IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONED_JJ, in his official and individual
capacities;
Defendant.
Case No.
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff JamesGardai, for his complaint against Defendant Zoned_JJ, alleges as follows:
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff JamesGardai is a resident of the State of Ridgeway.
2. Defendant Zoned_JJ is a resident of the State of Ridgeway.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
3. The jurisdiction of the Court originates from Art. V, Sec. IV which states “There
shall be a Superior court which shall exercise original jurisdiction for all civil and criminal cases
or controversies…”
4. Venue is proper as the actions that took place as stated within this complaint
occurred in Ridgeway County or an area which is subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
5. On February 21st, Plaintiff was patrolling the City of Palmer, Ridgeway County,
as an on-duty Sheriff’s Deputy.
6. Plaintiff witnessed CharlesLXV commit a crime—namely, assault.
7. Plaintiff attempted to apprehend CharlesLXV for such offense.
8. Plaintiff placed handcuffs and was dragging CharlesLXV when he was tased by
Defendant Zoned_JJ.
9. Zoned_JJ was an on-duty Ridgeway National Guardsman utilizing his
department-issued TB26 to tase Plaintiff numerous times, obstructing his duties in arresting
CharlesLXV.
10. Plaintiff began defending himself and proceeded to tase Zoned_JJ.
11. Zoned_JJ was then cuffed by another Ridgeway National Guardsman and placed
into a wall where he was unreachable by Plaintiff.
12. Plaintiff tased and attempted to apprehend the National Guardsman who placed
Zoned_JJ in an unreachable position for obstruction of justice.
13. His name is mlchalpm, a Colonel in the Ridgeway National Guard.
14. Some seconds later, Zoned_JJ got out of the wall and out of handcuffs.
15. Zoned_JJ then proceeded to brandish his department-issued Stestson M2-M and
fire and kill Plaintiff while he was attempting to apprehend mlchalpm.
16. At all times herein, Plaintiff was conducting lawful law enforcement duties.
17. Although Defendant was acting under color of his office, the conduct alleged
herein constituted an unauthorized misuse of official authority.
18. Defendant is sued in his official capacity solely for the First Cause of Action and
in his individual capacity for all remaining causes of action.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Official Misconduct—1 R. Stat. § 3114)
Official Capacity
19. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein.
20. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3114, “[a]ny individual who is a public servant and
commits an act relating to his office but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official
functions, where a reasonable person with his training, expertise, and experiences should know
that such act is unauthorized” is liable for Official Misconduct.
21. At all times relevant, Defendant Zoned_JJ was a public servant acting under color
of his official position as a member of the Ridgeway National Guard.
22. Defendant Zoned_JJ knowingly and intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s
lawful arrest of CharlesLXV by deploying a department-issued TB26 Taser against Plaintiff
without lawful justification.
23. At the time Defendant deployed force, Plaintiff was visibly engaged in the lawful
performance of official law enforcement duties, including the detention and arrest of a criminal
suspect.
24. As a graduate of the Law Enforcement Training Center, a reasonable public
servant with Defendant’s training and experience would have known that (1) Plaintiff was a
peace officer performing lawful duties; and (2) the use of force against Plaintiff constituted an
unauthorized and unlawful exercise of official authority.
25. The use of deadly force against a fellow law enforcement officer who posed no
imminent threat constituted an unauthorized exercise of official functions and a clear violation
of Defendant’s lawful authority.
26. Defendant’s actions were willful, malicious, reckless, and in conscious disregard
of Plaintiff’s rights and safety.
27. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s Official Misconduct, Plaintiff
suffered severe injury and death without lawful reason.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Wrongful Death—1 R. Stat. § 3109)
Individual Capacity
28. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein.
29. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3109, “[a]ny individual who causes the death of another
without legal cause or justification shall be wrongful death and liable for compensatory damages
and punitive damages up to $5,000.”
30. On February 21, while Plaintiff was actively engaged in the lawful performance
of his duties as a Sheriff’s Deputy.
31. Defendant, acting in his individual capacity and outside the lawful scope of his
employment, intentionally discharged his firearm at Plaintiff.
32. At the time deadly force was used, Plaintiff did not pose an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily harm to Defendant or any other person.
