ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
State of Ridgeway
IN RE
JAMESGARDAI
Petitioner
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
VERIFIED ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
AND MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
CLAIM NO.
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
CLAIM INFORMATION
Agency: Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office
Type of Action Administrative Leave
IA Reference No. N/A
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Petitioner is employed in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office as a Probationary
Deputy.
2. Upon information and belief, on or about the date of April 6th, 2026, Acting
Attorney General Xolaaz directly sent a directive to Sheriff CephalGPT to place Petitioner on
administrative leave (Appendix A).
3. Petitioner was then placed on administrative leave by Sheriff CephalGPT.
4. Petitioner was never on administrative leave prior to this directive.
5. Petitioner was not being investigated prior to this directive by the Internal Affairs
Unit of the Sheriff’s Office.
6. Petitioner received no notice or hearing.
7. This directive to place Petitioner on administrative leave was done by the Acting
Attorney General and, in his words, supported by 2 R. Stat. § 3126.
ARGUMENT
I. The Attorney General Lacks the Authority to Place Officers on Administrative
Leave Without Them Already Being On Administrative Leave
2 R. Stat. § 3126 provides that a person may be placed on administrative leave for more
than nine days if “there is a criminal investigation supplemented by an order from the Attorney
General for the person to be placed on administrative leave.”
The starting point in statutory interpretation, as always, is the text. Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 638 (2016). Where “the plain language” of the statute is “unambigious,” the inquiry
“begins with the statutory text, and ends there aswell.” National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of
Def., 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018). Because statutory language “cannot be interpreted apart from
context,” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993), it is necessary to examine “the
structure and language of the statute as a whole.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me.
Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992). Indeed, “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
Read the statute again, in whole:
“A person may only be on administrative leave for no longer than 9 days; however, a person may
be put on administrative leave for longer if: (a) there is a criminal investigation supplemented by
order from the Attorney General for the person to be placed on administrative leave; or (b) the
person is pending discharge and subsequent exit search as contractually obligated in their
employment.”
§ 3126. There are three things required for the Attorney General to order an individual on
administrative leave: (1) the person must already be on administrative leave; (2) there must be a
criminal investigation into the person’s conduct; and (3) the Attorney General may then issue an
order to supplement the administrative leave to a longer duration. The statute does not say that
may initiate administrative leave. The plain language of the statute treats the Attorney General’s
role as a conditional approval for extending leave, not as the issuing authority itself.
This viewpoint is also supported by the statutory scheme at whole. See 2 R. Stat. § 3126
(“A person may only be put on administrative leave for allegations which, if taken as true, would
warrant a general discharge or dishonorable discharge.”); 2 R. Stat. § 3129(a) (“There shall be no
review by an administrative court of the placement of someone on administrative leave unless * *
* [t]he placement was not by an internal affairs entity.”)
The Attorney General, therefore, had no authority to order Petitioner on administrative
leave in this situation, and this Court must reverse that action.
II. The Usage of Administrative Leave in Any Cases, Anyway, Is Unlawful
Because It Impermissibly Deprives Public Employees of a Protected Property
Interest
“A procedural due process claim in the employment context ‘is composed of two
elements: (1) the existence of a property or liberty interest that was deprived and (2)
deprivation of that interest without due process.’” Ventillo v. Falco, No. 19-CV-03664, 2020
WL 7496294, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) (quoting Domeneck v. City of New York, No.
18-CV-07419, 2019 WL 5727409, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2019)).
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972). Property interests are not governed by fixed definitions but are instead informed by state
law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). (“A property interest in employment can, of
course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract.”)
All public employees within the State of Ridgeway have a property interest in continued
employment. This property interest is created by statute. See 2 R. Stat. § 4101 (“All persons who
maintain good behavior shall have the right to employment.”); cf. U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 1.
(“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour.”). Administrative leave is an “indefinite suspension pending investigation.” 2 R. Stat.
§ 3126. And a “[s]uspension is the prevention of a person from executing their duties and
collecting pay.” 2 R. Stat. § 3125 (emphasis added).
If a public employee has a protected property interest in continued public employment
under state law, then placing that employee on administrative leave without pay deprives that
protected interest and therefore triggers due process protections. Indeed, “some form of hearing
is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). And “[w]here an employee has a property interest in his job, a
suspension can result in a deprivation of that interest and cannot be imposed without the
protection of due process.” Kennedy v. City of New York, No. 94-CV-02886, 1995 WL 326563,
*6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Urbina v. Port Auth. of New York, No. 15-CV-08647, 2017 WL
3600424, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017); see also FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (“It is
also undisputed that the FDIC's order of suspension affected a deprivation of this property
interest. Accordingly, appellee is entitled to the protection of due process of law.”)
