IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY; RIDGEWAY
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JAMESGARDAI, in his individual capacity
as a Probationary Deputy of the Ridgeway
County Sheriff’s Office,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-8708
MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE PROVIDED
INTRODUCTION
Defendant JamesGardai, proceeding in pro per, hereby moves to dismiss the
above-entitled case against him pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5) because it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be provided.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is imperative that a civil complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Similarly, federal rules
require a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(a)(5) dismissal motion,
therefore, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U. S., at 556).
Nonetheless, the details of a civil complaint must incorporate relevant facts and their relation to
the tort(s) in question. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that a mere “formulaic
recitation of elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555. “[W]hile
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, supra.” “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, supra, at 678. “At the pleading stage,
general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice.” Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343 (1996) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561
(1992)) “The plausibility standard [under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007)]
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 678 (quoting Twombly, supra, at 556).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
II. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN
BE PROVIDED
First, looking at Plaintiffs’ complaint, the whole premise it is based on is that Defendant
was ordered to be on administrative leave by the Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway, and
therefore, was suspended from his duties as a Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office Probationary
Deputy and prohibited from accessing Sheriff’s Office equipment. The only allegations as to
administrative leave, and Defendant being suspended thereof, is that there was a “criminal
investigation into Defendant,” Pls.’ Cmplt. ¶7, and “[p]ending this criminal
investigation,…Defendant was ordered on administrative leave by…[the] Attorney General of
the State of Ridgeway[]…pursuant to…2 R. Stat. § 3126.” Id., at ¶8.
A. The Claim Fails Because The Attorney General Has No Authority To Place Public
Employees On Administrative Leave
2 R. Stat. § 3126 provides that a person may be placed on administrative leave for more
than nine days if “there is a criminal investigation supplemented by an order from the Attorney
General for the person to be placed on administrative leave.”
The starting point in statutory interpretation, as always, is the text. Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 638 (2016). Where “the plain language” of the statute is “unambigious,” the inquiry
“begins with the statutory text, and ends there aswell.” National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of
Def., 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018). Because statutory language “cannot be interpreted apart from
context,” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993), it is necessary to examine “the
structure and language of the statute as a whole.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me.
Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992). Indeed, “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503
U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
Read the statute again, in whole:
“A person may only be on administrative leave for no longer than 9 days; however, a person
may be put on administrative leave for longer if: (a) there is a criminal investigation
supplemented by order from the Attorney General for the person to be placed on administrative
leave; or (b) the person is pending discharge and subsequent exit search as contractually
obligated in their employment.”
§ 3126. There are three things required for the Attorney General to order an individual on
administrative leave: (1) the person must already be on administrative leave; (2) there must be a
criminal investigation into the person’s conduct; and (3) the Attorney General may then issue an
order to supplement the administrative leave to a longer duration. The statute does not say that
may initiate administrative leave. The plain language of the statute treats the Attorney General’s
role as a conditional approval for extending leave, not as the issuing authority itself.
Accordingly, because the Attorney General has no authority to place an individual on
administrative leave, and Plaintiffs’ complaint does not cite another source for issuance of
administrative leave, Defendant could not possibly be suspended, and the complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be provided.
B. Even If We Were To Assume The Attorney General Can Place Public Employees
On Administrative Leave, The Claim Still Fails
The claim fails because, even if we were to assume that the Attorney General has the
authority to issue administrative leave to public employees, Plaintiffs’ complaint never states
that Defendant was ever on administrative leave. It simply states that “Defendant was ordered on
administrative leave by…[the] Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway.” Pls.’ Cmplt. ¶8.
That is all; nothing more, and nothing less.
Because the Senate has not defined the term “order,” it is given its ordinary meaning.
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012). The verb, order, means “to give
an order to.”1 The noun, order, “a specific rule, regulation, or authoritative direction.”2 In other
words, an order is a directive or instruction issued by an authority, not the execution of the
action directed.
2 See Footnote One
1 “Order.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/order.
Accessed 1 Mar. 2026.
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges only that an order was issued; it contains no allegation
that the Defendant was in fact placed on administrative leave by the appropriate authority, let
alone at all. Under the ordinary meaning of “order,” a mere directive does not effectuate the
underlying act; it is the act of placement that creates the legal status of being on administrative
leave. Without such an act, no administrative leave exists, and the claim fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the allegation that the Attorney General “ordered” the Defendant on administrative
leave is legally insufficient to establish that Defendant was ever on leave and as a result
suspended, and thus cannot support the claims in the complaint. The complaint therefore fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be provided.
C. This Court Should Dismiss With Prejudice
This Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The dismissal for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a “judgment on the merits.” See Angel
v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 330 U. S. 190 (1947); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). A court
can act within its own discretion when choosing to dismiss a charge or case with or without
prejudice. United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326 (1988); Lazerify v. StudsPerSecond, 1 Rid. __
(2023). Indeed, “[d]ismissing a case with prejudice [for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be provided] would indicate that there is something so gravely wrong with the plaintiff’s
assertions in their complaint that such a case should never return to the court.” Id.
Here, the complaint fails in multiple, substantive ways. First, Plaintiffs do not allege that
the Defendant was ever actually placed on administrative leave, only that an “order” was issued
by the Attorney General. As discussed above, the ordinary meaning of “order” is a directive or
instruction, not the execution of the act itself. Because no actionable employment action is
alleged, the complaint fails to state a claim under any plausible theory. Second, even if the
Attorney General had authority to place an employee on administrative leave, § 3126 requires
that the person already be on leave and that the order merely supplement the leave to extend its
duration; the complaint contains no allegation that these statutory prerequisites were met. While,
as a general rule, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff should
receive at least one opportunity to amend unless amendment is futile. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Rule 15’s direction that courts “should
freely give leave when justice so requires” does not create an automatic right to amend; it calls
for a reasoned exercise of discretion, and leave may be denied for familiar reasons such as undue
delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice, or futility. Id. Courts
therefore permit dismissal without leave to amend where “any such amendment would be
futile,” as would be here. Henry v. Fernandez-Rundle, 773 F. App’x 596, 598 n.3 (11th Cir.
2019); see Hollis v. W. Acad. Charter, Inc., 782 F. App’x 951, 955–56 (11th Cir. 2019); Williams
v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 225 (8th Cir. 1994).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 03/01/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI3
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
Gardai Island
United States Virgin Islands
D; fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
3 An unincorporated association.
