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RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONED_JJ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Adjutant
General of the Ridgeway National
Guard,
Defendant.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Zoned_JJ (“Defendant”), in his individual capacity, by and through the
undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(5), respectfully moves
the court to partially dismiss the above-captioned matter for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. A memorandum of law in support is attached.
Dated: March 1, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Bar No. 10241)
Counsel of Record
Nicklaus & Associates LLP
250 Farley Street
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
(123) 456-7890
[email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONED_JJ, in his individual and
official capacities as the Adjutant
General of the Ridgeway National
Guard,
Defendant.
Action No. RSC-CV-0853
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 21, 2026, JamesGardai was serving as a Deputy with the Ridgeway
County Sheriff’s Office. Complaint at 5. While on patrol, he observed Superior Court
Judge CharlesLXV commit an assault. Id. at 6. He moved to arrest him. Id. at 7. He
handcuffed CharlesLXV and began dragging him. Id. at 5. At that point, Zoned_JJ—the
Adjutant General of the Ridgeway National Guard—deployed a taser against
JamesGardai. Id. at 8–9. After being tased, JamesGardai recovered and responded by
deploying his own taser against Zoned_JJ. Id. at 10. A member of the Ridgeway National
Guard, mlchalpm, intervened by tasing and handcuffing Zoned_JJ into a wall. Id. at 11.
The confrontation continued. JamesGardai then turned his attention to mlchalpm. Id. at
12. He tased him and attempted to place him under arrest. Id. at 12–13. While he was
attempting to apprehend mlchalpm, Zoned_JJ freed himself from the wall and from
handcuffs. Id. at 14. He then drew his firearm and fired, killing JamesGardai. Id. at 15.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(a)(1) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of
an action for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). A motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can attack the sufficiency of the pleadings
to establish jurisdiction—a facial attack—or a lack of any factual support for subject
matter jurisdiction despite the sufficiency of the pleading—a factual attack. The plaintiff
bears the burden to establish that the court has jurisdiction, and the court must assume
that it does not. Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
Rule 12(a)(5) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of
an action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rid. R. Civ. P.
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12(a)(5). When confronted with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court
must “assume the veracity” of “well-pleaded allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). However, the court need not “accept as true” allegations that offer
merely “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678. To
survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
ARGUMENTS
I. The third cause of action for substantive due process fails because it is
mutually exclusive of the fifth cause of action for unreasonable seizure.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides substantive protections which “bar certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (cleaned up). A substantive due process
claim cannot survive, however, “where a particular amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior.” Id. In that case, the particular amendment, “not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Id.
Here, the plaintiff brings both unreasonable seizure and substantive due process
claims for excessive force. However, since the claims are based upon an alleged use of
excessive and unreasonable force during a seizure, and the plaintiff himself concedes a
seizure did occur, see Complaint at 62–67 (“shooting…constituted an unreasonable
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seizure”), the claims appropriately fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (“Apprehension by use of deadly force is a
seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). Indeed,
“all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force…in the course of…a
seizure…should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness
standard, rather than under a substantive due process approach.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (cleaned up).
II. The plaintiff lacks standing to seek equitable relief.
Plaintiff seeks “declaratory relief” and “injunctive relief enjoining Defendant from
conducting further acts” in relation to all causes of action. See Complaint at 70, 72. But
where, as here, a party seeks prospective equitable relief, they must make “allegations of
future injury” that are “particular and concrete.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998). The plaintiff, however, does not plausibly allege any future
threatened injury—much less that such an injury would be “certainly impending” and not
merely “possible.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). For a
plaintiff to have standing, an alleged injury must be “concrete” and “actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02
(1983). Even if a plaintiff establishes that his rights were violated in past incidents, he
nonetheless lacks standing to obtain prospective equitable relief absent a “real and
immediate threat” that he will suffer the same injury in the future. Id. at 105.
For those reasons, the plaintiff here lacks standing to pursue prospective equitable
remedies, like injunctive relief and declaratory relief. See, e.g., Updike v. Multnomah
County, 870 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying injunctive relief to a plaintiff
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challenging the lack of sign language interpreters in pretrial detainment and at
arraignment, even though he had previously been booked at county correctional facilities
five times and had previously been denied access to his desired interpretive standing
because standing for injunctive relief requires that he show real and immediate threat of
repeated injury).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court should dismiss the third cause of action and
any and all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Dated: March 1, 2026
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Bar No. 10241)
Counsel of Record
Nicklaus & Associates LLP
250 Farley Street
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
(123) 456-7890
[email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
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