Therefore, even assuming that the Attorney General has authority to place an officer on
administrative leave, Petitioner had no opportunity or notice to contest any allegations against
him before being deprived of a property interest by being placed on unpaid administrative leave.
Therefore, this Court must reverse that action.
III. The Court Should Also Grant a Preliminary Injunction Pending Disposition of
This Case1
First, Petitioner is more than likely to succeed on the merits of this case. The Attorney
General lacks the unilateral authority to place officers on administrative leave at his will. In any
1 The standard for a preliminary injunction is set in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) where the court must determine: (1) the likelihood of success on
the merits of the underlying case; (2) the irreparable harm that will occur if the preliminary
injunction is not granted; (3) whether the balance of equities and hardships is in the plaintiff's
favor; and (4) whether the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.
case, the act of placing an individual on administrative leave—which is unpaid
suspension—without notice or hearing impermissibly deprives them of a property interest
established by statute.
Second, Petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction.
Any deprivation of procedural due process, as is here, violates Petitioner’s constitutional rights
which constitutes irreparable harm. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). While when a deprivation of a
constitutional right is involved, no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary,2 Petitioner
further stands to become homeless without a preliminary injunction. Petitioner lives in Alder and
pays rent to his landlord, sage03x, and requires an income in order to pay rent. Petitioner has no
way of paying his rent and stands to become homeless on the streets and without a roof over his
head, and his landlord has made it clear that—despite his circumstances—if he cannot afford the
rent, he will have to terminate the housing agreement.
Third, the balance of equities and hardships is in Plaintiff’s favor. Absent preliminary
relief, Petitioner will continue to suffer immediate and substantial hardship through the ongoing
loss of pay, deprivation of his employment rights, and the imminent risk of losing his housing
2 In Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir.1984), the Second Circuit, reviewing a
preliminary injunction based on an eighth amendment claim rooted in prison overcrowding,
recognized that “[w]hen an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts
hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” In Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468,
482 (2d Cir.1996), another case addressing prisoners’ rights, the Court expanded on this general
proposition, recognizing a “presumption of irreparable injury that flows from a violation of
constitutional rights.” In support of this presumption, the Court noted that “it is the alleged
violation of a constitutional right that triggers a finding of irreparable harm.” Id., citing, Covino
v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1992); Mitchell, supra. Moreover, at least one district court in
this circuit has characterized an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights as a “per se
irreparable harm.” Scelsa v. City Univ. of New York, 806 F. Supp. 1126, 1135, 1146
(S.D.N.Y.1992) (granting a preliminary injunction barring employment discrimination against
Italian Americans).
altogether. By contrast, the hardship to Respondent in granting relief is minimal. A preliminary
injunction would merely preserve the lawful status quo by preventing enforcement of an
administrative action that was imposed without statutory authority and without constitutionally
adequate process. Respondent has no legitimate equitable interest in continuing an ultra vires
deprivation of Petitioner’s employment and pay, nor is there any cognizable hardship in requiring
public officials to comply with the limits of their statutory authority and the requirements of due
process.
Fourth, granting the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Indeed, it is always in
the public interest to prevent unlawful government action and to ensure that public officials act
only within the authority granted to them by law. The public, and especially public employees in
this scenario, have a substantial interest in the orderly administration of government
employment, the protection of due process rights, and the preservation of statutory limits on
executive power. Enjoining Petitioner’s unlawful administrative leave would reinforce public
confidence that employment actions within law enforcement agencies are carried out according
to law rather than by unilateral directive from unauthorized actors. The public is not served by
permitting a government official to suspend an officer without lawful authority and without
procedural protections; rather, the public interest is served by requiring adherence to statutory
and constitutional safeguards.
DEMAND FOR REMEDY
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays to this Court that it enters judgment in its favor, and
enter the following relief:
1. Preliminary injunction ordering Petitioner back to his position pending disposition
of this case;
2. A declaratory judgment that Petitioner’s administrative leave is in violation of law
and void;
3. Injunctive relief removing Petitioner’s administrative leave and reinstating him
back to duty; and
4. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 04/06/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI3
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
3 An unincorporated association.
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
A) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iyXbQl4GR4IyyPvSeLyMRSqivbhHWRYj/view
AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER JAMESGARDAI
I, the undersigned Petitioner, certify that I have read the foregoing claim and motion for
preliminary injunction and know the contents thereof. I swear under the pains and penalties of
perjury that my foregoing statements and contents are true to my knowledge except as to matters
alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 04/06/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI4
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
4 An unincorporated association.
