney General for the person to be placed on administrative
leave; or (b) the person is pending discharge and subsequent exit search as contractually
obligated in their employment.”
30. § 3126. There are three things required for the Attorney General to order an
individual on administrative leave: (1) the person must already be on administrative leave; (2)
there must be a criminal investigation into the person’s conduct; and (3) the Attorney General
may then issue an order to supplement the administrative leave to a longer duration. The statute
does not say that may initiate administrative leave. The plain language of the statute treats the
Attorney General’s role as a conditional approval for extending leave, not as the issuing
authority itself.
31. This viewpoint is also supported by the statutory scheme at whole. See 2 R. Stat.
§ 3126 (“A person may only be put on administrative leave for allegations which, if taken as
true, would warrant a general discharge or dishonorable discharge.”); 2 R. Stat. § 3129(a)
(“There shall be no review by an administrative court of the placement of someone on
administrative leave unless * * * [t]he placement was not by an internal affairs entity.”)
32. Defendant Xolaaz, as the Acting Chief Attorney of the State of Ridgeway and
based on his experience as a member of the State Bar and Department of Justice, should have
known that such act is unauthorized.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Official Capacity Against Defendant CephalGPT
(Official Misconduct — 1 R. Stat. § 3114)
33. The previous allegations are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
34. Defendant CephalGPT, being the Sheriff of Ridgeway County, committed an act
related to his office, i.e., placing Plaintiff on administrative leave from his position as a
Probationary Deputy.
35. This act against Plaintiff constituted an unauthorized act of his official functions
because Defendant CephalGPT placed Plaintiff on administrative leave without first affording
Plaintiff notice of the charges against him, a meaningful opportunity to respond, or any form of
hearing before depriving Plaintiff of his protected property interest in continued public
employment and pay, in violation of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment.
36. The act was also further unauthorized because the Attorney General has no
authority to place an individual on administrative leave from a statutory standpoint.
37. Defendant CephalGPT, based on his experience as certified law enforcement
officer and Sheriff who is expected to know employment laws and ensure the law abiding
functions of the Sheriff’s Office, should have known that such act is unauthorized.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Individual Capacity Against Defendant Xolaaz
(Civil Conspiracy — 1 R. Stat. § 3111)
38. The previous allegations are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
39. Defendant Xolaaz, in concert with Defendant CephalGPT, knowingly and
intentionally agreed to deprive of his protected legal right and property interest to continued
employment within the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office and suspension without pay without
due process of law.
40. Upon information and belief, Defendant Xolaaz directed Defendant CephalGPT
to place Plaintiff on unpaid administrative leave, knowing that no notice, hearing, or opportunity
to respond would be afforded to Plaintiff.
41. The agreement and coordinated actions of Defendants Xolaaz and CephalGPT
were intended to, and did, unlawfully deprive Plaintiff of his property interest in continued
employment under 1 R. Stat. § 3115, 2 R. Stat. §§ 3125–3126, and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Individual Capacity Against Defendant CephalGPT
(Civil Conspiracy — 1 R. Stat. § 3111)
42. The previous allegations are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
43. Defendant CephalGPT, in concert with Defendant Xolaaz, knowingly and
intentionally agreed to deprive of his protected legal right and property interest to continued
employment within the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office and suspension without pay without
due process of law.
44. Upon information and belief, Defendant CephalGPT implemented and enforced
the administrative leave against Plaintiff at the direction of Defendant Xolaaz, knowing that
Plaintiff would not be afforded notice, hearing, or any opportunity to respond to the deprivation
of his property interest.
45. Upon information and belief, Defendant Xolaaz directed Defendant CephalGPT
to place Plaintiff on unpaid administrative leave, knowing that no notice, hearing, or opportunity
to respond would be afforded to Plaintiff.
46. The agreement and coordinated actions of Defendants CephalGPT and Xolaaz
were intended to, and did, unlawfully deprive Plaintiff of his property interest in continued
employment under 1 R. Stat. § 3115, 2 R. Stat. §§ 3125–3126, and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court grant relief as follows:
47. Award compensatory damages;
48. Award punitive damages;
49. Award pre- and post-judgment interest;
50. Award fees and costs incurred in filing this suit; and
51. Any other relief which the Court deems necessary.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 04/06/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI1
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
1 An unincorporated association.
