ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
State of Ridgeway
IN RE
JAMESGARDAI
Petitioner
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ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
CLAIM NO.
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
CLAIM INFORMATION
Agency: Ridgeway Department of Transportation
Type of Action 2 R. Stat § 3324 Termination
IA Reference No. N/A
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant Secretary within the Support Services
Division of the Ridgeway Department of Transportation.
2. Petitioner is a seasoned operator, having joined in May 2022.
3. The Ridgeway Department of Transportation maintains internal disciplinary
structures, including investigations and formal personnel actions, which reflect that employment
decisions are ordinarily made for cause and through established procedures.
4. On March 16th, 2026, Petitioner was terminated from his position pursuant to 2
R. Stat. § 3324.
5. All public employees within the Transportation Department reasonably expect
continued employment so long as performance remains satisfactory.
6. Petitioner was provided no reason for the termination.
7. Petitioner was given no written notice of any alleged deficiencies, misconduct, or
performance concerns.
8. Petitioner was not provided any information relied upon by the agency.
9. Petitioner was not given any opportunity to respond, make representations, or be
heard prior to the termination decision.
10. The termination was effective immediately.
11. All all times herein and through Petitioner’s employment within the Ridgeway
Department of Transportation, he has maintained good behavior.
INTRODUCTION
This case rises from Plaintiff’s termination from public employment under 2 R. Stat §
3324—the at-will statute—which provides that “[c]ommand staff in all departments may, at any
time, for any reason not prohibited by law, honorably discharge any person,” and that “[a]n
at-will termination may not be reviewed by any court.”
This Court possesses jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to 2 R. Stat. § 3314. § 3324
does not prohibit this Court from hearing the matter and deciding matters on its constitutionality.
Ridgeway Legislature on behalf of the State v. Techiey, 3 Rid. __ (2024). This Court has the
power to render § 3324 unconstitutional pursuant to 2 R. Stat. § 3315, which affords this Court
“all remedies.”
ARGUMENT
Indeed, the Constitution, not statute, controls procedural protections afforded when the
State deprives a public employee of their job. Public employment carries a protected property
interest where there is a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Once such an interest
exists, the State must provide, at minimum, notice of the reasons for termination and an
opportunity to respond before a neutral decisionmaker.
“The doctrine of at-will employment traces its roots back to English common law, where
indefinite employment was presumed to last for one year unless proven otherwise. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 413 (1769). However, Horace Wood’s
seminal 1877 treatise, Master and Servant, introduced what became known as “Wood’s Rule.”
This principle defined indefinite employment as terminable at will by either party unless a
specific agreement or duration was established.
“With us, the rule is inflexible, that a general hiring or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to
establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year; no time being specified, is
an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party may serve.”
Horage G. Wood, Master and Servant §134 (cleaned up).
Although controversial, this rule became the bedrock of employment law and continues
to be. Courts “had no doubt that the great preponderance of the best considered cases in this
country recognize and affirm the rule laid down by Wood in his work on Master and Servant, and
which he terms the ‘American rule,’ Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co, 43 A. 609, 612 (Del.
Super. 1899). Far from being outdated, Wood’s Rule continues to underpin employment law,
which maintains that “either party may terminate an employment relationship with or without
cause unless limited by statute.” RESTATEMENT No. 01-14 3 OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §
2.01. However, assumption disappears when a property interest is claimed.” Zrihem, et al. v.
TDark99, 2 Mayf. __ (2024) (Cabot, J. dissenting.)
Indeed, public employees across the State of Ridgeway “have a constitutional property
right in their job which the state takes away with at-will employment rules, both through legal
rule and statute. Such a claim finds its origins and sanctuary in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.” Id. This claim also finds its origins in statute. See 2 R. Stat. § 4101 (“All persons who
maintain good behavior shall have the right to employment.”) Petitioner holds a property interest
in his continued service within the Ridgeway Department of Transportation. See Columbian
Alliance for Equal Rights v, Mayflower National Guard, No. CV-255-25 (Mayf. Dist. Ct. 2025).
The Due Process Clause, of course, does not itself define what constitutes a property interest.
Rather, courts rely on ‘rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, such as
state law—rules or understandings that establish certain benefits and create claims of entitlement
to those benefits.’ Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564). Property interests are not
governed by fixed definitions but are instead informed by state law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341. (“A property interest in employment can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an
implied contract.”)