33. The decision to use deadly force was a personal, voluntary, and unlawful act
undertaken with reckless disregard for human life.
34. Plaintiff was visibly engaged in attempting to apprehend a subject for obstruction
of justice and was acting within the scope of lawful law enforcement authority.
35. Defendant’s use of deadly force was unnecessary, excessive, and without legal
cause or justification.
36. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff sustained fatal
injuries and died.
37. Defendant’s conduct was willful, reckless, and in conscious disregard for human
life.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Deprivation of Rights—1 R. Stat. § 3115)
Individual Capacity
38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein.
39. Pursuant to “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the State of
Ridgeway or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…”
40. Defendant, acting under color of law, but sued in his individual capacity, engaged
in courses of action which violated the plaintiff’s substantive rights to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
41. Defendant discharged his department-issued firearm at Plaintiff without any type
of justification and with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s life, safety, and well-being, killing
him as a result.
42. Defendant’s actions were done without any legitimate type of law enforcement
purpose or self defense purpose.
43. Defendant acted with purpose to cause harm unrelated to any legitimate
governmental objective.
44. Defendant’s actions exhibit deliberate intent of harming Plaintiff.
45. Defendant’s actions were intentional and were carried out with reckless disregard
of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
46. Defendant’s actions were so egregious that they “shock the conscience” as
established in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); see also Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
47. Defendant’s actions were willful, reckless, malicious, and in conscious disregard
of Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Assault—1 R. Stat. § 3103)
Individual Capacity
48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein.
49. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3103, “[a]ny individual who intentionally and voluntarily
caused the reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact to another
shall be liable for assault…”
50. At all times relevant, Defendant Zoned_JJ intentionally deployed force against
Plaintiff, including the use of a department-issued TB26 Taser and the subsequent brandishing
and firing of a department-issued firearm.
51. Defendant’s actions were intentional, voluntary, and directed at Plaintiff.
52. When Defendant deployed his conducted electrical weapon against Plaintiff,
Plaintiff was lawfully engaged in the performance of his duties and did not pose an immediate
threat to Defendant.
53. The deployment of the TB26 Taser caused Plaintiff to experience immediate fear
and apprehension of harmful physical contact.
54. Defendant personally and intentionally directed force toward Plaintiff, causing
Plaintiff to experience immediate and reasonable apprehension of harmful contact and imminent
death.
55. Additionally, when Defendant brandished and aimed his department-issued
firearm at Plaintiff, Plaintiff was placed in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury or death.
56. A reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have feared immediate harmful
or offensive contact under the circumstances.
57. Defendant acted outside the lawful scope of employment and without legal
privilege and is liable in his individual capacity.
58. Defendant’s conduct was willful, malicious, and without legal justification.
59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff suffered injury,
fear, and death.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Deprivation of Rights—1 R. Stat. § 3115)
Individual Capacity
60. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if
fully set forth herein.
61. Pursuant to “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the State of
Ridgeway or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress…”
62. A seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment when governmental termination
of a person's movement is effected through means intentionally applied. Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
63. Furthermore, the application of physical force to the body of a person with the
intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued. Torres v.
Madrid, 592 U.S. ___ (2021).
64. Defendant, acting under color of law but sued in his individual capacity,
intentionally applied deadly force to Plaintiff by discharging a firearm.
65. At the time Defendant used deadly force, Plaintiff was a law enforcement officer
visibly engaged in official duties, did not pose an immediate threat of death or serious bodily
harm to Defendant or others, and was not attempting to flee from lawful authority.
66. No reasonable officer in Defendant’s position could have believed such force was
lawful.
67. Defendant’s intentional shooting of Plaintiff constituted an unreasonable seizure
and excessive use of deadly force in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
68. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unconstitutional conduct,
Plaintiff suffered grievous injury and death.
69. Defendant’s actions were willful, reckless, malicious, and in conscious disregard
of Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff requests that the court grant relief as follows:
70. Declaratory relief as it relates to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of
action;
71. Punitive damages as allowed by law;
72. Injunctive relief, enjoining Defendant from conducting further acts as it relates to
the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action;
73. Compensatory damages; and
74. Any other relief that the court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted.
Date: 03/01/2026
_________________________________
JamesGardai, Esq.
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
Palmer, Ridgeway
D: fishfromocean