“[A] property interest…exist[s] due to a reasonable expectation of continued
employment. An expectation of continuous employment does not impact possible variation of the
contract of employment throughout the relationship, either by conduct or written variation. The
existence of a dishonourable discharge scheme,” for example, “by its very nature demonstrates
that a reasonable state employee would infer that they would only be fired for cause. Otherwise,
why not just use the at-will regime which is more generous than the dishonourable discharge
scheme and would avoid litigation altogether? It makes little sense and creates a constitutional
dichotomy which is evaluated later in this opinion. A two-tiered system of employment which
divides employees into the ‘have’ and ‘have-nots’ (of proper legal advice) is beyond offensive to
the rule of law and is repugnant to the Constitution. Therefore, all persons employed in the public
services, no matter their status, have a continued property interest in their job because the
existence of a dishonourable discharge scheme and the lack of widespread at-will usage
demonstrates exactly that.” CAFER, supra.
“[T]he existence of the so-called “at-will regime” is a constitutional dichotomy. The very
existence of an at-will regime would prevent the need for a dishonourable discharge scheme
because all bad (and good) employees could be dismissed without cause or question and void this
legal jigsaw puzzle altogether. The existence of the dishonourable discharge scheme therefore
vindicates the position of the English common law that at-will regimes are constitutionally,
socially and morally aberrant. The existence of two regimes (at-will and dishonourable
discharges) are constitutionally incompatible. They provide two widely different levels of
protections for employees and permit a two-tiered dismissal system. Employees could simply all
be fired under at-will provisions and avoid the dishonourable discharge scheme, thus frustrating
the Senate’s obvious legislative intent and purpose—to protect public employees and limit
dismissal for-cause. Employees should be considered the protected class here, the right to pursue
a common occupation constitutes a right capable of protection through strict scrutiny.” Id. See
also Law Enforcement Training Institute v. RRP_SAM10, et al. 2 Mayf. ___ (2025). “
“‘Our Framers adopted the old law of England’” that at-will regimes have never been
recognised in English law because they are so aberrant and strike against the fabric and dignity
that binds our Union. Because at-will regimes are by their very nature aberrant to the English
common law that we follow in this Union and because the current regime’s existence violates the
Equal Protection Clause it cannot stand. The at-will regime is constitutionally illogical and is a
statutory heresy to the highest degree. The statute states that this is an at-will regime, but it
simply is not. An at-will regime is not subject to statutory limitations and caveats that make the
law so administratively unworkable that it renders it a ‘‘gotcha’ card in litigation... reminding
employees that we have not really moved away from the master-servant doctrine.’” CAFER,
supra (quoting Cash_Money v. Combatrole, 2 Mayf. __ (2025) (Khaled, J., plurality opinion) and
Zrihem, supra. (slip op. 16) (Cabot, J., dissenting joined by Turntable, C.J. and Clarke, J.),
respectively).
As such, because the “at-will regime” is not constitutionally tenable, this Court must
reinstate Plaintiff to his previous position and strike down 2 R. Stat. § 3324.
The Court should, in the alternative of striking the provision down as unconstitutional,
construe the statutory scheme in harmony rather than read one provision to nullify the others.
Section 4101 expressly provides that “[a]ll persons who maintain good behavior shall have the
right to employment,” thereby creating a substantive entitlement to continued public employment
absent lawful cause for removal. That entitlement is reinforced by the Legislature’s creation of
formal discharge mechanisms—such as dishonourable discharge and involuntary general
discharge—which require Internal Affairs investigation and, where applicable, administrative
adjudication before separation may occur. Read in context, § 3324 therefore cannot reasonably
be construed to authorize the arbitrary involuntary termination of an employee who has
maintained good behavior and wishes to remain employed, because such a reading would render
§ 4101 and the surrounding discharge procedures meaningless surplusage. The only coherent
harmonization is to construe § 3324 narrowly, such that “honorable discharge at will” permits
only voluntary or otherwise consensual separations. Any broader construction would collapse the
Legislature’s for-cause employment framework into an illusory at-will regime and defeat the
statutory scheme as a whole.
DEMAND FOR REMEDY
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays to this Court that it enters judgment in its favor, and
enter the following relief:
1. A declaratory judgment, declaring 2 R. Stat. § 3324 unconstitutional or in the
alternative, in harmonizing the statutes, narrow section 3324;
2. A declaratory judgment, declaring Petitioner’s termination unlawful;
3. Injunctive relief enjoining 2 R. Stat. § 3314 or in the alternative, in harmonizing
the statutes, narrow section 3324;
4. Injunctive relief reinstating Petitioner to his position as Assistant Secretary for the
Support Services Division.
5. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 04/03/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI1
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
1 An unincorporated association.
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE
A)
